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ABSTRACT 
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) serve a social mission, while also having to 
focus on financial sustainability. Microfinance emerged as an alternative to traditional aid 
to the poor and aims to help alleviate poverty through providing them with financial 
services. MFIs can be self-sustainable and even profitable through income generating 
activities. This twin goal of commercial viability and social mission has generated much 
scholarly interest in the competition between two seemingly incompatible logics of 
action. Assumptions about the incompatibility of profit and mission motives have 
dominated the literature and led to a neglect of how some MFIs may be successful in 
integrating both logics.  
This study elaborates on the specific actions and processes Chikum MFB Ltd, - a 
microfinance bank located in Owerri, Nigeria took to balance ‘nonprofit’ and ‘for-profit’ 
institutional logics. The findings reveal that the leadership’s commitment to integrated 
logics enabled the deployment of the required resources to meet its goals. Commitment to 
founding mission provided guidance for management decisions including workforce 
composition, products offerings and pricing and the operation of multiple outposts. Also, 
its integration of financial with nonfinancial services contributed to financial 
sustainability, since microcredit and its associated revenue is only one of several revenue 
streams.  
By adopting a case study approach, this qualitative study engaged in an in-depth 
investigation on why and how the bank engaged in sustainable microfinance practice. 
The interpretive approach was deployed to explore, seek understanding and interpret 
meaning from the interview transcripts and reviewed documents. Thematic analysis 
 
 
revealed five key themes that described the bank’s goal attainment strategies: 
shareholders’ avowed commitment to founding mission; human asset development; pro-
active poor products and services offering; innovative/strategic products pricing; and 
institutional competitive advantage. The interrelated themes also constituted the 
framework for the study’s findings. 
The findings underscore the need for commitment to the MFI’s organizational 
logics, for innovative and integrated approach to the needs of microfinance clients and to 
incorporate other revenue mechanisms to achieve financial sustainability. This study 
compliments the call to broaden the search for the double bottom-line objective to focus 
on understanding the effectiveness of different types of MFIs operating in different 
contexts. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
The microfinance strategy acknowledged across the world is one of the largest 
poverty alleviation tools in development and economic empowerment. It is a financing 
methodology designed to provide financial services to the active poor and other micro-
entrepreneurs traditionally excluded by conventional methods. The underlying logic is 
that ease of financial access to the active poor will enable them to acquire skills and 
productive assets and grow out of poverty. At the end of 2018, microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) reached an estimated 139 million borrowers, including six million in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Leading countries in the sector are India (47 million borrowers), Vietnam, 
Bangladesh, Peru, and Mexico (Microfinance Barometer, 2019). Notwithstanding, the 
practice has evolved over time from a microfinance of nonprofit orientation to a 
microfinance of market-based for-profit orientation (Conning & Morduch, 2011). It has 
evolved from primarily non-profit, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) actors that 
substantially depended on subsidies to accomplish their social goals to now a financial 
market of nonprofit and for-profit actors competing to provide financial services to the 
active poor. Though a successful microfinance practice, one that promotes the 
microfinance goal, also known as the double bottom line goal integrates simultaneously 
both social and financial logics (Reichert, 2016), and both academics and practitioners 
have stressed the importance of both profitability and outreach for the long-term 
sustainability of the industry, the results of integration has been inconclusive. 
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Problem Statement 
Previous studies investigating the success of the microfinance strategy have 
focused mostly on the two broad distinctions of ‘nonprofit’ and ‘for-profit’ microfinance 
orientations (Im & Sun, 2015). They distinguish between social and financial orientations 
with the claim that social and financial logics are negatively correlated. An emphasis on 
financial goal would undermine a microfinance institution’s social goal and vice versa 
(Pinz & Helmig, 2015). However, empirical evidence suggests that neither a strictly 
philanthropic path nor a fully commercial path has delivered institutions that optimize the 
goals of microfinance (Conning & Morduch, 2011; Cull et al., 2007). Less studied and 
warranting greater attention are microfinance institutions that integrate both commercial 
and financial institutional logics (Battilana & Lee, 2014). 
 In addition, the previous studies also overlooked or addressed only peripherally 
extenuating factors capable of shaping the success of the microfinance enterprise. Human 
needs are multi-dimensional and financial sustainability is not just the function of loans 
and interest rates but are shaped by social networks (Salamon et al., 2017), ownership 
and national contexts (Casselman et al., 2015), culture (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), and civil 
society (Bartley & Child, 2011; King & Pearce, 2010). Evidence from the related fields 
of impact investing (Child, 2016), social enterprises (Fitzgerald & Shepherd, 2018) and 
studies on hybridity (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Battilana & Lee, 2014; Jay, 2013) 
provide insight on how institutions / organizations could integrate logics to achieve 
organizational goals. 
This study explored the quest for the double bottom-line objective in the context 
of Nigeria’s 2005 streamlined microfinance banking scheme. Specifically, the study 
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investigated how institutional identity could foster and/or impede the simultaneous 
pursuit of social and financial goals in a microfinance bank.  
Statement of Purpose 
Conflicting financial and social orientations complicate the evaluation of 
microfinance success and the optimism of its ability to mitigate the needs of the active 
poor. The main objective of this study was to explore the quest for the double bottom-line 
objective in Chikum Microfinance Bank Ltd. I suggest that the realization of the 
microfinance objective is contingent upon key organizational factors – governance, 
integrated activity, and workforce composition – that shape how microfinance institutions 
experience the competing logics. To sufficiently gain a deep and holistic description that 
illuminates how institutional identity informs the actions of the board of directors, staff 
and management of the bank this study was done using the qualitative method. The 
collection of qualitative data to investigate the microfinance objective in a microfinance 
institution is uncommon in the microfinance literature. Previous studies generally have 
focused on quantitative data either of nonprofit or for-profit institutional orientation. This 
study will compliment prior works exploring integration of multiple logics in 
microfinance institutions as well as offer the basis for further investigations on 
microfinance institutions from the dual objective’s perspective. It equally responds to the 
call for investigations focused on understanding the effectiveness of different types of 
microfinance institutions operating in different contexts (Casselman et al. 2015; Zuru et 
al., 2016).  
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Research Question 
The aim of this study was to understand how the operators of Chikum MFB Ltd 
perceived and responded to the tensions of integrated logics in their bank. The study was 
guided by the following research question: how does a faith affiliated microfinance bank 
navigate the competing challenges of the double bottom line goal of microfinance 
strategy? 
Conceptual Framework of Institutional Logics: A lens for Exploring Integrated 
Logics in Chikum Microfinance Bank Limited 
The conceptual framework of institutional theory has been suggested as an 
appropriate lens for investigations into the sustainability of microfinance institutions 
(Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Battilana & Lee, 2014). Evidence from studies in the field of 
institutional theory and analysis provide insight on how institutions/organizations could 
integrate logics to achieve organizational goals, and in particular hybrid logics (Battilana 
& Dorado, 2010; Battilana & Lee, 2014; Jay, 2013; Fitzgerald & Shepherd, 2018; Pache 
& Santos, 2013; Sun & Im, 2015). The assumptions of institutional theory suggest that 
while institutional logics constrain the choice sets available to individuals, groups and 
organizations, logics also provide opportunities for those actors to socially construct and 
reconstruct logics in ways that reflect their interest (Greenwood, 2008; Davis et al., 
1997). Thus, the institutional logics framework was the most appropriate for this study.  
Using a case study design, and the analytical frameworks of institutional logics as 
lens this study investigated, a) how the two logics co-exist in Chikum Microfinance 
Bank, and b) how organizational identity (integrated logics) could foster and/or impede 
the pursuit of social and financial goals in Chikum Microfinance Bank Ltd. The study 
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developed a priori constructs to explore each of the study participant’s understanding of 
the microfinance dual objective, and their personal experiences of concrete application in 
the bank. Key areas of interest are how mission statement, hiring, pricing, lending policy, 
financial services (sources of evidence of commitment to integrated logics) typify 
activities in the bank.   
The remaining part of this chapter summarized the several steps taken to ensure 
quality and intellectual rigor to address the research interest and answer the research 
question starting with chapter two.  
Chapter two provides context to this dissertation, discussing briefly the history 
and background of Nigeria’s unique microfinance practice essential to understanding the 
significance of the investigation. It includes the country profile, the politics, economics 
and socio-religious structure of the nation state. The effects of the colonial system of 
administration which configured the entire social, legal and political life of the nation 
created an imbalance in socio-economic growth among the federating states long even 
after independence in 1960. Also, the system spurred the growth of indigenous voluntary 
associations designed to promote education, economic development and self-governance, 
not in the form of state and citizen partnership but as semi-independent bodies. The 
interplay between these structures separately and collectively helped to develop and 
promote the emergence of Nigeria’s regulated equity-financed microfinance banks, 
including the emergence of different ownership configurations. 
In chapter three I reviewed relevant literature on the microfinance practice, 
including the trade-off debate between social and financial objectives with a focus on 
institutional logics. The literature review revealed evidence of disparate results among 
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trade-off studies indicating the need to broaden investigation to other determinant factors 
of microfinance sustainability. The review also indicates that while studies focused on 
competing orientations are bourgeoning, insights from related fields that could advance 
the microfinance objective have largely been ignored. Related studies from the field of 
institutional theory and analysis provide insight on how institutions/organizations could 
integrate logics to achieve organizational goals, and in particular hybrid logics (Battilana 
& Dorado, 2010; Battilana & Lee, 2014; Jay, 2013; Fitzgerald & Shepherd, 2018; Pache 
& Santos, 2013; Sun & Im, 2015). 
The various steps employed in order to systematically apply the scientific method 
to address the research question, including the research design (logic of inquiry) and the 
methods (logistics of inquiry) is the focus of chapter four. The study relied primarily on 
semi-structured interviews and document review as data sources. The data from the 
interview transcripts and organizational documents were compared and contrasted to 
render visible issues that informants did or did not explicitly articulate as per the policies 
and activities of the bank. Data analysis consisted of a series of steps including data 
transcription, generating codes, defining and naming themes.  
The details of the findings of this investigation are presented in chapter five. Five 
key themes were generated from the study, and collectively they explained the bank’s 
goals attainment strategy: (a) shareholders’ avowed commitment to founding mission; (b) 
Human Asset Development (c) Targeted active poor products and services offering; (d) 
Innovative/Strategic products pricing, and (e) Institutional Competitive Advantage. The 
conclusion that was interpreted from the themes was that the bank is intentional about 
achieving the dual objectives, it pursued both financial and social goals through 
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integrated services. However, integrated services presented both internal and external 
challenges. This chapter illustrated how the bank addressed the challenges and how some 
of the data features provided the basis for the interpretation as well as answered the 
research question. 
The sixth and final chapter discusses the key findings of the study, linking them to 
existing literature. The significance of the findings to research and practice, the study’s 
limitations and future research opportunities are highlighted to conclude the chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND OF STUDY 
This chapter provides context to this dissertation, discussing briefly the history 
and background of Nigeria’s unique microfinance practice essential to understanding the 
significance of the investigation. It includes the country profile, the politics, economics 
and socio-religious structure of the nation state. The effects of the colonial system of 
administration which configured the entire social, legal and political life of the nation 
created an imbalance in socio-economic growth among the federating states long even 
after independence. Also, the system spurred the growth of indigenous voluntary 
associations designed to promote education, economic development and self-governance, 
not in the form of state and citizen partnership but as semi-independent bodies. The 
interplay between these structures separately and collectively helped to develop and 
promote the emergence of Nigeria’s regulated equity-financed microfinance banks, 
including the emergence of different ownership configurations. The subsequent sections 
detail the highlighted socio-historical context. 
Nigeria: Country Profile 
 
The case study of this dissertation focuses on a 
microfinance bank in Owerri, Nigeria. Owerri is the capital city 
of Imo State, one of the thirty-six states of Nigeria in addition 
to Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory. The states are grouped 
into six geopolitical zones, namely: North-Central, North-Eastern, North-Western, South-
Eastern, South-South, and South-Western. Owerri is located in the south eastern part 
geopolitical zone, home to the Igbos and one of the country’s three major ethnic groups. 
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The other two ethnic groups are the Hausa-Fulani in the North and the Yorubas in the 
West. Nigeria is situated in the Western part of Africa and lies between latitudes 10° 0' N 
and longitudes 8° 00' E, covering a total area of 923,768 sq. km. She shares boundaries 
with Benin to the west, Niger to the North, Cameroon to the east and the Atlantic Ocean 
to the south. The official language is English, though it has 250 ethnic groups and over 
500 languages and dialects (CIA Factbook, 2018; Falola, 1999, p.5). 
Nigeria operates a multi-party federal system of governance with three tiers of 
government – executive, judiciary and legislature – at the federal, state and local 
government levels. All elected offices have a four-year tenure; however, the 
gubernatorial and presidential seat can be run for a maximum of two-terms. The local 
government level comprises of 774 Local Government Areas. Owerri covers three of 
these local government areas namely, Owerri Municipal, Owerri West and Owerri North. 
It is densely populated with an estimated population of about 1,401,873 as of 2016. 
Religion occupies a central position in the life of the Nigerian people. Nigeria’s 
‘triple heritage’ of African Traditional Religions, Islam and Christianity creates a 
complex and fascinating situation (Country Profile: Nigeria 2016). Though a secular state 
with no state religion, political and economic life reflects a more complicated 
engagement with religious identity that varies by religion, ethnicity and region. The 
estimate is that about 48.8% of the population is Muslim, 49.3% is Christian, and 2.9% 
practice indigenous African religions. These figures are however contested (The Pew 
Forum, 2010; Country Profile: Nigeria 2016). Overall, the people are deeply religious. 
Recent studies identify Nigerians as the most religious people in the world (Huber and 
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Huber, 2012; Obadare, 2007). Owerri the heartland of Igboland is predominantly 
Christian with few people still practicing the African Traditional Religion.  
Nigeria has eight ecological zones, ranging from dry and intermediate savannah, 
through tropical rainforest to mangrove swamps and dry sandy areas – the varied climate 
makes for equally varied crops in the different regions, although only about one-third of 
the country’s arable land is being cultivated. With an estimated population of over 186 
million (UN, 2016), the average living conditions of the citizens remain poor by World 
Bank standard. This makes the country a veritable ground for the microfinance practice. 
The average banking density of Nigeria is one financial institution outlet to 32,700 
inhabitants in urban cities and 57,000 inhabitants to one bank in rural areas (CBN, 2005). 
With the National Financial Inclusion Strategy (NFIS) relaunched in 2012 and revised in 
2018, the percentage of Nigerians who own bank accounts and use formal financial 
services is still less than 63.2% in 2018. On their part, the inhabitants of Owerri are 
mostly agrarian engaged in cultivating yams, taro, corn (maize), rice, and cassava 
(manioc) as their staple crops, and oil palm is the main cash crop. They rely mostly on 
traditional and informal micro funding to grow their businesses. Nigeria has a total of 
nine hundred and eleven (911) licensed microfinance banks as at December 2019 located 
mostly in the city centers. Thirty-six of the banks are located in Imo State comprising 
twenty (20) Tier 2 Unit Microfinance Banks, thirteen (13) Tier 1 Unit Microfinance 
Banks and three (3) State level Microfinance Banks. There is no national level 
microfinance bank in the state (CBN, 2020). 
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Nigeria’s Socio-Political History 
The powerplay between colonialism, foreign religions and local culture are 
intricately related in understanding the structuration and functions of the Nigerian nation. 
The British colonial system created institutions that spurred the growth of indigenous 
voluntary associations designed to promote education, economic development and self-
governance. This section discusses indigenous historical context in which the country’s 
socio-historical context helps provide insight to the interlink between the microfinance 
double bottom-line objective and Nigeria’s streamlined microfinance banking scheme. 
The Legacy of Colonialism 
Nigeria was a colony of the Great Britain and gained her independence on 
October 1, 1960. The British colonial system laid the foundation that continues to 
influence policies and programs of the nation state even to the present day. Pre-colonial 
Nigeria was a varied and diverse body of ethnic entities broadly grouped under North and 
South. The Berlin Conference of 1884 -1885 which regulated European colonization and 
trade during the ‘scramble for Africa’ required European nations to show evidence of 
effective occupation for any territory to which they laid claim (Bassey, 1991). 
Accordingly, soldiers, traders, merchants, and missionaries alike were sent afield and 
used by the various imperial governments to satisfy this clause of the treaty (Bassey, 
1991, p. 39). To lay claim over Nigeria and consolidate its power the British colonial 
administration established the northern and southern “protectorates” in 1882.  And in 
1914 joined the two protectorates to create the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria with 
Frederick Lugard as the Governor-general.  
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Pre-colonial Nigerian communities were highly structured and functioned 
effectively. First, beginning with the North, Lugard established a policy of ‘indirect rule’ 
through the Fulani ruling classes in the north, leveraging the existing northern emir 
hierarchies. The overall goal was to use the traditional authorities as agents while 
reserving custodial powers to the colonial authorities. A few years later, and to establish a 
common system of law for the whole country the colonial administrator decided to 
introduce this system in the south as well and commissioned ‘warrant chiefs’ to rule the 
districts in the South. While the policy was effective in the North, it was resisted in the 
South as it destabilized traditional institutions due to the lack of social hierarchies in the 
South. Consequently, in the South the policy of indirect rule created a division between 
state and society leading to the emergence of “two publics” in the public sphere – the 
“primordial public” and the “civic public” (Ekeh, 1975). While the “civic public” 
consisted of ‘intermediaries’ between the colonial administrators and the natives in the 
public sphere, the “primordial public” responded to the needs of natives for public goods 
and services and consists of primordial groups, sentiments and activities that impinge on 
the public interest (Ekeh, p. 92).  
The “civic public” collected taxes and performed other local administrative tasks 
and never successfully integrated with the primordial public. Their alien origins and 
authoritarian character disconnected the “civic public” from the “natives” and the state 
apparatus they represented (for a detailed discussion on this, see Ekeh, 1977). Over time, 
the primordial public evolved to fill the gaps created by the contraption and functioned as 
an ‘exit site’ for those who felt alienated from the state as well as a parallel or ‘shadow 
state’ that provided public goods and services the state failed to provide (Osaghae, 2006, 
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p. 238). It introduced a trend that will characterize the provision of public services by 
groups and communities even after independence. The relevant point here however is that 
first, the colonial system of administration unintentionally spurred the growth of 
indigenous voluntary associations designed to promote education, economic development 
and self-governance, not in the form of state and citizen partnership but as semi-
independent bodies. And second, the effects of the policy of indirect rule will later 
configure the entire social, legal and political power-play creating an imbalance in socio-
economic growth among the federating states after independence. 
The Religious Factor 
Religion is a vital factor in any major issue in Nigeria. With colonialism came 
European missionaries in the nineteenth century. Increased industrial production meant 
new markets and plenty of raw materials for European industrialists. Chaplains 
accompanied traders not just to minister to them but also to convert Africans. They 
established missions at trading posts (Mbachirin, 2006), paving the way for the expansion 
of trade and the establishment of colonial rule. On its part, the colonial administration 
largely ignored or remained silent on religious activities in the colony. It encouraged 
religious conversion especially to Anglicanism, as part of their mandate to “civilize” 
Africa. While proselytization was left to individual convictions in the South they were 
vehemently opposed in the North. At the insistence of Hausa-Fulani leaders in the North, 
colonial administrators barred Christian missionaries from proselytizing in the North 
which later helped create socio-economic imbalance between the North and the South.  
As indirect vehicles of evangelization, the missionaries established various socio-
economic institutions that served as recruiting grounds for the churches as well as the 
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development of human resources to drive the institutions. Thus, while the south saw the 
rise of economic growth, urbanization and a skilled middle class through missionary 
education; the North had extensive agricultural production, little access to Western 
education and rampant poverty. The missions not only created the foundation for the 
socio-economic development of modern Nigeria but also provided the major intellectual 
inspiration to Nigerian activists who formed local associations out of which Nigerian 
nationalism emerged as an independence movement (Dzurgba, 1991). This resulted in a 
preponderance of Christians among Nigeria’s early nationalists and later to a state of 
mutual distrust between the South and the North at independence in 1960. The disunity 
introduced by colonial rule and foreign religions far before independence continues to 
give religion a stranglehold on the polity. 
In addition, while the policy of indirect rule favored the North from a political 
perspective, its rejection in the South played to the advantage of religious missionaries. In 
contrast to the “civic public”, religious groups especially foreign missionaries enjoyed the 
goodwill of the natives, connected with the “primordial public” filling the gap created by 
the state. The relationship between the religious missionaries and the natives were more 
cordial. In collaboration with the primordial public, European missionaries established 
institutions including schools, printing press, hospitals and garages etc., that became 
sources of revenues and training grounds for the churches. It enabled the organization of 
self-help groups and the partnership of religious groups with their local communities for 
development and economic initiatives. Thus from the very beginning the responses of 
religious groups to the needs of the citizenry has more to do with socioeconomic and 
political realities than with theological and philosophical conviction (Mbachirin, 2006). 
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And for these reasons religious groups are integral to the economic development of the 
Nigerian society. Religious leaders continued to make religious institutions relevant to 
the people even for economic activities. 
Independence and Military Rule 
With Independence in October 1960 the nationalist sought to establish control of 
the nation state and met with the enormous huddles inherited from colonialism. 
Independence came with many demands including uniting the diverse groups and the 
provision of public infrastructure. To address these needs, the government obviously 
needed partners, and such partners could be found locally among existing institutions, 
especially those established and run by Christian missionary societies. Colonial policy 
had given lots of latitude to religious control of social services especially in education 
and health. They unwittingly became the faces of “public goods and services” and 
economic empowerment than the state (Mbachirin, 2006, p.6). Thus, the assumed 
“threat” by these organizations existing in the Christian-dominated south created tension 
for the federal government run by the Muslim north. The tension has been well 
documented, “[T]he period 1966-1980 saw not only a rapid increase in the range of 
demands made on education but also a growing tendency on the part of the military 
government to challenge the missions' claim to popular recognition and acceptability in 
the educational process in Nigeria” (Ahanotu 1983, p. 334). 
Equally important, though Nigeria is a secular state with no state religion, 
political life in reality reflects a more complicated engagement with religious identity that 
varies by religion, ethnicity and region. The first civilian government after independence 
was ousted in a bloody military coup in 1966 led by a Southern Christian prompting 
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widespread accusation that the Moslem north was being politically marginalized and 
subsequently led to the civil war of 1967-1970. With the civil war and its attendant 
problems, the state’s secular foundation was seriously questioned after it has consistently 
failed to provide basic services to most Nigerians. Islamist allege that the “secular” 
government was in fact based on a European Christian and colonial model, hence 
inherently discriminatory towards Moslems and that corruption and poverty were 
evidence of secularism (Moore, 2016). On their part, ordinary Nigerian citizens with the 
deterioration of social values started to express anger and distrust towards their state and 
national governments accusing them of nepotism and tribalism. Nigeria's political and 
economic problems fed upon one another, forming a vicious cycle of poor economic 
performance, and loss of political legitimacy. In the face of growing economic and social 
problems including rapid urbanization, unemployment and poverty, successive Nigerian 
governments after independence adopted various solutions tailored towards religious and 
cultural differences. For instance, in the area of social welfare services and rural 
economic development, successive Nigerian governments introduced various micro 
finance schemes to empower rural communities. These schemes were modelled after the 
existing cultural and political structures already implicated by colonial system of 
administration. In all, political instability and military control of society led citizens to 
fall back on religious institutions for socioeconomic support and to the formation of 
secular civil society organizations agitating against military dictatorship.   
The Evolution of Nigeria’s Microfinance Practice 
The evolution of Nigeria’s microfinance practice can be categorized into two time 
periods: the period of informal/traditional self-help groups and the period of 
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formal/modern microfinance institutions. The practice of microfinance in Nigeria is 
culturally rooted and dates to the 1800s. Such cultural economic activities as “Esusu” 
among the Yorubas in the South West, “Adashi” by the Hausas in the North, and “Igba 
Utu” among the Igbos in the East, are forms of micro finance activities that are norms 
among the various cultures of the country (Abraham & Balogun, 21012; Acha, 2012; 
CBN, 2005). They are mainly Self-Help Groups (SHGs) or Rotating Savings and Credit 
Associations (ROSCAs) whose primary role is to provide funds for their members, 
individuals and group enterprises (Ayodeji, et al, 2015, p.34; Idolor & Eriki, 2012). “Igba 
Utu” among the Igbos as an example is a form of raising capital to meet socio-economic 
needs of the participants. Individuals form a group of “Igba Utu Association”, agree to 
make regular contributions (usually daily or weekly) to a fund which is given in whole or 
in part to each contributor in rotation (Nwabughogu, 1984; Osondu, 2011). Each member 
in his/her turn was entitled to the sum of these contributions. No other payment was 
exacted and, after receiving his/her share, s/he would continue to pay his/her weekly due 
until s/he had contributed the full amount which s/he had received. The purpose is to 
meet the specific needs of participants like the acquisition of land, purchase of household 
goods, building of houses, payment of debt and education of children, etc., 
(Nwabughogu, 1984).  
Successive Nigerian governments after Independence in their efforts at providing 
socio-welfare services and to empower rural communities, initiated series of publicly 
financed micro credit programs targeted at the rural and the urban poor modelled after 
these cultural economic practices. Notable among such programs include, the Nigerian 
Industrial Development Bank (NIDB) established in 1964, the Nigerian Agricultural and 
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Co-operative Bank (NACB) in 1973, the Rural Banking Scheme of 1977 which stipulated 
that Commercial Banks should open up a specified number of branches in the rural areas. 
Others include the National Directorate of Employment (NDE), and Nigerian 
Agricultural Insurance Corporation (NAIC) in 1988, the Peoples Bank of Nigeria (PBN) 
in 1989, the Community Banks (CBs) in 1990, and the Family Economic Advancement 
Program (FEAP) in 1997. In 2000, Government merged the NACB with the PBN and 
FEAP to form the Nigerian Agricultural Cooperative and Rural Development Bank 
Limited (NACRDB) to enhance the provision of finance to the agricultural sector. And in 
2001 it created the National Poverty Eradication Program (NAPEP) (Abraham & 
Balogun, 2012; Acha, 2012; Iganiga, 2008).  
 These interventions though helpful were not sustainable either in meeting 
government objectives or in poverty alleviation (CBN, 2005; Idolor & Eriki, 2012, p. 59). 
While scholars share differing opinions as to the reasons for the failures of these past 
initiatives, it is difficult not to link the failures to the nation’s historic past. It is argued 
that in most cases the schemes ended up funding inefficient and politically motivated 
schemes that resulted in limited outreach, high loan default rates, and unsustainable 
operations (Abraham & Balogun, 2012; Acha, 2012; Anyanwu, 2004). While Acha 
(2012) sees the reason for the failure of the interventions in the increasing sophistication 
of the economy; others insist the initiatives largely failed because of nepotism, partisan 
interests, political instability (incessant military coup d’état) leading to inconsistencies in 
economic policies (Abraham & Balogun, 2012; Acha, 2012; Anyanwu, 2004; Iheduru, 
2002). 
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The adoption of informal micro-credit schemes for socio-welfare services induced 
the growth of private sector-led micro finance. Again, individuals and groups found they 
could not depend on government sponsored micro-credit programs, resorting to reliable 
providers was inevitable. With the initiatives, government had adopted a top-down non-
profit oriented approach (Idolor, 2012, p. 59), and encouraged the participation of non-
governmental bodies like churches, mosques and other rural community development 
bodies. Some of their functions include provision of resources targeted at difficult-to-
reach clients and the poorest of the poor; capacity building and collaborating with other 
relevant stakeholders in assisting the active poor. The Community Banks of the 1990s for 
instance started as ‘grassroots’ unregulated banks owned and managed generally by 
community associations (Iganiga, 2008, p. 92). They depended solely on donations, 
grants, interests on loans, fees and contributions from their members, and were forbidden 
from mobilizing deposits from the general public. They have limited outreach due 
primarily to paucity of loanable funds and boundary limitations. Significant increases in 
the number of NGOs involved in microfinance activities and its attendant challenges to 
the economy led to the call for a shift in paradigm. 
To meet its commitment in achieving the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) – the United Nations Millennium Declaration of September 2000 that committed 
world leaders to combat poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, environmental degradation, 
and discrimination against women by 2015 – the Federal Government based on global 
trends in poverty alleviation conducted various studies, set up commissions and 
organized study tours to proffer solutions (Ujunwa, Salami & Umar, 2011). The outcome 
is the 2005 Federal Government Microfinance Policy Guideline (CBN, 2005). The new 
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guideline and its 2011 and 2013 revisions sought to integrate the informal financial sector 
into the national economy and institutionalize the microfinance practice. Any entity to be 
recognized as a microfinance institution must be licensed and regulated under the 
supervisory purview of the Central Bank of Nigeria. The new policy moved 
microfinancing from the domain of informal micro lending to a thriving industry of 
equity-financed deposit-taking microfinance institutions (Ehigiamusoe, 2006). 
Thus, the evolution of Nigeria’s microfinance practice can be categorized into two 
time periods: the period of informal/traditional self-help groups and the period of 
formal/modern microfinance institutions. Traditional microfinance period comprising 
mostly of the early informal cultural micro-credit activities to the 1960s and 1970’s when 
government started to dispense its socio-economic welfare programs modelled after the 
self-help practices and in conjunction with community development organizations 
(CDOs). The period was characterized by the growth of unregulated micro-credit 
institutions/organizations engaged in the provision of micro credits to their targeted 
population. It was also plagued by problems including operational inefficiencies, high 
default rates, and political favoritism (Adams & Von Pischke, 1992).  
The second period of formal/modern microfinance institutions started with 
government’s 1980’s and 1990’s economic policy direction towards privatization and 
commercialization of services informed by the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). 
The propelling force was the failures of government’s past poverty alleviation initiatives, 
increasing poverty rate and the need to tap into the growing emphasis all over the world 
in the effectiveness of microfinance banking in rural economic empowerment, and for 
better economic policy (Ayodeji, Adeusi & Ibotoye, 2015, p. 30; Acha, 2012; Lard & 
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Barres, 2007; Pham & Lensink, 2008). Institutionalized microfinancing was therefore 
canvassed to provide financial services such as financial education, credit, savings, micro 
insurance, micro leasing and payment services and to integrate the informal sector into 
the mainstream economy (CBN, 2005). This section described the evolution of 
microfinancing in Nigeria, the next section will present the era of the new microfinance 
banking scheme. 
The Era of Microfinance Banking Scheme 
Nigeria is Africa’s biggest economy. It operates a financial dualism of formal and 
informal financial sectors (Iganiga, 2008). While the formal financial sector operates 
within the integrated mainstream of national financial system comprising of the ministry 
of finance, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), conventional banks and other regulated 
financial institutions (Ofoegbu, 2013); the informal financial sector is as old as the 
various communities comprising unregulated, unsecured, unorganized, financial activities 
of people legally lending and borrowing directly from each other through such culturally-
rooted economic activities like “Igba utu”, “esusu”, “adashi”, daily contributions and 
self-help groups (Acha, 2012; Ofoegbu, 2013; CBN, 2005). The informal financial 
activities are legal and associated with a way of life, molded mostly by custom and 
tradition, rather than a conscious decision to remain outside the formal financial sector. 
The average banking density of Nigeria is one financial institution outlet to 32,700 
inhabitants in urban cities and 57,000 inhabitants to one bank in rural areas (CBN, 2005). 
A 2005 Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) estimate indicates that the formal sector serves 
only about 35% of the population while the other 65% are serviced by the informal 
financial sector. In addition, most of the 65% without access to the formal financial 
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services dwell in the rural areas (CBN 2005). Though more than 95% of the businesses in 
Nigeria are small and in rural areas (Acha, p.107), Ayodeji, Adeusi and Ibitoye (2015) 
estimates that less than 2 percent have access to financial institutions (p.37) because of 
their inability to provide asset-based collaterals. Those figures have moved upward in 
recent times.  
The inability of existing initiatives to yield the desired results on the one hand and 
the appeal to integrate the informal financial sector to the mainstream economy on the 
other led to the call for institutional alternatives for delivering financial services to the 
citizenry. The Nigeria government inaugurated the microfinance banking scheme with 
the 2005 Federal Government Microfinance Policy Guideline (CBN, 2005). The policy 
created a platform for the establishment of microfinance banks to ensure monetary 
stability and liquidity management by the CBN as well as provided appropriate 
machinery for tracking the activities of development partners in the microfinance sub-
sector (CBN, 2005; Gene Financial, p. 10). It has as objectives: 1) to make financial 
services accessible to a large segment of the potentially productive Nigerian population 
who otherwise would have little or no access to financial services. 2) to promote 
mainstreaming of the informal sub-sector into the national financial system; 3) to enhance 
service delivery by microfinance institutions to micro, small and medium entrepreneurs; 
4) to contribute to rural transformation; and 5) to promote linkage programs between 
universal/development banks, specialized institutions and microfinance banks (CBN, 
2005).  
Under the new guideline, any entity to be recognized as a microfinance institution 
must be licensed and regulated under the supervisory guideline of the Central Bank of 
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Nigeria (CBN). The policy provided for three categories of microfinance banks; unit 
microfinance banks (comprising two tiers: tier 1 licensed to operate in the urban and 
high-density banked areas of the society; and tier 2 unit microfinance bank licensed to 
operate in the rural, unbanked or underbanked areas), state-level microfinance bank 
(licensed to operate statewide), and national-level microfinance bank (licensed to operate 
nationwide) (see figure 2.1 below). Microfinance banks can be established by individuals, 
groups of individuals, community development associations, government agencies, 
private corporate entities, or foreign investors (CBN, 2012, 2005). Significant ownership 
diversification is encouraged to enhance good corporate governance
 
Equally the new policy established minimum capital requirements for the 
different categories. As at 2019 the minimum capital requirements are as follows: tier 1 
unit microfinance bank minimum capital requirement is two hundred million naira 
(₦200,000,000), tier 2 unit microfinance bank is fifty million naira (₦50,000,000), state-
level microfinance bank is one billion naira (₦1,000,000,000) and the minimum capital 
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requirement for national-level microfinance bank is five billion naira (₦5,000,000,000). 
Licensed microfinance banks have the responsibility to providing diversified, affordable 
and dependable financial services to the active poor in a timely and competitive manner, 
and to mobilize deposits from the public and help create employment opportunities and 
increase the productivity of the active poor in the country.  
Prior to 2005, various forms of microfinance institutions existed across the nation. 
With the new scheme green fielding institutions, former MFIs, and commercial bank 
microfinance subsidiaries also come to fall under the purview of the CBN microfinance 
banking regulations (Ulrich & Hoback, 2014). NGOs and faith-based organizations with 
existing microfinance services including newly established ones embraced the directive 
and registered microfinance banks to be able to continue their services. From the most 
recent available statistics (CBN, September 2019) Nigeria has a total of nine hundred and 
eleven (911) licensed microfinance banks, comprising of three hundred and twenty one 
(321) tier 1 unit microfinance banks; four hundred and forty-five (445) tier 2 unit 
microfinance banks; one hundred and thirty-four (134) state-level microfinance banks 
and eleven (11) national-level microfinance banks. In general, Nigeria’s microfinance 
banks (MFBs) are regulated equity-financed, for-profit deposit-taking institutions that 
could be established by individuals, groups of individuals, community development 
associations, government agencies, private corporate entities, or foreign investors (CBN, 
2012, 2005). 
Part of the uniqueness of Nigeria’s modern microfinance practice is that it unified 
both the nonprofit and for-profit orientations into a single umbrella of microfinance 
banking scheme. The new scheme did not only integrate best practices of traditional 
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schemes into its operational procedures and under the regulatory authority of the apex 
bank, it created a heterogenous sector of microfinance banks operating with varying 
origins and objectives. Its significance lies in the elimination of the distinction between 
“nonprofit microfinance institutions” and “for-profit microfinance institutions” common 
in other countries. It enabled the emergence of “hybrid ideals” (Clark, Emerson, & 
Thornley, 2014) in Nigeria’s microfinance banking institutions – commercial 
microfinance banks focused on social mission. The ‘nonprofit character’ resides now 
with the promoters of the bank and not with the microfinance bank itself.  
This phenomenon is not without precedent. It followed from the country’s socio-
historic context underlined above. Religious entities have long engaged in for-profit 
activities as sources of revenue and training grounds for their members. The responses of 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in particular religious bodies in economic 
empowerment activities have had more to do with socio-economic, political and religious 
realities than a theological and philosophical conviction (Mbachirin, 2006). The 
phenomenon of commercial microfinance banks exhibiting hybrid ideals can be found 
with microfinance institutions with religious or faith-based foundations. They provide a 
veritable lens for investigating the microfinance double bottom line objective. The next 
section discusses how faith-based groups came to be vital in Nigeria’s socio-economic 
provisioning. 
Nigeria’s Faith-affiliated Microfinance Banks 
The unique phenomenon of Nigeria’s faith-rooted microfinance banks stems from 
the country’s socio-historic antecedents. First, different socio-historical contexts lead to 
different patterns of social welfare provisioning (Salamon & Anheier, 1998; Salamon, 
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Sokolowski & Haddock, 2017). In Nigeria the historic pattern of power relationships 
between the locals and the British colonial administration unwittingly enabled religious 
nonprofits to become the faces not only of public goods and services but also of 
economic empowerment (Mbachirin 2006, p. 6). Colonial system of administration 
encouraged religious groups to address social and religious needs that also had economic 
consequences rather than political. Religious missionaries in the colony from the very 
beginning provided public goods and services such as schools, markets, dispensaries, 
scholarships, and water supply which paved the way for new economic activities 
(Enwerem, 1995, p. 26). Thus, religious organizations were not new nor averse at seeking 
both social and financial goals through for-profit outfits, more specifically in the 
economic empowerment of rural communities.  
The 2005 streamlined federal government microfinance scheme prompted the 
emergence of a unique form of microfinance institutions - the emergence of microfinance 
banks of new institutional identity, whose core logic or logic of existence is “hybrid 
ideal”. “Hybrid ideal” is a term promoted by Jed Emerson for organizations where social 
value and commercial revenue are non-divisible, where everything it does produces both 
social and commercial revenue (www.blendedvalue.org). Many faith-based organizations 
with existing microfinance services including newly established ones embraced the 
directive and registered microfinance banks to participate in the new scheme. This form 
of microfinance institutions is particularly valuable for exploring the pursuit of the 
microfinance double bottom line objective. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter reviews relevant literature on the microfinance practice, including 
the trade-off debate between social and financial objectives with a focus on institutional 
logics. The findings reveal evidence of disparate results among trade-off studies 
indicating the need to broaden investigation to other determinant factors of microfinance 
sustainability. The review also indicates that while studies focused on competing 
orientations are bourgeoning, insights from related fields that could advance the 
microfinance objective have been ignored. Relevant studies from the field of institutional 
theory and analysis provide insight on how institutions/organizations could integrate 
logics to achieve organizational goals, and in particular hybrid logics (Battilana & 
Dorado, 2010; Battilana & Lee, 2014; Jay, 2013; Fitzgerald & Shepherd, 2018; Pache & 
Santos, 2013; Sun & Im, 2015). 
The chapter is organized as follows: first we summarize the evolution of the 
microfinance practice to situate the debate on microfinance double bottom-line objective. 
One major problem of prior studies is the assumption that profits and mission are 
mutually exclusive and cannot be pursued simultaneously. To overcome this limitation, 
the chapter considers frameworks capturing complimentary relationships in hybrid 
organizations (Abzug & Webb, 1999; Frumkin, 2002; Salamon, 2012). We examine 
specifically the institutional logics perspective to understand the potential for 
compatibility of the microfinance dual logics. The theoretical framework of institutional 
logics predicts institutions have central logics that regularize behavior, provide 
opportunity for agency and change, and are capable of new logics and or new institutions. 
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Interrelations between logics through integration, aggregation, compartmentalization or 
subordination has the potential to engender new practices and or institutions (Murray, 
2010; Reay & Hinings, 2009). Such a lens is useful for examining how a microfinance 
bank within the context of Nigeria’s microfinance scheme may promote the microfinance 
objective - sustainable provision of microfinance services to the active poor.     
The Evolution of The Microfinance Strategy 
The microfinance strategy acknowledged across the world is today one of the 
largest poverty alleviation tools in the development sector. At the end of 2018, 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) reached an estimated 139 million borrowers and an 
estimated credit portfolio of $124 billion. Leading countries in the sector are India (47 
million borrowers), Bangladesh, Vietnam, Mexico and Peru (Microfinance Barometer, 
2019). It is a financing methodology that employs effective collateral substitutes to 
provide financial services to the active poor and other micro-entrepreneurs traditionally 
excluded by conventional banking services. The underlying logic is that by providing 
financial services and access to the poor, microfinance clients will acquire skills, 
productive assets and grow out of poverty.  
This is made possible through the unique characteristic features of the 
microfinance strategy. Per the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), microfinance 
distinguishes its financial services from other formal financial institutions in three ways: 
1) the smallness of loans advanced and/or savings collected; 2) the absence of asset-based 
collateral, and 3) simplicity of operations (CBN, 2011). Microfinance products and 
services consists of both financial and other ancillary nonfinancial services targeted to 
meet the needs of low-income clients. Microfinance financial services include, but not 
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limited to microcredits/loans, savings, deposits, insurance, business education and fund 
transfer. It also includes provision of working capital, informal/formal appraisal of 
borrowers, guarantees, savings remittances and equity. Nonfinancial services refer to 
various social intermediations including group formation, training in financial literacy 
and management practices (Hulme & Mosley, 1996). It also involves organizing citizens’ 
group to voice their aspirations and raise concerns for consideration by policy makers and 
develop their self-confidence (Ledgerwood, 1999). 
Microfinance products and services are often directed at low-income earners and 
small enterprises. Low-income people have relatively small amount of income to invest 
which has implications on transactional cost, and the fund absorptive capacity of 
microenterprises is low. Access to financial services entails providing small units of 
services structured to reflect the absorptive and debt capacity of the service users. Sizes 
and frequency of loans/savings are determined by the ability of the clients. Small loans 
are disbursed at earlier cycle according to lower debt capacity of new clients. It also 
serves to test the credit worthiness of newer clients. Repeat loans ensure that impact of 
utilization of financial services is maximized. Micro-enterprises require several cycles of 
financial support to grow to maturity (Okafor, 2014). 
Irobi (2008) defines microfinance as the provision of services such as credit 
(loans), savings, micro-leasing, micro-insurance and payment transfers to economically 
active poor and low-income households to enable them to engage in income generating 
activities or expand/grow their small businesses. While many people agree that 
microfinance can make a great deal of difference in the lives of the poor, access to these 
products and services are one of the greatest challenges of the active poor. Ehigiamusoe 
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(2008) noted that conventional banking practice places primacy on provision of collateral 
as condition precedent for credit. Tangible assets are pledged as securities for credit. The 
reasoning is that a credible threat of loss of pledged assets serves as enough motivation 
for loan repayment. It mitigates the lender’s risk by transferring it to the borrower to 
avoid nonpayment. The poor and micro entrepreneurs are excluded or denied accesses to 
financial services on account of their inability to provide tangible assets as collateral for 
credit facilities. Microfinance begins with the recognition that the poor or owners of 
micro-enterprises do not exercise command over assets as titled land and stocks often 
demanded by conventional banks. To mitigate risks of delinquency in lieu of collateral 
requirements, microfinance providers adopt a mixture of techniques. Microfinance 
operators use a combination of group-lending, individual lending, dynamic incentives, 
regular repayment as collateral substitutes. For instance, the use of guarantors for 
individual lending and group formation for group-lending. Group lending basically refers 
to a process whereby prospective clients form groups voluntarily for the purposes of 
accessing loans. Social solidarity provides joint liability for underwriting, monitoring and 
enforcement of loan contracts.  
Through these products and services microfinance enables the active poor to 
move from everyday-for-survival to planning for the future, investing in better nutrition, 
their children’s education and health and empowering women socially (Ehigiamusoe, 
2005). The continuous expansion of microfinance as just highlighted will have an 
economic impact not only on the individual, the household and the community, but may 
also impact on a country’s economic and political stability as well (Valadez & Buskirk, 
2011).  
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The Emergence of Modern Microfinance 
Over the past three decades the field of microfinance has evolved from what was 
originally a nonprofit microcredit lending to a for-profit microfinance of a “new source of 
investment returns” (Pinz & Helmig, 2015, p. 489; Sparke, 2012). Microcredit refers to 
the traditional practice of providing short, small scale loans to the poor and needy to 
establish small enterprises to grow out of poverty (Bogan, et al., 2007; Okafor, 2014; 
Olanike & Adebola, 2014). While an aspect of microfinancing, microcredit is only one 
component of the larger array of micro finance services (Ayodeji et al., 2012; Idolor & 
Eriki, 2012). Though some authors tend to use the terms interchangeably microcredit is a 
precursor of microfinance. Microcredit is an century’s old traditional practice of 
extending small credits to rural population for self-employment projects that generate 
income, allowing them to care for themselves and their families (Hashemi & Morshed, 
1997). For instance, Jonathan Swift is credited to have introduced the first microcredit 
program in the 18th century to provide loans to Irish poor farmers without collateral. 
Similarly, in Germany, Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen developed the idea of a financial 
cooperative which rapidly spread throughout Europe and then to the rest of the world in 
the mid 19th century (Yahaya, Osemena & Abdulraheem, 2011). In Nigeria like other 
parts of Africa, scholars document evidences of microcredit practices such as “Isusu”, 
“Adashi” “Otataje” etc., which are practiced by cultural communities over centuries to 
provide funds for self-help and community projects (Iganiga, 2008). 
In general, microcredit refers to making small loans available to poor people, 
especially those traditionally excluded from financial services, through programs 
designed specifically to meet their particular needs and circumstances. Though the 
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practice may appear to differ from country to country, the defining characteristics 
include: the size of loans are micro; target users are microentrepreneurs and low income 
households; fund is used for income generation and enterprise development and also for 
community development projects; and the terms and conditions are flexible in terms of 
collateral and suited to the local conditions of the community (Bogan, Johnson & 
Mhlanga, 2007). Over time, development support agencies and governments desiring to 
improve productivity and living conditions of rural populations adopted the practice to 
mitigate poverty (Hulme & Moore, 2006). The tremendous success of microcredit 
programs in reaching poor women in rural areas, coupled with exceptionally high rates of 
loan recovery, soon attracted the attention of international donor community. The 
popularity inspired academic interest in the topic, leading to the coinage of the term 
microfinance in the late 1990s (Elahi and Rahman, 2006). It also brought enormous 
changes to the practice. First, the growing recognition of the importance of and need for 
additional services beyond microcredit (loans), expanded the concept of microcredit to 
microfinance. Second, it focused attention on overcoming the structural barriers to 
providing savings and credit services to the poor including information asymmetries, lack 
of collateral, high cost, high risk and systematic market bias (Okafor, 2014).  
Many scholars attribute the evolution to modern microfinance to two 
developments. First, some scholars point to the New Public Management (NPM) regime 
and the related neoliberal demands for market-based approach in public governance in 
general and in the Nonprofit Sector in particular (Eikenberry & Mirabella, 2017). While 
the NPM regime promoted contractual partnership between public sector and social 
actors in addressing all types of collective problems in society (Dean 2015; Henriksen, 
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Smith, and Zimmer 2012); the neoliberal approach to governance demands market-like, 
individualized and data-driven solutions that can be evaluated by well-defined 
measurable criteria from participants in public service provisioning (Dean, 2015; Ruzza, 
2014; Schmitz, Raggo & Bruno-van Vijfeijken, 2012). Propelled by the associated 
factors, nonprofit and voluntary organizations involved in public service provisioning 
faced more explicit demands for accountability, transparency, and financial responsibility 
(Eikenberry, 2009). The trend also affected the microfinance industry as microfinance 
providers relying on foundations and government grants were pressured to adopt 
financial ratios as evidence of sustainability.  
Second, while the pressure on nonprofit organizations to provide evidence of 
performance through transparency and effectiveness spilled into the microfinance 
industry, the success of microfinance itself engendered new issues. The worldwide 
achievements of microfinance in social outreach and their success as profitable ventures 
(Idolor & Eriki, 2012; Mersland, D’espallier & Supphellen, 2013; World Bank & DFID, 
2010) attracted new entrants into the field for two separate reasons. On the one hand, the 
success of microfinancing as profitable enterprise sparked interest from commercial 
banks and venture capitalists, and on another, their achievements in social outreach 
attracted interest from governments and social entrepreneurs interested in making money 
doing good (CGAP, 2007). The influence of these factors ushered in new emphasis into 
the field and changed the landscape of the microfinance industry. Much of the emphasis 
shifted from subsidized credit delivery of programs by nongovernment organizations 
(NGOs) and nonprofit organizations (NPOs) to investor-financed commercial 
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microfinance by for-profit organizations with emphases on profitability. It also saw to the 
emergence of the broad distinctions of ‘nonprofit’ and ‘for-profit’ MFIs. 
The Emergence of Competing Conceptions 
 The shift towards a greater business focus set the stage for the emergence of two 
competing conceptions in microfinance study – a distinction between nonprofit and for-
profit microfinance orientations. While those who pioneered microfinance and view it as 
a strategy for empowering the poor (Roy, 2010; Yunus, 2007) insist on a nonprofit-based 
approach (Pinz & Helmig, 2015), for-profit actors promote microfinance using business-
like strategies and see no conflict between making money and making change (Deneulin 
& Rakodi, 2011; Edwards, 2015). This framing is reflected in two competing institutional 
logics (Im & Sun, 2015): nonprofit MFIs operating with social-welfare logic and the 
other, for-profit MFIs operating with commercial logic. Nonprofit MFIs are more socially 
oriented and tend to tolerate low profitability to increase outreach (Conning, 1999; 
Meyer, 2015), while for-profit MFIs are more focused on financial metrics at the expense 
of outreach to the poor (Cull, Demirgii P-Kunt & Morduch, 2007; Hermes & Lensink, 
2011; World Bank, 2015). The schism is not without consequences; on one hand, the 
emerging venture-capitalists are blamed for creating a global ‘poverty capital’ through 
insistence on market driven performance evaluation (Roy, 2010; Sparke, 2012), while the 
pioneers are accused of lacking accountability and transparency (Beisland, Mersland & 
Randoy, 2014).  
Though there are some merits on both sides, empirical evidence suggests that 
neither a strictly philanthropic path nor a fully commercial path has delivered institutions 
that optimize the goals of microfinance (Conning & Morduch, 2011). Academics, 
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practitioners and funders interested in solving “the poor’s problems” have stressed the 
importance of both profitability and social outreach not only for the long-term 
sustainability of the sector but more so to realizing the microfinance objective. However, 
the ability to achieve these ‘dual missions’ simultaneously remains a contentious issue of 
debate (Reichert 2016). The challenge concerns whether MFIs can be financially 
sustainable and at the same time achieve outreach performance. Also, the commercial 
focus has raised issues of outcome measurement in the industry. In all, the shift towards a 
greater business focus seemed to have drowned out other potential factors capable of 
achieving the microfinance goal. Thus, progress in the industry continues to be bugged 
by debates between the social and financial performance of MFIs. 
Research on Competing Institutional Logics among Microfinance Institutions  
Conceptually, the debate on the trade-off between social and financial objectives 
of microfinance institutions (MFIs) is rooted in the two major distinctions of “nonprofit 
MFIs” and “for-profit MFIs” which itself is linked to the way the field has evolved over 
the years. Nonprofit MFIs promoted by pioneer advocates such as the Bangladesh 
Grameen Bank model see microfinance as an effective tool in the fight against poverty 
and economic empowerment of the poor. They tend to be socially oriented, to provide 
financial services to microfinance clients based on the social welfare logic (see Table 1, 
for a sketch of the three types and characteristics of microfinance institutional logics). 
The social-welfare logic builds on the framework of creating solidarity institutions such 
as NGOs and cooperatives to subsidize financial services to poor clients (Yunus, 2007). 
Based on the logic of subsidization and relying mostly on donors, philanthropists and 
government grants, nonprofit MFIs provide financial services at interest rates at less than 
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market rates. The emphasis is mostly on greater level of outreach, affordable cost of 
financial services to microfinance clients and tend to tolerate low profitability to increase 
outreach (Conning, 1999; Meyer, 2015). 
On the other hand, for-profit MFIs use the commercial logic to offer similar 
services to microfinance clients. Based on the commercial logic, for-profit MFIs builds 
on the framework that market rates are essential for sustaining financial services and for 
profitability. Conscious of the limited capacity of donors to meet the huge demand for 
microcredit, protagonists argue profitability ratios attracts high net-worth investors into 
the market. They typically demand very high interest rates from their clients to cover 
transaction cost related to their services delivery. They tend to be financially oriented and 
more likely to pursue high profitability than to increase outreach (Cull et al., 2007; 
Hermes et al., 2011). For-profit MFIs supported by international organizations such as 
the World Bank, the United Nations and the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor 
(CGAP) are profit-oriented, concerned with whether an institution earns enough revenue 
to cover its full costs without subsidies (Zeller & Meyer, 2002). 
The above distinction is also visible in the academic studies focused on this field. 
While most agree that the core objective of the microfinance is to provide the active poor 
with access to financial services on a sustainable basis (Bassem, 2012, p. 92), scholars 
lack consensus on attaining the objective. Extant literature on microfinance has focused 
mainly on those broad distinctions in their study of microfinance success (Pinz & 
Helmig, 2015). It is argued that social (outreach) and commercial (financial) performance 
conflict with each other especially in providing services to rural poor communities. Some 
studies question the feasibility of achieving both goals simultaneously, because an 
37 
 
 
 
emphasis on financial sustainability would induce the microfinance institution (MFI) to 
reallocate its loan portfolio to favor larger loans and undermine its primary objective of 
greater depth of outreach (Abate, Borzaga & Getnet, 2014; Annim, 2012; Conning, 1999; 
Hermes et al., 2011; Mersland & Strøm, 2008;). Some others suggest a mixed outcome 
(Crawford, Skully &Tripe, 2011, Kar, 2012), and still a third group assert that the 
relationship between sustainability and outreach can work in harmony (Lebovics, Hermes 
& Hudon, 2016; Meyer, 2015; Quayes, 2015). 
Three Research Camps: Complementary, Competing, and Independent Logics of 
Action 
The microfinance literature can be divided into three camps:  those that find both 
logics to be broadly complementary and positively reinforcing; those that describe logics 
as incompatible and conflictual; and those that argue that the two logics do not 
necessarily interact and operate independently from each other. All three separately and 
collectively help to focus attention on the challenges of the sector, identify areas of 
further investigation, and make suggestions on how to better sustain financial services to 
microfinance clients. 
Complementary Institutional Logics 
The first camp prescribes to the view that the two institutional logics are 
complimentary. This view held by institutions such as the World Bank, the Consultative 
Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) and USAID, argues that social and financial 
sustainability are complimentary (Lebovics et al., 2016). High financial returns lead to 
more investment in the poor, and increased outreach to poor clients increases 
profitability. Larger numbers of poor clients can be serviced once an MFI becomes 
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financially sustainable and increased outreach to poor clients earn higher portfolio yields 
as higher risks lead to higher returns. For instance, a larger pool of poor clients (social 
outreach) attracts additional funding from investors and private donors; and depth of 
outreach has the tendency of increasing profitability as people with bad or no credits tend 
to pay higher interest rates than those with good credit. This position finds support in the 
study done by Quayes (2015). 
Quayes (2015) used a panel of 764 MFIs from 87 countries to analyze the 
possibility of trade-off between outreach and performance. The study found that 
increased depth of outreach (social performance) has a statistically significant positive 
impact on the financial sustainability of MFIs indicating that depth of outreach can 
increase profitability. Similarly, Meyer (2015) conducted a panel study with 1,508 
observations and found that institutions with more social engagement in terms of 
outreach to the poor earn higher portfolio yields, hence the expected trade-off between 
social and financial factors does not seem to exist. Interestingly, both Meyer and Quayes 
used two different mechanisms to achieve similar results.  While in Quayes’ higher 
financial returns lead to more investment in the poor, Meyer (2015) finds that depth of 
outreach increases financial sustainability due to higher returns.  
Several other studies including Bassem (2012), Lebovics et al. (2016), and Piot-
Lepetit and Nzongang (2014), also found no supporting evidence of trade-off. Lebovics 
et al’s (2016) study analyzed the relationship between financial and social efficiency in a 
context of implicit subsidies by state and international donors. Using data from a sample 
of 28 Vietnamese MFIs, they found no evidence to support the claim of a trade-off. 
Rather their analysis suggests that subsidies on which most Vietnamese MFIs operate 
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helps them to reach high financial efficiency, and at the same time attain social goals. 
Interestingly, their study also notes that while in principle larger number of poor people 
will be served by a financially sustainable microfinance institution, the mechanism did 
not assist the poor leap out of poverty. This may be indicative that at the practical 
individual level, higher profitability may not always serve the interest of most 
microfinance clients. 
Incompatible Institutional Logics 
Trade-off scholars based on the notion that social and financial outcomes are 
mutually exclusive claim that emphasis on social performance (outreach) involves 
additional financial costs, which entails bad financial performance (Bassem, 2012; 
Reichert, 2016). Some of the studies indicating existence of trade-off including Annim 
(2012), Conning (1999), Hermes et al., (2011), and Mersland & Strøm (2008), argue that 
social outreach and profitability are negatively related. They argue based on their studies 
that smaller loans associated with poorer clients entail higher per unit transaction cost. 
Greater outreach means higher financial cost which would have a negative impact on 
efficiency. Hermes and Lensink (2011) analyzed the impact of microfinance on social 
and economic situation of the poor in developing nations, and whether there is a trade-off 
between sustainability and outreach using new empirical evidence from eight original 
contributors to the World Development journal. Their analysis claim that strong evidence 
of trade-off exists between outreach and sustainability. Aiming for sustainability does 
compromise the social goals (Hermes & Lensink, 2011, p. 880). It is costlier for an MFI 
to serve remote rural and poorer communities as compared to urban poor clients. Their 
finding is further supported by Kablan (2012). Kablan (2012) studied 104 MFIs in 
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countries of the West African Monetary Union, and found evidence that outreach is 
negatively related to the cost efficiency of MFIs. Also, another recent cross-country study 
suggests that unsubsidized MFIs may differ in terms of social performance (D’Espallier, 
Hudon & Szafarz, 2013).  
Independent Institutional Logics (Mixed or Hybrid) 
The third group technically branded the ‘mixed outcome’ group argue that social 
and financial outcomes are not necessarily substitutes and do not always coincide 
(Bassem, 2012; Crawford et al., 2014). Profitability and social efficiency follow their 
own track (Serrano-Cinca, Gutierrez-Nieto & Molinero, 2011). Financial efficiency is not 
an undesirable outcome for socially oriented MFIs and financially oriented MFIs can still 
efficiently reach the most number of clients. Social and financial efficiency could depend 
on a number of endogenous factors to the microfinance institution (Abraham & Balogun, 
2012; Acha, 2012; Iganiga, 2008). For instance, a focus on profit could attract more 
clients possibly due to efficient operations and access to cheaper capital while a focus on 
outreach could lead to higher profits or losses with increased number of clients. Bassem 
(2012) who studied 64 microfinance institutions consisting of three North African 
countries and six Middle East countries, found evidence of mixed outcome that stems 
from the desire of microfinance institutions to reduce their portfolio at risk. It did not 
prove that having good financial performance and serving the poorest were contradictory, 
rather the difference stems from the desire of an MFI to reduce their portfolio at risk. 
Crawford et al.’s (2014) study also supports the argument of mixed outcome but for a 
different reason. Using data from Cambodian MFIs, Crawford et al., (2014) found that 
for-profit focused MFIs are no less efficient at reaching the poor than non-profit ones, 
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and socially focused MFIs do not necessarily sacrifice financial efficiency in order to 
maximize their outreach (p.16). Though serving poorer clients is associated with 
additional cost implications (see Abate et al., 2014; Hermes et al., 2011; Kablan, 2012), 
the study found many Cambodian MFIs irrespective of their institutional types are 
becoming less outreach efficient over time due to growing emphases on profitability. 
Microfinance institutions can achieve outreach goals alongside continued profitability 
through the adoption of several approaches including technology and better government 
regulations. Based on mixed evidence from studies examining trade-off between social 
and financial performance, this review turns to relevant studies from related fields for 
other determinant factors of organizational success. 
Why are there three camps of scholarship with competing claims about 
microfinance? 
Studies cover different empirical evidence 
From the preceding, the studies seem to provide empirical evidence in favor of the 
various camps. Most of the empirical studies both qualitative and quantitative provide 
insights on nonprofit and for-profit orientations and on social and financial objectives. At 
the same time, the evidences in themselves help confirm that the trade-off debate is not 
over, if for no other reason, there are only divergent results. On the other hand, the 
studies share some commonalities that raise some questions including methodological 
approach. The analysis of the literature indicates that cited studies relied on datasets from 
different countries and regions for their analysis, assume that MFIs are homogeneous 
within and outside of countries and regions, and with comparable products and services; 
and focused mainly on the two competing distinctions of “nonprofit microfinance 
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institutions” and “for-profit microfinance institutions” in their respective social and 
financial orientations in investigating claims of social and financial trade-off (Pinz & 
Helmig, 2015; Im & Sun, 2015). Separate and collectively, these commonalities could be 
problematic for a number of reasons. 
First, the competing orientations though helpful in advancing the strategy 
underserves the microfinance practice and could present ominous consequences for 
microfinance clients especially in developing countries where the services are most 
needed. Beyond the two distinctions of nonprofit and for-profit orientations and their 
respective emphasis on social and financial objectives, the studies (see Meyer, 2015; 
Quayes, 2015, etc.) rarely investigates performance outcomes among microfinance 
institutions sharing same institutional logics or distinguish between regions and service 
methodologies in cases of comparative data analysis. The studies (see e.g., Bassem, 2012; 
Cull et al., 2007; Pinz and Helmig, 2015, etc.) rather relied on datasets from different 
countries and regions for their analysis, assume that MFIs are homogeneous within and 
outside of countries and regions, and with comparable products and services. This is not 
always the case. Although MFIs are found in many developing countries, they differ 
greatly in their nature and importance (Ulrich & Hobach, 2014; Zuru et al., 2016, p. 456). 
Theory suggests that microfinance varies enormously, works differently in different 
regions and available to a wide range of people in a variety of contexts (Van Rooyen et 
al., 2012, p. 2250). As alternative approach, Balkenhol and Hudon (2011) suggest 
comparisons of trade-off in MFI operations are best carried out within a single country 
context. 
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Studies on Institutional Logics in Related Fields 
The review of the microfinance literature in this study further confirms prior 
findings from scholarship in the nonprofit sector that scholars often are interested in 
competition between nonprofit and for-profit orientations (Abzug & Webb, 1999; 
Frumkin, 2002; Salamon, 2012) than on their complimentary relationship. All 
organizations, to some extent, demonstrate both commercial and social logics along a 
continuum, rather than a duality. The extent to which there are clearly distinct logics or 
identities for nonprofits and for-profits remains unclear (Fitzgerald & Shepherd, 2018). 
Though there are fundamental differences guiding social and financial motives, focusing 
on evidence of complementary relationship than on finding trade-off may advance the 
double bottom-line objective of microfinance better than the current approach. 
Complimentary approach has also been supported by some recent studies in related 
fields. For instance, Child’s (2016) study in the related field of social enterprises found 
evidence to suggest that social enterprises in the fair trade and socially responsible 
investing (SRI) industries are quite dependent on philanthropic support, indicating that 
market approaches are not completely independent of charitable ones. There is no 
evidence to suggest the field of microfinance is different, though it remains to be 
empirically verified. 
Also, overt emphasis on financial and business-like approach ignores other 
methodologies in investigating success of the practice. And, one reason knowledge about 
other determinants of MFIs’ success remains relatively scarce (Mersland et al.’s, 2011). 
Pinz and Helmig’s (2015) study is one study that acknowledges the need to include other 
success factors in addition to social and financial orientations in investigating the success 
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of microfinance institutions. They have for instance suggested the need to address 
efficiency, financial and social performance ratios simultaneously (p. 490), and the 
deployment of technology. Broadening the scope of the investigation may reveal there is 
more than what we currently know.  
Much more relevant, the review indicates prior studies overlooked or addressed 
only peripherally the external environment in which microfinance institutions operate. 
Though the microfinance literature addresses several relevant topics including social 
outreach (Casselman, Sama, and Stefanidis, 2015; Quayes, 2015), financial sustainability 
and governance (Im & Sun, 2015), there are several other factors to organizational 
success. This is relevant considering the multi-dimensional nature of human needs. The 
literature from related fields including development (Deneulin & Rakodi, 2011), social 
enterprises (Fitzgerald & Shepherd, 2018) and social economy (Child, 2016) underscore 
the import to search beyond microfinance itself in investigating what makes for 
sustainability in microfinance practice. For instance, economic sociologists have long 
indicated that economic outcomes are not just the function of markets at work but are 
shaped by social networks (Uzzi, 1997), states and political institutions (Evans, 1995), 
culture (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), and civil society (Bartley & Child, 2011; King & 
Pearce, 2010). The same is true of history and culture; history and socio-cultural contexts 
influence social and financial perceptions of people (Deneulin & Rakodi, 2011; Salamon 
et al., 2017). For instance, in the context of Africa, the combining effects of colonialism 
and foreign religions promoted nonprofit institutions that combined both social and 
financial orientations in service delivery to rural communities, much close to what we 
know today as social enterprises. In such regions, nonprofit sector organizations engaging 
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in microfinance activity with simultaneous social and financial orientations will not be an 
exception. Thus, assuming all MFIs are either nonprofit or for-profit oriented, and 
combining data from disparate regions to determine evidence of trade-off may not be the 
best methodological approach. These suggest microfinance researchers could borrow 
insight from related disciplines to better understand the link between contextual factors 
and the microfinance objective. 
Similarly, there is a conspicuous absence in the microfinance literature of studies 
applying governance and organizational theories to investigating the double bottom line 
objective of microfinance institutions (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Zuru et al., 2016). 
Although researchers have highlighted the role institutional logics play in organizational 
success, and in particular of competing logics (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Battilana & 
Lee, 2014; Jay, 2013; Pache & Santos, 2013; Sun & Im, 2015), microfinance scholars 
have largely ignored insights from the related fields of impact investing (investment that 
is made with the intention of generating positive social impact as well as financial 
returns), social enterprises (organizations combining aspects of business and charity) and 
evidence of hybridity (organizations with multiple logics that entails the combination of 
identities and institutional logics). There is a lack of research on the broader social, and 
institutional contexts within which microfinance institutions operate and function. Few 
scholars have shown interest on how integrated logics function in hybrid institutions, in 
particular, microfinance institutions (see Fitzgerald & Shepherd, 2018; Ebrahim, 
Battilana, and Mair, 2014; Zhao & Lounsbury, 2016). Almandoz (2012) suggests that 
organizations with high degrees of integrated financial and social logics may reap the 
benefits from both logics, though they may also experience disharmony and factionalism 
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as a result (p. 1382). Appropriating an institutional logics perspective to the double 
bottom line goal is particularly valuable for extending the investigation beyond the 
current competing logics of the microfinance strategy. The next section presents a 
summary review of the institutional logics perspective thereby linking this literature to 
the role of organizational identity in the quest for the microfinance goal.  
The Concept and Development of Institutional Logics 
 Broadly, institutional logics refers to systems of cultural elements - values, beliefs, 
and normative expectations - by which people, groups, and organizations make sense of 
and evaluate their everyday activities and organize those activities in time and space 
(Greenwood, 2008; Haveman & Gualtieri, 2017; Lounsbury, 2002). It emerged as part of 
the development of institutional theory and organizational analysis which sought to explain 
how institutions function to integrate organizations with other organizations in society 
through universalistic rules, contracts and authority (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, p. 100). 
The core quest of institutional theory is to understand organizational action as something 
bound by more than economic reasoning and rational strategic goals (Johansen & Waldorff, 
2017). In responding to this need, the institutional logics perspective posits that the core 
institutions of society – the capitalist market, the bureaucratic state, families, democracy, 
and Christianity – each has a central logic that constrain both the means and ends of 
individual behavior and are constitutive of individuals, organizations and society. The 
institutional logics perspective contributes to institutional theory by exploring “how 
individual and organizational behavior is located in a social context and the social 
mechanisms that influence that behavior” (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, p. 122). It opened 
the door for a variety of levels of analysis, including organizations, markets, industries, 
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inter-organizational networks, geographic communities and organizational fields. Equally, 
the idea of institutional logics provides institutional theory with a capacity to explain 
institutional change and agency. It focused on institutional change and analysis seeking to 
understand how institutional logics become institutionalized and de-institutionalized.  
Most scholars would agree that the term “institutional logics” gained currency with 
the 1991 publication of “Bringing society back in: symbols, practices and institutional 
contradictions” by Roger Friedland and Robert Alford. Friedland and Alford (1991) 
developed the concept to explore the interrelationships between the three nested levels of 
social interaction: individuals, organization and society. To answer how different 
institutional arenas were both culturally and politically shaped they argued that behind “the 
most important institutional orders” of Western societies are “central logics”. Per the 
pioneers, western societies have five main institutional orders including the capitalist 
market, the bureaucratic state, the democratic politics, the nuclear family and Christian 
religion. Each of these orders has a central logic that guides its organizing principles and 
provides social actors with vocabularies of motive and a sense of identity. A logic is “a set 
of material practices and symbolic constructions” (Freidman & Alford, 1991) guiding the 
institution; for instance, “participation” in the institution of democracy or 
“commodification of human activity” in the institution of capitalism. Thus, there is not a 
logic called “capitalism”, instead there are logics comprising underlying practices and 
symbols that make capitalism possible (Johansen & Waldorff, 2017, p. 7). Logics are 
unique organizing principles, practices and symbols that influence individual and 
organizational decisions and responses (Thornton et al, 2012). Friedman & Alfred (1991) 
explain organizations or institutions as creatures of social human interaction subject to 
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dynamism and change. Over time through social interaction values, beliefs, assumptions 
and rules shape behavioral choices (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). Thus, institutional logics 
are a set of norms, culture and social codes that belong to a certain organization form. It 
functions as “frames of reference” of the institutional orders helping actors make sense of 
their world and construct their actions and identities (Johansen & Waldorff, 2017). 
Subsequent scholars amended the original five institutional orders to comprise the current 
seven orders of family, community, religion, state, market, profession and corporation.  
Each of the core institutional orders has both material and cultural characteristics 
(Friedman and Alford, 1991). Institutions develop and change as a result of the interplay 
between both of these forces. Through various mechanisms, institutional logics may get 
reshaped and customized in an organizational field (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, p. 119). An 
organization’s institutional logics determine both ends and means, both what is valued and 
how things are valued (Friedland & Alford, 1991). They constrain the choice sets available 
to individuals, groups and organizations, and provide opportunities for those actors to 
socially construct and reconstruct logics in ways that reflect their interests (Haveman & 
Gualtieri, 2017, p. 10). They do so by “providing context-specific practices and symbol 
systems that show how the culture is anchored in a set of elemental building blocks” 
(Tracey, Phillips & Jarvis, 2011, p. 62). For instance, the institutional order of the family 
is the origin of the institutional logic of Japanese corporate networks (Bhappu, 2000). 
Similarly, family and religion while both are not typically considered part of the economic 
sphere, they are directly involved in the production, distribution and consumption of 
services. Institutional logics shape rational, mindful behavior, and individual and 
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organizational actors have some hand in shaping and changing institutional logics 
(Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). 
The works in particular of Haveman & Rao (1997), Thornton and Ocasio (1999) 
and Scott et al. (2000) are credited for developing and positing the concept as a new 
approach to institutional analysis by employing institutional logics to defining the content 
and meaning of institutions. They sought to understand “how pluralism in institutional 
demands is handled in organizations, and how organizational individuals and groups are 
active in institutional change” (Johansen & Waldorff, 2017, p. 5). Prior to their 
contributions, institutional analysis focused on how cultural rules and cognitive structures 
shape organizational structures. The emphasis was on organizations as institutions infused 
with meaning, value, and legitimacy by their members and leaders (Selznick, 1957). Later 
development of the theory shifted emphasis to external actors that impose values and 
expectations on the organization (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). From what goes on inside to what affects institutions from 
outside, the emphasis remained on diffusion of norms and practices across organizations. 
With institutional logics, researchers directed attention on the effects of differentiated 
institutional logics on individuals and organization in a larger variety of contexts including 
markets, industries, and populations of organizational forms. For instance, the health care 
field is shaped by the institutional logics of the market, the logic of the democratic state 
and the professional logic of medical care (Scott et al., 2000). The institutional logics 
literature identifies two broad approaches among scholars of institutional logics (Johansen 
and Waldorff, 2017). While some scholars invested in developing the concept, many others 
have focused on applying the perspective in empirical studies analyzing relationships 
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between agency and change. The subsequent section briefly discusses the two major trends 
in institutional logics scholarship. 
Institutional Logics as a Metatheory  
Scholars interested in the institutional logics perspective have employed the 
perspective both as a metatheory as well as a method of analysis – scholars who strive to 
understand institutional logics as more abstract social structures than institutions, thus 
offering institutional theory new explanations for institutional dynamics and change; and 
those who strive to expand the concept as co-existing in practical organizational life where 
the friction between logics creates agency and potential change (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008; 
Johansen & Waldorff, 2017). Meta-theorists focus on the typology by which logics could 
be identified and analyzed comprehensively and thus help institutional theory strengthen 
the codes of each institutional order in terms of its logic’s composition and associated 
micro-level expressions.  
They tend to conceptualize a generalized construct to be used to explain social 
structure at whatever level. Logics as generalized construct provide rules of actions that 
help actors cope with ambiguity and cognitive limitations by highlighting particular issues 
and problems that demand managerial attention and framing of possible solutions 
(Thornton, 2002). The rules comprise a set of assumptions and values about how actors 
should interpret organizational reality, about what represent appropriate behavior, and what 
constitutes success for the institution (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). In other words, 
institutional logics seek to “link internal mental cognitions to external rituals and stimuli” 
(Thornton 2004, p.41) and connect meaning with actions.  
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As a metatheory, institutional logics has the potential to explain institutional change 
and agency. Any context is influenced by contending logics of different societal sectors. 
By describing the emergence of the organizational form, authors identify their norms and 
denominate them as logics. While individual and organizational action is embedded within 
institutions, institutions are socially constructed and therefore constituted by the actions of 
individuals and organizations (Berger and Luckman, 1967). Because logics are less 
tangible than institutions in that they guide institutions it is important to recognize the 
difference between the institutional logic and the institution it supports. Thus, logic is the 
result of both internal and external factors to it – family, religion, society etc. 
Institutional Logics as a Framework of Analysis 
The major part of institutional logics research is highly empirical and presents a 
multitude of interesting case studies that show logics at work. Studies applying institutional 
logics as a framework of analysis tend to analyze types of relationships between 
institutional logics; most prevalently as competing, co-existing, hybrids, or as institutional 
“bricolage” of two or more logics (Johansen & Waldorff, 2017). As a method of analysis, 
scholars seek to measure the effects of content, meaning and change in institutions using 
the institutional logics perspective. Because institutional logics constrain sensemaking by 
providing scripts for action and schemata through which organizational phenomena get 
interpreted (Weber & Glynn, 2006; Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 2005), researchers 
focused on how institutional logics shape organizations; on how people disagree, 
compromise and conclude more or less lasting agreements. And, because logics exist at 
multiple nested levels of analysis, individuals, groups and organizations can use the 
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cultural elements of higher-level logics to create, bolster, transform or undercut lower-level 
logics.  
To recapitulate, notwithstanding an intricate, multilevel analytic world 
organizational theorists have created from institutional logics, at its core, institutions 
possess unique identities. Institutional logics is an extension of institutional theory that 
highlights how the cultural dimensions of institutions both enable and constrain social 
action. It is a systematic way to theorize and measure the interrelationships between 
institution, individual and organizational behavior (Thornton & Ocasio, p. 122). Whether 
the values, meaning and legitimacy are infused by their members and leaders (Selznik, 
1957), or by external factors (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Powell 
& DiMaggio, 1991), organizations /institutions exhibit logics of action – “central logics.” 
And those core logics regularize behavior as well as provide opportunity for agency and 
change. Furthermore, interrelations between logics and agency can lead to new logics 
and/or institutions in the form of integration, aggregation, compartmentalization or 
subordination (Fitzgerald & Shepherd, 2018). While traditional institutional theory was 
mainly interested in explaining organizational convergence due to external normative 
pressures, the institutional logics frame facilitates the study of different logics shaping 
ongoing organizational change.  
The Institutional Logics Perspective 
An institutional logic is the way a particular social world works (Jackall, 1988). 
The above review of institutional logics elaborates how competing logics could lead to new 
practices and institutions (Murray, 2010; Reay & Hinings, 2009). The assumptions of 
institutional logics suggest that logics constrain the choice sets available to individuals, 
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groups, and organizations; and also provides opportunities for those actors to socially 
construct and reconstruct logics in ways that reflect their interests. As Thornton and Ocasio 
(2008) further explain, “the contradictions inherent in the differentiated set of institutional 
logics provide individuals, groups, and organizations with cultural resources for 
transforming individual identities, organizations, and society” (p. 100). By describing the 
emergence of the organizational form therefrom, researchers identify their norms and 
denominate them as logics. For instance, organizations who want something else than the 
status quo strive to incorporate unfamiliar logics, and novel logics are adopted leading to 
new and better future identities (Kodeih & Greenwood, 2014). That is to say, where sets 
of institutional logics provide individuals, groups and organizations with cultural resources 
leading to the transformation of individual identities, organizations and society, a new 
central logic or individual identity or organization is created. Equally, relationship and/or 
interaction between logics can also create a new organizational form (Tracey, Philips & 
Jarvis, 2011). In addition, an institution or organization can emerge with the sole aim of 
addressing an emergent situation thus creating an institution/organization of “a new central 
logic”, an identity of its own. The obvious conclusion is that logics’ friction give rise to 
new practices and institutions.  
Conceptualizing the institutional logics of organizational forms is possible 
(Greenwood, 2008) and sheds light on how underpinning values and beliefs drive behavior. 
It encourages an exploration of the broad belief systems, values, and organizing 
frameworks that actors use to assign meaning and organize the workplace (Fitzgerald & 
Shepherd, 2018). Such investigations might unearth new conditions under which responses 
are likely to occur, as well as the intended and unintended consequences of those responses. 
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Since the 1990s, organizations and studies addressing institutional logics are large and 
diverse ranging from areas and sites as different as climate change, proceedings of the 
United Nations, local banks in the United States to business groups in Taiwan (Haveman 
& Gualtieri, 2017). Thornton & Ocasio (2008) document that research on institutional 
logics represents an impressive variety of empirical contexts, from thrifts, higher education 
publishing, health care organizations, colleges and universities, consumer research, mutual 
funds, French cuisine, equity markets and architects among others (p.99).  
Consequently, the institutional logics framework has large and diverse applications. 
It has been employed to analyze types of relationships between institutional logics 
including competing (Haveman & Rao, 1997; Lounsbury, 2007; Reay & Hinnings, 2005), 
co-existing (Goodrick & Reay, 2011; Raynard, Lounsbury & Greenwood, 2013), hybrids 
(Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Pache & Santos, 2013) or as institutional “bricolage” of two 
or more logics (Fitzgerald & Shepherd, 2018; Johansen & Waldorff, 2017). These studies 
show that multiple logics may co-exist in the same field in a varied number of forms and 
combinations, thus simultaneously influencing organizations in that field (Battilana & Lee, 
2014).  
The evidence of integrated logics emerged with an increased attention to hybrid 
organizations that blend more than one logic in their operations or identity (Battilana and 
Dorado, 2010; Battilana & Lee, 2014; Jay, 2013; Pache & Santos, 2012). Scholars 
developed these ideas by studying how organizational identities and institutional logics 
appear in hybrid configurations. Almandoz’s (2012) study even suggest it is beneficial for 
entrepreneurs to embrace competing logics. For instance, Battilana & Lee (2014) suggest 
combining organizational forms is central to organizational innovation and the creation of 
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new forms. However, the extent to which logics co-exist within an organization is likely to 
differ based on the extent to which these logics are core to the organization, as well as to 
the extent to which they provide compatible prescriptions for action. For instance, when 
facing competing external demands, organizations can engage in compromise, avoidance, 
defiance, or manipulation (Pache & Santos, 2010). And when facing competing internal 
identities and factions adhering to those identities, managers can attempt integration, 
compartmentalization, aggregation and subordination (Fitzgerald & Shepherd, 2018; 
Kraatz & Block, 2008).  
Fitzgerald and Shepherd (2018) have developed a four-quadrant typology 
explaining what happens to institutional identities with institutional logics (see Figure 3.1 
below). From this typology, the higher the assessed compatibility or non-compatibility of 
the logics – the more they fit into any of the four categorizations. An organization will 
experience integration when both the integrating logics are compatible, and they combine 
to form one blended logic. Aggregation occurs when an organization internally endorses 
the simultaneous use of two logics – using the commercial and social logics as example – 
the organization embraces simultaneously the use of the two as its modus operandi. But if 
there is low compatibility between the logics, then there is either compartmentalization or 
subordination. Subordination occurs when an organization endorses two logics but do not 
fully implement the practices required of one logic, while retaining the practices of the 
other logic that is more aligned to the goals of the organization (Pasche and Santos, 2013b). 
On the other hand, compartmentalization involves developing a separate organizational 
unit in which a different set of logics and mind sets are located to avoid the clash of logics 
within the larger organization.  
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Figure 3.1 Structural options for hybrid logics 
Source. Adopted from (Fitzgerald & Shepherd, 2018) 
 
Apart from the diverse applications organization theorists have enacted and 
recomposed of the theory, it is pertinent to underscore that our overarching interest in this 
theoretical framework is not in its theory of organizational behavior and structure as in its 
support that institutions have logics of action. Institutions and organizations have 
embedded logics, and how those logics come into existence is varied based on society as 
an inter-institutional system with levels of association; and those logics emphasize how the 
organization responds to both internal and external environments. Institutional logics 
predicts that interrelations between logics could lead to new practices and institutions 
(Murray, 2010; Reay & Hinings, 2009). Ownership frames organizational principles and 
associated practices (Watson, 2006). Founder and ownership affect an institution’s logics, 
in particular in the field of microfinance. Such a lens provides the theoretical framework 
for examining how the ownership of a microfinance bank within the context of Nigeria’s 
microfinance scheme could promote and, in some cases, undermine the microfinance 
objective - sustainable provision of microfinance services to the active poor. Who or what 
an organization is and does (sets out to accomplish) might provide insight to how it fulfills 
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its objectives. The interest is to investigate how the identity of the organization informs the 
goal of the microfinance dual objectives. 
 
Table 3.1 Types and Characteristics of Microfinance Institutional Logics 
 
Social welfare logic 
(Nonprofit MFI) 
Commercial logic 
(For-Profit MFI) 
Integrated logics 
(Faith-Affiliated MFI) 
Characteristics        
  
  
Goal/Priority 
Create social value - 
poverty alleviation  
  
  
  
Generate 
economic value - 
profit 
maximization 
  
   
Create social and economic 
value – financial access to 
the financially 
disenfranchised with 
fiduciary obligations 
towards depositors and 
investors 
  
  
  
Operating 
principles 
- Clients are 
beneficiaries and 
seen as more or less 
deserving of 
support. 
  
- Provide them with 
financial services at 
less than market 
interest rates and 
empower them to be 
self-employed.  
- Clients are 
customers seen as 
risky investment. 
  
  
- Provide them 
with financial 
services by 
generating 
revenues to satisfy 
investors with 
competitive 
returns  
- Clients are beneficiaries 
and seen as micro-
entrepreneurs  
  
  
 - Provide them with 
financial services by 
generating revenues to 
satisfy investors with 
reasonable returns 
  
Management 
Principles 
  
Maximizing the 
impact of donor 
funds in delivering 
services to clients 
  
Maximizing 
investors and 
depositors’ funds 
in delivering 
services to clients 
Striking a balance between 
maximizing access of the 
disenfranchised to financial 
services and reasonable 
returns to depositors and 
investors.   
Funding 
source 
Contracts and 
donations 
Investors and 
depositor’s fund 
Investors, depositors, and 
contracts.  
Tactic/ 
Governance 
strategy 
Collaborative/ Unity 
of purpose 
Competitive/ 
Market position 
Collaborative competition / 
Sustainable empowerment 
Source. This table is based on Battilana & Dorado 2010; Fitzgerald & Shepherd 2018 and literature review. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
METHODOLOGY 
This study investigated how the board and management of Chikum Microfinance 
Bank Limited (Chikum MFB), – a bank with two institutional logics at the core of its 
foundation – pursues its dual microfinance objective. Chikum MFB, a faith-rooted 
microfinance institution was established with the goal to balance financial sustainability 
and social mission to empower the active poor in local communities. Located in Owerri, 
Nigeria, Chikum MFB is neither a commercial spin-off of a religious institution intent on 
revenue/income diversification nor is it a social responsibility division of a for-profit 
organization seeking to advance social good. Rather, it is a hybrid organization that 
combines financial sustainability and outreach to needy communities as the core of its 
identity. In the absence of institutional scripts for how to deal with the tensions of 
multiple logics in organizations, and in microfinance institutions in particular (Battilana 
& Dorado, 2010), this investigation requires a careful research design – one that does not 
rely on any “ready to wear” model for how to handle integrating logics (Flyvbjerg, 2011; 
Yin, 2014). Several steps were taken to ensure quality and intellectual rigor while 
applying a qualitative case study approach and an interpretive thematic analysis of the 
data. The study relied primarily on semi-structured interviews and document review. The 
data from the interview transcripts and organizational documents were compared and 
contrasted to render visible issues that informants did or did not explicitly articulate as 
per the policies and activities of the bank. Data analysis consisted of a series of steps 
including data transcription, generating codes, defining and naming themes. Cognizant of 
the positionality of the researcher (Adu-Ampong & Adams 2019), at all stages of this 
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design, the researcher remained conscious of personal subjectivities while reflecting upon 
how it is both used and monitored. This chapter details the various steps employed in 
order to systematically apply the scientific method to address the research question, 
including the research design (logic of inquiry) and the methods (logistics of inquiry). 
Research Design 
This qualitative study examined the quest for the microfinance double bottom line 
objective in the context of one of Nigeria’s faith-rooted microfinance banks. To examine 
the primary research inquiry - how a faith-affiliated microfinance bank navigates the goal 
of the double-bottom line – in the context of Nigeria’s microfinance framework, the study 
adopted the interpretive study approach. The objective of the researcher is to explore, 
seek understanding, and interpret meaning from the perspective of those involved. 
Interpretive approach enables the researcher to examine the perspectives of informants 
within the integrated system in which the case unfolds (Glesne, 2016; Merriam, 2009; 
Neuman, 2011).  
The study informants are real people, in real contexts, with consequential past 
experiences of their own, play with them, question them, combine them to conduct their 
daily obligations in their workplace. The research question requires an approach that is 
open to emerging contextual information on the policies and activities of the bank. The 
interpretive approach permits an interactive process aimed at capturing meaning and 
understanding perspectives relative to the context (Harrison, Birks, Franklin & Mills, 
2017). It is open and capable of generating inductive reasoning and interpretation. Thus, 
the interpretive approach enables investigations into the how and why the informants 
define the bank’s identity and explain the actions of the board of directors, staff and 
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management of the bank. The aim is to generate a rich holistic description that 
illuminates how and what the bank is doing to define and attain its goals (Merriam, 
1998). 
Case Study Approach  
Within the broader interpretivist framework, the study used a single case study 
design to facilitate analysis. A case study approach was chosen for a number of reasons. 
First, in other to understand the blending of two seemingly opposed logics the study 
requires a microfinance institution that combines the two competing logics – a 
phenomenon very uncommon in the industry. To answer the research interest and 
question – how a faith-affiliated microfinance bank navigates the goal of the double-
bottom line, it was essential to select a microfinance bank capable of providing 
information on interactions between the two logics. Merriam (2009) suggest cases be 
selected based on the research purpose and question, and for what they could reveal about 
the phenomenon or topic of interest. “Context-dependent knowledge is the center of case 
study research” (Chowdhury et al. 2020, p.282).  
Second, the case study makes it possible to understand and analyze multifaceted 
phenomena. This study entails examining all key sectors of the case study institution 
including institutional identity, human resources, pricing, products and services to 
understand how the units individually and collectively contribute and constrain 
organizational goals. A case study design meets this criterion. Yin (2014) have noted that 
the case study method allows investigators to retain holistic and meaningful 
characteristics of real-life events like organizational and managerial processes. Like Yin, 
Patton (2002) asserts that the case study approach enables a holistic approach in 
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interpreting and understanding a phenomenon from manifold perspectives (Patton, p. 58-
59).   
Also, a single case study strategy is appropriate since the study requires the use of 
multiple data sources including interviews, and analysis of organizational documents to 
understand the phenomenon. Multiple data sources are essential for the empirical 
grounding of this study. Many qualitative researchers (Chowdhury et al., 2020; Glesne, 
2016; Patton 2002) elaborate on how the case study strategy is consistent with qualitative 
methodologies by relying on researcher immersion in multiple sources (Stake 1995). “It 
adopts a holistic approach in interpreting and understanding a phenomenon from 
manifold perspectives specifying various factors engaged in a situation” (Chowdhury et 
al., 2020, p. 283).  
Fourthly, – and most fundamentally – the study requires an in-depth information 
from the perspectives of the informants on how their actions influence or are influenced 
by organizational identity to enable analysis. Case study research permits both a deep 
dive into the organization for an in-depth information as well as in-depth analysis of an 
issue within its context from the perspective of informants (Yin, 2014). Chowdhury et al., 
(2020) have suggested that “where the researcher wants to know the answer of why and 
how questions about microfinance programs, the case study method maybe a good 
option” (p. 280). The significance lies on its ability to achieve the greatest possible 
amount of information on the bank which would not have been possible or be an 
appropriate strategy with a representative case or random sample (Flyvbjerg, 2006). As 
the study is open to unanticipated outcomes, a single case study approach is better than 
virtually all other research designs that could be employed. 
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The Case: Chikum MFB Ltd  
 
This study focused attention 
on Chikum MFB Ltd, – a 
faith-rooted grassroots 
microfinance bank located in Imo State, Nigeria – established with the goal to balance 
financial sustainability and social mission through providing financial services to the 
active poor in local communities. The bank received its license to operate on November 
9, 2008. In line with the Nigeria government’s 2005 Microfinance Policy 
recommendation for grassroots and significant ownership diversification (CBN, 2005), 
the promoters recruited a cross-section of interested individuals and groups from the 
church community to contribute equity for the required paid-up capital. A group of initial 
twenty (20) investors including individuals and the associations of Catholic men and 
Catholic women organizations of the Archdiocese contributed equity to own the bank. 
Nigeria’s microfinance banks are government regulated equity-financed deposit 
taking banks that could be established by individuals, corporate organization, and 
nonprofit organization including religious bodies (CBN, 2011). As a financial enterprise 
owned mostly by individuals sharing a common faith conviction, the promoters of the 
bank thought of a micro finance institution that can be accessible and sustainable 
(profitable) at the same time. From inception, the aim of the bank is “to debut as a truly 
versatile financial institution that will create a niche for itself through the provision of 
better access to savings services and loans to the Catholic Church societies, poor 
households, trade groups/associations and microenterprises, thereby reducing poverty and 
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at the same time build a reputation for safety and soundness” (Feasibility and Viability 
Report, p. 4). Accordingly, the mission of the bank is “to harness and make resources 
easily accessible to individuals and groups for creative and productive services”. It 
envisions herself as the leading provider of financial services to micro-enterprises and 
poor households in every market it chooses to operate (Vision Statement).  Its financial 
and social missions are not differentiated; rather the two objectives are intertwined. 
Commercial and social activities are fully integrated as every time it provides 
microfinance services to a client it also accomplishes its social mission which aims to 
give access to financial services to the poor.   
The bank was first licensed as a unit microfinance bank when it commenced 
financial services to the general public on November 9, 2008. In 2013 it upgraded to a 
state level microfinance bank making it possible for the bank to establish outposts 
(branches) to rural communities within the state distant from its corporate head office. 
Currently with a staff strength of seventy-five (75) and total assets of about one billion, 
ninety-three million, eight hundred and fifty-three thousand and thirty-one naira 
(₦1,093,853,031.00), the bank has seven outposts spread across four local government 
areas of the state including the head office located in the heart of the state capital. 
Chikum Microfinance Bank Ltd was purposefully selected for this study based on 
a number of reasons. First, based on its pioneer status in the field of social and financial 
“hybrid microfinance” practice. Established three years after the inauguration of 
Nigeria’s 2005 new Microfinance Banking Scheme (CBN, 2005), it is one out of a total 
of three state level microfinance banks in Imo State (see CBN, Nov. 2019 – List of 
Microfinance Banks). Imo State is located in the eastern part of Nigeria, one of the thirty-
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six states of the federation. With a population of about five million people, the state is 
predominantly rural comprising mostly of small and medium income entrepreneurs. As at 
December 2019, the state has a total of thirty-six licensed microfinance banks including 
thirteen (13) Tier 1 Unit Microfinance Banks; twenty (20) Tier 2 Unit Microfinance 
Banks, and three (3) State level Microfinance Banks. No national level microfinance 
bank exists in the state as of date (CBN, 2020). Unlike its other two state-level 
counterparts that migrated from community banks to the new microfinance scheme, 
Chikum MFB Ltd shares the distinct honor of a new breed of independent microfinance 
institutions after the new scheme. It is neither a commercial spin-off of a religious 
institution intent on increasing revenue/income nor a social responsibility outreach of a 
for-profit organization desirous of social good. Instead, as a regulated equity-financed 
deposit-taking financial institution with religious institutional root, its financial and social 
missions are not differentiated, rather the two missions are intertwined. Its commercial 
and social activities are fully integrated as every time it provides a service to a client it 
also accomplished its social mission which aims to give access to financial services to the 
active poor. 
The bank was also chosen because the researcher has some prior knowledge of 
the bank as a former member of the board of directors. Some familiarity with the case 
study institution is crucial for informed inquiry into the bank, for access to study 
informants and to documents, and for the analysis of the findings. Qualitative inquiry 
emphasize proximity to how others think, act and feel as vital to understanding reality 
(Chowdhury et al., 2020). More fundamentally, the bank was purposefully chosen for its 
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potential to offer explanations to how a microfinance bank could meet the challenges of 
dual objectives.   
Methods 
The methods employed in this study primarily relied on two data sources: 
interviews and organizational documents. The logistics of the study entailed identifying 
interview participants and documents, the collection of the data, and the subsequent 
analysis. The data from the interview transcripts and organizational documents were 
compared and contrasted to render visible issues that informants did or did not explicitly 
articulate as per the policies and activities of the bank. Data analysis deployed the 
thematic data analysis procedure (Braun & Clarke, 2012; Crowe, Inder & Porter, 2015) to 
analyze transcript data, generate codes, define and name themes. Cognizant of researcher 
bias (Adu-Ampong & Adams, 2019), the researcher at all stages of the study remained 
mindful of personal subjectivities while reflecting upon how positionality is both used 
and monitored. The above processes associated with the method is detailed in this 
section. 
Data Sources 
The main data sources for this study were interviews and organizational 
documents. The perspectives of those who operate the bank is essential to understanding 
both how and why the bank carries out its obligations. The interview approach was 
adopted as the primary data source for this study because the goal is to understand the 
actions of the bank through the perspectives of the operators. While observations, 
questionnaires and surveys are other possible sources of qualitative data collection, 
Flyvbjerg (2011), Stake (2006), and Yin (2014) attest that interviews are the most 
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dominant and the most preferred data collection method in interpretive qualitative 
studies. The operators of the bank were interviewed to gain insight into how the bank’s 
identity fosters and/or impedes the microfinance double bottom-line objective (see 
Appendix 4.1: List of interviewees). Interviewing the actors of the bank allowed the 
researcher to capture the richness of the informants’ experiences, obtain detailed 
descriptions and verbatim quotations on the bank to enable in-depth analysis for 
meanings to emerge (Arsel, 2017; Belk, Fischer & Kozinets, 2013; Chowdhury, Ahmmed 
& Hossain, 2020). Key areas of interest are how the bank’s products and services, 
lending, hiring, pricing and citing of outposts (sources of evidence of commitment to 
outreach and profitability) reflect underlying institutional logics. If the bank is successful 
in balancing financial and social objectives, we would expect that the bank will hire 
individuals with expertise in and a preference for offering sustainable products and 
services focused on the needs of the active poor. For instance given the particular role of 
directors in the stewardship of organizational identity and mission, the researcher asked 
the directors to share about the role of board members in recognizing and managing risks 
of goal displacement and mission drift. 
Document analysis is another recognized source of data collection (Harrison, 
Birks, Franklin & Mills, 2017; Alison, 2014; Yin, 2014). Document analysis was used to 
supplement interview data. Internal documents including minutes of board meetings, 
policy manuals, memos, and audited annual reports were reviewed to triangulate data 
from interview transcripts (see Appendix 4.2: List of reviewed documents). Institutions 
promote and entrench espoused values through formal documentation; the expectation is 
that key policy documents including mission statement, human resources, operations and 
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marketing manuals (sources of evidence of commitment to espoused values) will 
emphasize the complementarity of social and financial goals. 
Semi-structured interviews. The interview data collection process followed a 
semi-structured interview format. The semi-structured format enabled the use of prior 
understanding and themes built around the research question to guide the interviews. 
Informed by theory and literature, I had some expectations of where to focus the 
interview (see Appendix 4.3, Interview Protocol). It consists of a description of the 
research project, an explanation of interview procedures and an invitation to the 
interviewee to ask questions about the study and the study procedures (Arsel, 2017). The 
aim is to keep the interviewer focused and cover all prior identified relevant concepts; 
give a sense of control and reignite or redirect conversation when there is an extended 
digression (Wallendorf & Brucks, 1993). While each interview took its own form, the 
protocol ensured that the interview remained focused on the overarching purpose of an 
evolving research question. It helped to avoid Arsel’s (2017) timely warning that 
“interviewing people without engaging in some theoretical and methodological 
preparation … can end up with interviews that might lead you to more noise than data” 
(p. 940). 
The interviews were carried out during the months of August through December 
2019. A total of twenty-two interviews were conducted with directors, ex-directors, 
managers and front-line employees (see Appendix 4.1, List of interviewees). I initially 
envisaged to interview the customers of the bank. A re-reading of the research interest 
determined otherwise. Their input will not provide insight to the study. While customers 
may know and use the products and services of the bank they may not know how and for 
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what purpose the bank is providing such services; they do not possess the requisite 
knowledge to comment on the activities of the bank in relation to logics of action. 
The bank has a current staff strength of seventy-five (75) employees including 
those in management positions. Though the seven (7) heads of key management positions 
and members of the credit and marketing staff were the primary interview targets, the 
intention was to interview as many employees of the bank as are possible to a point of 
saturation. However, not all employees wanted to be interviewed, two of those who 
initially agreed to be interviewed later changed their minds and did not show up. In one 
instance a head of department delegated the next in command to stand in for him. The 
researcher later learnt after the interviews that the individual was thinking of leaving the 
bank and would not like to entertain a conversation that might prematurely disclose his 
intentions. While there was no formal attempt to find out why some declined to be 
interviewed, the researcher’s positionality as one who had past association with the bank 
could have played a factor especially with the front-line employees. 
Though efforts were made to keep interviewing schedules and create conducive 
environment for interaction some of the interviews especially with credit and marketing 
staff were rescheduled a couple of times to accommodate interviewees’ emergent needs 
with their customers. Some interviews were rescheduled when heavy rains prevented the 
timely arrival of interviewees to the venue or the pounding of rain drops on the roof made 
it difficult to audio record the conversation.  
One major challenge however was the insider-outsider status of the researcher 
who also had to personally conduct the interviews as the researcher. This could have 
created some nervousness for some of the employees. The researcher tried to make the 
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best use of his insider-outsider status. I highlighted my insider status in certain contexts 
and simultaneously downplayed it in certain others. The emphasis was on the 
researcher’s past affiliation with the bank and his current status as a doctoral candidate 
studying in an elite Catholic University in America.  It resonated same for both directors 
and staff as there is both an implicit and explicit respect for the well educated in the 
Nigerian society. The official letter from the University of San Diego Institutional 
Review Board established the researcher as an outsider deserving of their time, 
information and respect. It both enabled interviewees to share how and what they do as 
well as constrained some to freely express their thoughts. During the interview when I 
noticed that the interviewee could be withholding information on the basis that  being 
connected with the bank entailed having implicit knowledge of certain things, I had to 
downplay my past association with the bank for the interviewee to provide more detailed 
answers and explanations by pointing out that it has been more than six years since the 
researcher left the bank. Knowledge of the language and vocabulary of the field also 
enabled the researcher to carry insightful probe into what the bank was doing.   
Archival Materials.  
In addition to the semi-structured interviews, formal organizational documents 
including board and board committee minutes, policy manuals, operations manuals, 
internal memos, audited annual reports and website postings were reviewed to augment 
interview data. Because no single source of information can be trusted to provide a 
comprehensive perspective, Patton (2002) encouraged the use of multiple data sources to 
validate and cross-check findings. First, the informants comprise various strata of people 
associated with the bank ranging from directors to marketers, there were reasonable 
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expectations of mixed and inconsistent responses. On some issues the views of the 
directors seem to differ and or conflict with that of the managers. For instance, the 
interview showed evidences of disagreement between some board members and an ex-
managing director over what kind of individuals to be recruited and how best to 
achieving the organization’s goals. The document analysis helped to supplement and 
validate information between interviewees and between interview data and data from 
reviewed documents. Patton (2002) and Neuman (2011) noted interview data could have 
limitations including responses due to personal bias, anger, anxiety, politics, recall error 
and self-serving responses. The document analysis helped to understand where particular 
snippets of data appear to be common themes and those that are different between the 
sources. And “because new dimensions tend to reveal where people did not always act 
consistently” (Gibbs, 2007, p. 94), document analysis provided a behind the scenes look 
at the bank about which the researcher might not ask appropriate questions without the 
leads provided by the documents. 
Informants and Interview Protocol 
Representativeness is not sought with regard to participants, however, 
understanding the operations and activities of the bank requires interviewing individuals 
in different key roles. For instance, the positions of seven directors and heads of key 
seven department (Risk Management, Audit and Internal Control, Credit and Marketing, 
Operations, Admin/Human Resources, Finance and ICT) are mandated by the regulatory 
body for the effective running of microfinance banks in Nigeria (CBN, 2011). This 
provision provided the basic structure for eliciting information from all key sectors of the 
bank essential to the research interest. A total of twenty-two informants were interviewed 
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including all the seven members of the bank’s board of directors, two past directors, 
seven heads of department, two operations staff and four credit and marketing staff. 
Interview protocol. The approval for this study was granted both by the relevant 
authorities at the University of San Diego and by the Board of Directors of Chikum 
Microfinance Bank Ltd through the Institutional Review Board (IRB). The actual 
interviews started with the permission to address the entire staff of the bank in one of 
their daily briefings before the commencement of work. The researcher used the 
opportunity to provide a description of the research project, an explanation of interview 
procedures and an invitation for the staff to ask questions about the study and procedures. 
The consent form highlighted what the study is all about, the consequences of 
participation, confidentiality of information and of no recrimination from participation 
(Arsel, 2017, Patton, 2002). Participants were asked to provide explicit consent to be 
interviewed. Written and signed informed consent was received from each informant. 
The semi-structured interviews followed an informal interview approach guided 
by an interview guide (see Appendix 4.4 Interview Guide). The interview guide outlined 
key points of exploration, provisional questions and planned probes and transitions. It 
was developed partly from theory and literature review. In line with Zilber’s (2016) 
insight that “institutional logics do not deterministically direct activities and behaviors 
within organizations but are rather worked out within a hermeneutical circle” (p. 151), 
the theoretical framework of institutional logics (Fitzgerald & Shepherd, 2018; Friedland 
& Alford, 1991; Greenwood, 2008) was adopted as lens. The realization of the 
microfinance objective is contingent upon key organizational factors – governance, 
funding, clientele, products and services, and regulatory requirements, – that shape how 
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the microfinance institution responds to the challenges of meeting its statutory 
obligations. The assumptions of institutional logics predict that interrelationships between 
internal and external factors can lead to hybridization of logics and or new institutions of 
new logics (Johansen and Waldorff, 2015). Such a lens was useful to understanding how 
this microfinance bank (MFB) organize and function to accomplish its organizational 
goals. 
The interview guide was semi-structured based on a mix of close - and open-
ended questions. The open-ended questions were used to maintain a balance between 
providing enough openness for the informants to tell their stories and enough focus to 
allow the interview structure to work (Patton, 2002; Seidman, 2013), essentially 
permitting the empirical grounding of the study. It consists of the questions to be 
explored in the course of the interview to ensure that some basic lines of inquiry are 
pursued with each interviewee (Patton, 2002). Some of the questions include: Discuss in 
detail what your bank does to encourage outreach to the active poor. How would you 
describe the bank’s commitment to the active poor in relation to the cost of providing 
them with services? What does the bank do to encourage sustainable outreach; how does 
the bank socialize the employees to embrace its mission? What do the directors do to 
ensure that the staff are committed to the mission of the bank? etc. The recorded 
interviews were transcribed to generate the primary data for the investigation.  
The Interview Process 
All Interviews with the executive directors and ex-directors took place in various 
locations. Primarily for their convenience because of personal engagements and zones of 
comfort, the directors were interviewed in their homes or offices with prior appointment. 
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Also, for their convenience because the interviews took place during office hours, all the 
staff and management informants were interviewed on pre-scheduled dates in a reserved 
room at the bank’s corporate office. The interviews were scheduled at least four to five 
days ahead of time. To ensure punctuality and avoid incidents of no show, I sent text 
message reminders on the eve of interviews re-confirming time and venue. It created a 
sense of responsibility and reminded informants of the importance and value attached to 
the exercise.  
The interviews took place in the context where the researcher is fluent in the local 
language in this case Igbo and pidgin English. However, all interviews were conducted in 
English language, which is the official language of communication in the country. The 
shortest interview was 30 minutes while the longest lasted 70 minutes. I interviewed each 
informant at least once (See Appendix 4.1: List of interviewees). Where the need arose 
for additional interview it took place by phone contact and were primarily to elaborate on 
issues or to clarify meanings that did not seem obvious at the time of transcription. 
The interviews started with very general questions about the bank and the 
informants’ job responsibilities to very specific questions on the activities of the bank. I 
customized interview questions to informants which included questions on career 
background, experience with the microfinance industry and with the bank in particular. 
For instance, while board members and heads of departments were asked to respond to 
questions on policies and governance, the Operations, Credit and Marketing staffs were 
particularly important as the primary interface between the bank’s products and services 
and the bank’s clients.    
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All interviews were digitally recorded using a digital recorder for quality. All the 
recordings were with the prior express permission of the informant before the start of 
interview. The audio data were later transcribed into text data. The researcher mainly 
edited for brevity, removing any words or clauses that are not essential for understanding 
the overall meaning of a phrase or sentence. The transcribed interview data generated a 
total 225 typed pages of single line spacing using Times New Roman 12-point font.  The 
transcribed data formed the dataset for the study. 
Review of Organization’s Documents 
An analysis of formal documents of the bank served as a complement to the 
interviews. My past association with the bank and her directors gave me access to 
documents and archival data sources. Most of the bank’s formal documents were in the 
custody of the company secretary, and the chairman of the board had personally 
addressed management and requested cooperation with the researcher to the extent 
permissible. I either collected original copies or made copies of documents including 
feasibility studies, policy manuals, board and board committee minutes, and five years of 
audited financial reports (2013 – 2017) (see Appendix 4.2, List of reviewed documents). 
The data from the interview transcripts and documents review were compared and 
contrasted to render visible issues that participants did or did not explicitly articulate as 
per the policies and activities of the bank. 
Data Analysis Procedure 
 Crowe, Inder and Porter (2015) elaborate on two methods of data analysis – 
thematic analysis (TA) and content analysis (CA) – that enable researchers capture 
meanings within qualitative data. While thematic analysis is a process of interpretation of 
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qualitative data that enables finding patterns of meaning embedded in participants’ 
responses, content analysis follows a descriptive process in order to represent qualitative 
data in clusters of participants’ responses (Crowe et al., p. 619). Though TA tends more 
towards inductive approaches to uncover latent meanings, and CA tends more towards 
deductive approaches to identify manifest meanings (Figure 4.1: The Analysis 
Continuum), the two methods are not mutually exclusive and can be considered on a 
continuum. However, they serve different research purposes, providing two different 
ways of understanding meaning and experience. Both approaches to analysis were used 
to produce a robust understanding of the activities of the bank. While the deductive 
approach enables analysis using the assumptions of institutional logics, the study 
deployed the inductive approach to help draw conclusions from the meanings and 
perceptions within the interview transcripts and reviewed documents. The rationale, 
Braun and Clarke, (2012) noted is that thematic analysis is “a method for systematically 
identifying, organizing, and offering insight into patterns of meaning (themes) across a 
data set... a way of identifying what is common to the way a topic is talked or written 
about and of making sense of those commonalities” (p. 57). It is flexible and allows the 
researcher to focus on the data in numerous different ways.
 
Figure	4.1:	The	Analysis	Continuum.	(Adopted	from	Crowe	et	al.,	2015) 
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Thematic analysis. Thematic analysis (TA) consists of a series of steps, 
including data transcription, generating codes, searching for themes, defining and naming 
themes and ending with synthesizing themes (Crowe et al., 2015).  An interpretive TA 
was conducted on the interview transcript following the process described in figure 4.2. 
Following these steps, the study analyzed the interview data. The first step was the 
transcription of the interview data. This involved transcribing the audio data into text 
data. While there are many different styles of transcription including electronic 
qualitative data management systems (see Edwards and Lampert, 2014; Kelle, 2004; 
Seale, 2000), qualitative researchers attest that manual systems are equally effective if not 
the most desirable for some cases (Braun & Clarke, 2012; Crowe et al., 2015).  
The interview data were transcribed manually by typing text into a Microsoft 
Word file created for the purpose. The transcript data was checked back against the 
original audio recordings for accuracy. The aim of manually transcribing was to develop 
a thorough understanding of the data through the whole gamut of transcription. Braun & 
Clarke (2012) suggest that manually transcribing data may help to familiarize self with 
data and facilitate the close-reading and interpretative skills needed to analyze the data. 
Notes (writing comments to highlight items potentially of interest) were made during 
transcription as well as during reading and re-reading of the transcript.  
Generating codes. The next step is generating codes. This involves reading and 
re-reading comprehensively the entire dataset to identify data items that may form the 
basis of repeated patterns across the dataset. Twenty-five (25) initial codes were 
generated by extracting significant statements made by various informants focusing 
primarily on the research question rather than on the interview prompts. For instance, 
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while reading the entire transcript, I focused on what the informants shared in relation to 
the services the bank is providing, who benefits and how sustainable they are. Additional 
materials not directly related to the research question that could provide a context to 
understanding the rationale behind what the bank does were equally noted. The abstracts 
formed the initial twenty-five codes. 
Coding technique. I coded the interview transcripts manually by cutting and 
pasting text into a Microsoft Word document file created for this purpose as electronic 
qualitative data analysis software offered little help with the main analytical work. I color 
coded data abstracts and assigned codes that emerged organically while examining the 
dataset (Exhibit 4.1: Codes with data extracts available on a separate file). Throughout 
the coding process, I referred to the entire interview transcript. Codes were clustered into 
related ideas using a coding matrix approach similar to the Miles and Huberman matrix 
strategy (Miles & Huberman, 1994. 240-241) (see Figure 4.3 Initial thematic map, 
showing 25 codes). Miles and Huberman (1994) matrix chart allowed for a visual 
overview of codes, categories and themes derived from the twenty-two informants.  
Searching for themes. The next step is searching for themes. This phase involved 
first sorting and collating the twenty-five initial codes into categories. All the data 
abstracts were systematically reviewed and associated to nine categories or sub-themes 
including “dedicated to mission and goal”, “we tailor our products and services to meet 
the needs of the active poor”, “human asset development”, “innovative/strategic product 
pricing”, “operational efficiency”, “organizational niche”, “shareholders return on 
investment appetite”, “we focus on profit not profit maximization” and “outreach through 
outpost expansion” (see Figure 4.4 Developed thematic map, showing 9 sub-themes). 
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Chowdhury et al., (2020) noted, “the case study begins with assumptions using possible 
theoretical lenses and data that is analyzed through an inductive approach by establishing 
patterns and themes” (p.282). The sub-themes evolved from coding the data on how the 
bank addressed issues of outreach and sustainability. However, grouping such responses 
together does not mean they are exactly the same or have the same meaning, but because 
they have something in common which consists of differences. Some codes did not form 
obvious categories and could not be clustered into any distinct category and were noted. 
Next, the categories were used to explore relationship to each other and to the 
context in which they emerged to generate overarching themes. Fereday and Muir-
Cochrane (2006, p. 90) had warned that fabricating evidence can be a common problem 
in the process of interpreting data due to unintentional, unconscious “seeing” of data that 
researchers expect to find. Thus, the previous stages were again closely scrutinized to 
ensure that the themes were representative of the initial data analysis and the assigned 
codes. As indicated by Boyatzis (1998), a theme is “a pattern in information that at 
minimum describes and organizes the possible observations and at maximum interprets 
aspects of the phenomenon” (p. 161). It captures something important about the data in 
relation to the research question and represents some level of patterned response or 
meaning within the data set (Braun & Clarke, 2012). Basically, I reviewed the coded 
abstracts to identify areas of similarity and overlap between the codes. I collated or 
clustered codes; collapsed or clustered codes that seem to share some unifying feature 
together so that they reflect and describe a coherent and meaningful pattern in the data 
(Crowe et al, 2015). Five key themes were generated from this analysis regarding how 
this microfinance bank pursues the microfinance objectives: a) shareholders’ avowed 
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commitment to founding mission; b) human asset development; c) pro-active poor 
products/services delivery; d) innovative/strategic product pricing) and, e) institutional 
competitive advantage (see Figure 4.5, Final thematic map, showing 5 main themes). 
Definitions of the five main themes are attached as Appendix 4.  
The second phase of the analysis entailed comparing expoused values with the 
actual performance data of the bank. To note evidence of the existence and extent of 
double bottom line in the MFB, the five-year audited annual report of the bank was 
analyzed to understand differences if any, between what the interview data claims and the 
actual performance results of the bank. 
Positionality. Qualitative inquiry emphasize proximity to how others think, act 
and feel as vital to understanding reality (Chowdhury et al., 2020), making the role of the 
researcher also pivotal to the final outcome of his/her investigation. Reality depends on 
and are co-created by the researcher who perceives and interprets the subject matter 
through his/her worldviews (Harrison, Birks, Franklin & Mills, 2017). This researcher’s 
concern and passion for the microfinance practice was the motivation for this study. My 
previous work experience with rural communities in microfinance provisioning was a 
great asset to this study as qualitative researchers cannot conduct research from a neutral 
position (Blaikie & Priest, 2017).  
This researcher is a Nigerian who was born, raised and worked in the eastern part 
of Nigeria most of his adult life. The bulk of his work experiences revolves around 
accessing and managing financial resources for church institutions serving rural 
communities. In the process he helped to establish and was appointed a board member of 
the microfinance bank of this case study. In 2014, he resigned his position with the bank 
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and migrated to the United States of America to pursue postgraduate studies at the 
University of San Diego. Returning to the bank six years after to conduct a research 
project clearly qualified him simultaneously as both an “insider” as well as an “outsider” 
to the case study institution. 
The researcher’s “insider-outsider” status enabled familiarity and credibility 
critical for this study. Familiarity with the context and subject matter facilitated 
understanding the task and vocabulary used in the field. The researcher’s past association 
with the bank as an ex-director and a member of the local clergy working with rural 
communities established the researcher as a professional insider while returning back as a 
research student from a reputed Catholic University in America established the researcher 
as a professional outsider deserving of their time, information and respect. Insider-
Outsider status imputes credibility and approachability in which the researcher is 
perceived as both credible and approachable (Adu-Ampong & Adams, 2019). While 
credibility refers to the researcher’s ability to establish self to the informants as worthy of 
the time to be invested in the research; approachability relates to the extent the researcher 
is not perceived as threatening to the informants. Nigerians in general have the cultural 
tendency to accord imputed credibility and acceptability to the clergy and the well-
educated class in the society. For instance, having “travelled outside” for further studies, 
the entrenched colonial perception of “foreign is better” characterized the interviewer as 
“expert” and credible. Some informants including the directors saw the researcher as one 
who has come to “improve” things. A doctoral candidate studying in America projected 
the researcher as an expert who could help transform Nigeria’s microfinance practice, or 
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in particular project their bank to an international limelight. And as one who was once 
with them the researcher was characterized as approachable.  
Though the “Insider-Outsider status” enabled interaction and interpretations 
between the informants and the researcher it could equally constrain the research 
encounter. Glesne (2016) suggest researchers direct their attention beyond individual or 
subjective selves to help guide the research process, content and possibly interpretation. 
Conscious of researcher bias and of the “insider-outsider” status’ ability to enable and 
constrain the research encounter, I actively engaged in reflexive analysis through all the 
stages in developing and implementing the study. Adopting reflexivity allowed the 
researcher to reflect upon, examine critically, and to critique self not only as an object of 
the inquiry but also in relation to the way the researcher analyzes the data. I remained 
mindful that researcher bias could cause researchers to jump into irrelevant conclusions 
and/or simply produce partial findings (Machi & McEvoy, 2016). The overarching goal 
was to be attuned to intersubjectivity as to realize the benefits of objective inquiry. 
  Figure 4.2:Thematic Analysis Process
Data transcription
Data abstracts
Abstracts clustered under 25 initial Codes
9 sub-themes
5 main themes
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Figure 4.3: Initial thematic map, showing 25 codes
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Figure 4.4: Developed thematic map, showing 9 sub-themes
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CHAPTER FIVE 
FINDING 
“Ours is a microfinance bank with a more human face” _ Chairman, Board of Directors 
 
“We focus on profit and not profit maximization” – An Executive Director   
 
This chapter details the findings of this investigation. The study investigated how 
the operators of Chikum Microfinance Bank Ltd sought to achieve sustainable 
microfinance practice. Social (outreach) and financial (commercial) goals are the “two 
legs” of the microfinance practice. A successful microfinance practice promotes 
simultaneously social and financial goals, also known as the double bottom line (Conning 
& Morduch, 201; Pinz & Helmig, 2015). Using a case study design, and the analytical 
frameworks of institutional logics as lens the study investigated how organizational 
identity (integrated logics) could foster and/or impede the pursuit of social and financial 
goals in Chikum Microfinance Bank Ltd. The findings indicated that the bank is 
intentional about achieving the dual objectives. Five key themes were generated from the 
study, and collectively they explained the bank’s goals attainment strategy: (a) 
shareholders’ avowed commitment to founding mission; (b) human asset development (c) 
pro-active poor products and services offering; (d) innovative/strategic products pricing, 
and (e) institutional competitive advantage. The conclusion that was interpreted from the 
themes was that the bank pursued both financial and social goals through integrated 
services approach. However, integrated services presented internal and external 
challenges. In presenting each of the five themes in detail, we illustrate how some of the 
data features provided the basis for our interpretation as well as answered the research 
question. 
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 Finding 1: Shareholders’ Avowed Commitment to Founding Mission  
Shareholders’ avowed commitment to founding mission relates to the 
shareholders’ commitment to mission goal primarily through controlling investor appetite 
for investment returns, investing for long-term gain and focusing on profitable returns as 
against profit maximization. The results showed that commitment to founding mission for 
the shareholders entails first making financial services available to the active poor, which 
also is the overarching principle behind all aspects of the bank’s activities. 
Control of Investor Appetite 
The data analysis revealed that during the formative stages of the bank the 
promoters considered the potential influence of shareholder’s self-interest on the mission 
of the bank and decided on who should invest in the bank. They recognized and worked 
to prevent conflicts which might arise from self-serving investment goals with 
organizational goal, in particular, appetite for investment returns common with financial 
investors. Financial logic, which is based on the supreme authority of shareholders’ 
interest would likely lead “financial directors” to seek to maximize their investment self-
interest over the social mission of the bank. As safeguard, the promoters championed by 
the Archbishop of the local church decided to exclude “wild money directors” – a term 
used by Juan Almandoz to describe financial investors whose only investment interest 
was in seeking high rates of return (Almandoz, 2012, p. 1386). Securing the cooperation 
of all investors required the integration of their multiple goals into the Archbishop’s 
vision. Prospective investors received prior information on the requirements and 
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expectations if they decide to invest in the bank. One of the initial shareholders provided 
insight on the decision, describing how he became an investor. 
…those of us who invested did out of our own volition. We are not compelled the 
few of us, you know the Archbishop and his charisma and his attitude towards 
public things. He will be careful. Definitely if he wants one billion, two billion he 
knows who to approach to give him the money. But these people are they really 
what he wants, can they afford to play down or slow their appetite because 
anybody who has that appetite of one billion will be needing two million and that 
is not what the Archbishop wants. So, he has to balance the investors, when he 
was looking for investors – people yes, they are good people, he also had that in 
mind (JN-ED). 
The shareholders consist of investors who embraced the dual blend of social and 
commercial value creation. “We have the major shareholders that have more of the 
nonfinancial objectives as its own core value” explained another director who is a 
minority shareholder. “And then you also have some of the minority shareholders that 
have recognized the need for this nonfinancial objective to be met. They recognized that 
before investing. So, they are not too conscious of dividend in the short run provided the 
organization will be sustained” (DA-ED). 
A similar perspective was expressed by a director representing a group of 
shareholders, and was not a member of the board at inception; “from the onset, it does 
appear at the foundation of the bank the mission was well spelt out and they 
(shareholders) were comfortable with that because severally in our meetings some of the 
directors who do not have much to do with the church, who do not represent a church 
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body or standing in for a group have always emphasized let us not deviate from what we 
have as our mission in this board - looking at how to reach out to the poor” (BO-ED).  
Investor controlled appetite for return on investment was observed in the attitude 
of the shareholders on dividend and recapitalization. Shareholders are unanimous in first 
growing the bank to an enviable level before distributing declared profit. “We have not 
been receiving dividends because we are more interested in growing the bank. We were 
receiving dividends some time ago, but we said everybody should slow his appetite, let us 
first of all develop the bank... And we tried to sell that idea at the AGM to the other 
investors … and say look why not you re-invest and reinvest until we come to a stage 
where we are able to do certain things without feeling it. That is what we have been doing 
so far….” (JN-ED).  
However, the decision to suspend dividend sharing should not be interpreted to 
mean that investors are not interested in making profit because as one of the executive 
directors explained; “if you are now operating without profit how do you meet up? And 
again if I am an investor, you need dividend and the calculation of dividend is based from 
the profit you have made…, the individual, everybody that is asked to put in money is 
putting money for a purpose and that is why you must have to make profit (JO-ED).  
The aim of controlled investor appetite is to be able “to move and increase our 
capital base, increase the number of our outposts. Where we have our presence, we will 
be reaching out more, we will have a higher reach to customers, to the active poor which 
is you know … do more impacting on the communities where we are” (OO-MD). The 
shareholders do not see their decision as an act of charity, rather it is a commitment “to 
do business with a more human face” (AO-BC), to first invest on the people and wait to 
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reap the benefits. “When you establish a business, you might not reap the dividend of the 
business immediately, it takes some time and over the years you will pay off the capitals 
and assets you invested there” (BO-AM). 
Investing for the Long Term 
Controlling investor’s appetite for returns on their investment is an organizational 
strategy to enable the bank to pursue long term growth. The data analysis revealed that 
Chikum’s shareholders are committed to the strategy of investing for the long term. 
“Each time we have had the AGM, the management meeting, there has been the issue of 
dividend coming up,” the chairman of the board explained. “What I have seen so far is 
that there has been a request on the part of the shareholders to plough back whatever 
dividend they would have taken away into the bank to help it grow further and better so 
the bonus will be more appreciable and appreciated in the long run… that has been the 
trust rather than wanting to just share the bonus and work away with it” (AO-BC).  
Sustainable social and financial goals are at the heart of the bank’s road map to 
success. However, seeking funding from any available source for capital growth would 
derail the vision of the founders. Shareholders’ commitment to long term investing 
enabled staff and management to focus on activities with greater future benefit. “The 
issue here is sustainability and of meeting the overall objective of the owners. If you look 
at … on the short term it could be seen to be conflicting in terms of profitability … by the 
time you grow these people you now have more and more people and the volume of that 
will compensate the financial short term deficit” (DA-ED). For the owners of the bank, it 
is a win-win strategy that fulfils in the “short-term” the needs of individual microfinance 
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clients and in the “long-term” the promoter’s need for outreach and operational 
sustainability. 
Profitable Returns versus Profit Maximization.  
Another strategy to goal attainment is emphasis on profitable returns as against 
profit maximization. Interview data show the bank’s policy is “to provide microfinance 
services with a more human face” (AO-BC). “The essence is to touch on the lives of 
people, to reduce the poverty rate, to assist the vulnerable people in the society. And we 
are not targeting to getting all the money in the world, just the one that can enable us to 
move” (JO-ED). To achieve its organizational goal, the bank recognizes that the path to 
financial sustainability is not synonymous with profit maximization. At the same time, 
outreach to the active poor is intimately connected to financial revenue. The interview 
data indicates the operators of the bank believe that focusing on growth does not take 
away resources, it is the bank’s core existence because the beneficiaries of their services 
are also their only customer. By focusing on financial services to the active poor – the 
one customer/stakeholder that fulfils its social and financial objectives – Chikum MFB 
uses depth of outreach to achieve profitability.  
The operators of the bank understand profit-oriented approach can lead to the 
abandonment of the poorest segment for the better-off clients to get better returns (Ashta 
& Hudon, 2009; Hermes et al., 2011; Mersland & Strom, 2010) and provided some 
safeguard. An executive director offered explanation, “that is why I said that we are not 
into profit maximization, but we look at profit making. If we are to maximize profit we 
will go to the highest; but since we must survive, we take a middle course that will keep 
the business floating and at the same time keep the customers satisfied and our mission 
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achieved” (BO-ED). While “some people are talking about some shylocks out there who 
want to make it almost impossible for poor people to access loans because of the high 
rate, because they are very greedy” another director explained, “Chikum because of the 
background it has, it is kind of like comfortable with average minimal gain that continues 
to sustain the business” (JO-ED). The director associated profit maximization in the 
industry to greedy investors whose only interest is to make money.  
You know most of the microfinance banks are owned by individuals and you 
know that human beings especially our people the way we are, some of us are 
over profiteering, they want to maximize their profit, they are not burdened….But 
our own we are looking at how it is going to affect our customer, how the 
business is going to move and again if we can get a little profit at least to maintain 
the bank… We talk of reasonable profit, but not over profiteering. (JO-ED) 
Reasonable profits are very possible and attainable through operational efficiency 
and integrated and innovative services delivery. Chikum combines a number of 
innovative products and strategies including technology, outpost location, product 
pricing, and hiring from outposts’ catchment areas amongst other measures to attain 
organizational goal. All these strategies are consistent with the bank’s long-term 
approach to balancing outreach with profitability. 
Tensions between Mission and Daily Demands   
However, commitment to founding mission does not mean that the decision has 
been a smooth sale, that Chikum is completely immune from mission drift. There have 
been occasional pressures even from within to give priority to profit seeking over social 
mission. One executive director shared that “sometimes the managers want to say, no, no 
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I need to invest in bigger projects so that I can have higher income. Fine there is no doubt 
about it, but you have to consider the other objectives of microfinance bank. It is micro, 
small, it is not macro” (JN-ED). Some managing directors would prefer better-off clients 
or different employee mix to get better returns. One ex-managing director of the bank 
voiced her opinion that the directors need to understand that microfinance cannot be 
successful in the manner the directors conceive of it. This manager like some of her 
predecessors came from the conventional banking background to head the bank. She 
expressed her objections with some of the bank’s policies with this statement; “you see 
when you have directors that are very knowledgeable, because Chikum have directors 
that are very knowledgeable in their own fields… and say use the Grameen bank model, 
and do like the Grameen bank people, we forget that we are in different countries. This is 
a country, and now this is your own country. The reality on ground, that is what you see, 
whether we like it or not … that is difficult” (CE-XMD). 
On their side, the directors are convinced of what they want; they appeared to be 
resolute on the task they set for themselves. An executive director described their efforts 
in a board meeting to focus the attention of a managing director on the thinking of the 
directors about growing the bank:  
It is so difficult because he (managing director) wants immediate result. We have 
employed him, he wants to make sure that if the bank has made 20 million profit 
this year, he has come in he wants to make 25 million. So, he needs immediate 
result. But we are telling him you have to balance the result as against the image 
of the bank; against the image of the organization that set up the bank, and that is 
the Archbishop (JN-ED). 
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It wasn’t quite obvious why the managers would differ from the directors in what 
seemed so obvious. It is assumed the staff and management of the bank would comprise 
of those who share the bank’s mission or those incentivized to join. The ex-managing 
director interviewed for this study provided a clue to what could be an explanation. 
No, you see everybody has his own area of specialization and that is what is 
impotant. Like I mentioned earlier, I was coming from a commercial bank that 
was affiliated with retail marketing…. So, it was not a problem, but what I see is 
that when somebody has an area of specialization, it is good to allow the person to 
show that area of specialization so that things don’t go away (CE-XMD). 
This can be explained either that the managers assumed that as managers they 
were the ones to chart the course of the bank or underestimated the intent and 
commitment of the directors to the mission of the bank. 
However, it seemed that the promoters are succeeding in sustaining the focus. The 
bank has refused to charge exorbitant rates for their services or to target wealthier and 
more profitable segments of the market. The head of audit and risk management touted 
the bank’s achievement with low-end customers. “… [i]f you check our customer base 
here you find out that over 70-80% of them are the active poor people. It is not as if we 
cannot deal with the big organizations, but we are more interested in the poor. Instead of 
giving a loan of five million to one individual, we spread the risk and if you spread the 
risk I think it is better for us in the sense that if you give one organization or one person 
five million naira and the person goes away with your money you have lost the whole 
five million naira but when you spread the risk giving to the poor may be out of that five 
million naira you give them fifty, fifty thousand naira or hundred, hundred thousand 
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naira, you give it to a couple of people” (EE-AM). The implication is that loan risk is not 
unique to micro borrowers. Macro borrowers also are susceptible to credit risk. From the 
proceeding, data analysis showed that shareholders’ avowed commitment to founding 
mission is pronounced and contributes to retaining the focus of the bank on easy and 
accessible financial services to the active poor. 
Mission Driven Products and Services.  
Shareholders’ avowed commitment to founding mission also encouraged the 
promotion of mission-driven products and services. Interview data indicated that mission 
driven products and services demands focusing first on identified needs rather than 
financial gains. The promoters shared a strong conviction that outreach to the poor though 
capital intensive in the short term, is both financially profitable and empowering of the 
poor in the long term. “The bank takes decisions that are based on things that may not have 
to do with making money immediately” (LO-CS). It is through first satisfying needs that 
the bank makes its money, in this case the needs of the active poor. The company secretary 
shared the example of the decision to open one of the bank’s outposts in a particular rural 
community,  
You see by the time the opening of Amaimo outpost came up, the SWAT business 
analysis was done, the initial business analysis would not have allowed the bank to 
open an outpost at Amaimo, however you look at it as a way of giving back to the 
people and started the Amaimo outpost…. Yes, the bank would not have gone to 
Amaimo, but there was the need to reach out to more people and we started from 
Amaimo. And when we look at it Amaimo connects to several axis. (LO-CS) 
94 
 
 
 
Evidence from interview data showed that Chikum MFB’s commitment to mission-
driven products and services continue to receive on-going emphasis by the bank’s 
executive directors who demand that management respect the mission of the bank. The 
analysis indicated that for the directors, the financial success of the bank depends on its 
acceptability as “the people’s bank” rather than on high interest rate. 
Finding 2: Human Asset Development. 
Human asset development outlines the ways the bank recruits, trains and inculcates 
organizational culture to its employees to meet organizational goals. The bank is intentional 
with who joins the organization. Employees comprise of those with conventional banking 
background, microfinance banking background, those from other related disciplines and 
fresh graduates from the university. The justification is that commercial microfinance 
banking is new and evolving, without any institutional script for how to provide 
commercial services to the active poor. For the same reason, job candidates with extensive 
experience or training in commercial microfinance typically are in short supply (Battilana 
& Dorado, 2010). The bank believes the right approach to good-fit employees is through 
training and orientation aimed at socializing recruits to think Chikum and her unique 
approach to serving the active poor. The analysis also indicates that despite some 
reasonable success the policy has also encountered resistance from some staff members.  
Intentional Recruitment  
Chikum MFB Ltd is open about the centrality of their organizational identity and 
intentional about how they recruit, train and orientate employees into the bank. To keep 
the mission on course and ensure good-fit employees to sustain their operations the 
interview data revealed that Chikum MFB Ltd hires individuals educated enough to 
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appreciate the challenges of a commercial microfinance organization, then augment it 
with training and orientation. The Board chairman echoed the reason for the emphasis, “It 
(Chikum MFB) was a movement of concern for the people which is not without some 
sense of compassion. At the same time, it wasn’t just meant to be a charity outfit where 
you just come and take money” (AO-BC). For the promoters of the bank the founding 
mission is not a feel-good mantra, the bank “was meant to serve as a stimulus for both 
educating and empowering people to do business in a more regulated and organized way” 
(AO-BC). Employees comprises of recent university graduates, those with commercial as 
well as microfinance background. The rationale is that commercial microfinance is 
relatively new, experienced microfinance workforce is limited. “So, the important thing is 
for the bank, in this case Chikum microfinance bank to inculcate its own culture into 
whoever is coming whether they are coming with the microfinance background or the 
commercial bank background or whether they are coming fresh from school, you must 
have your own culture. You teach them what you value” (RO-XED). 
Another interviewee expressed similar views, “commercial banking is totally 
different from microfinance banking and you have to source from the same market with 
commercial banks for microfinance employees. So, you have to emphasize more on the 
training of the staff to be able to let them understand the characteristics of the customers 
they are going to serve, the peculiarities, the needs, the respect, which is totally different” 
(DA-ED). Chikum MFB has to train its workers to operate as the organization thinks fit to 
accomplish its goals. In particular, in addition to the general microfinance environment, 
the employees needed to understand the peculiarities of the bank as a bank with a unique 
mission.  “Chikum has a culture, there is a culture in Chikum and that culture we have tried 
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to maintain and not to get watered down even with fresh employment and of course exit of 
staff which is something that is a normal phenomenon and that we do via trainings” (OO-
MD). 
In advertisements for employment into the bank, Chikum targets individuals with 
interest in working in a microfinance institution. To get the job, respondents had to go 
through the highly formalized and selective hiring system that has been developed over the 
ten years of the bank’s existence. The process included an initial screening of CVs, an 
exam, an orientation course, and six-month trial period. According to the bank’s managing 
director,  
What the bank has done and is still currently doing is trying to employ people who 
have an idea about microfinance banking, and even employing those who may not 
have an idea about it. However, there is training and retraining and retraining 
because the microfinance banking terrain like we have agreed is certainly slightly 
different. …So, in employing staff we have tried to employ staffs who are 
experienced, we have a good number of staff within the country who are 
experienced in microfinance banking trying to source for those experienced staff 
and also get some fresh hands and also train them. We do constant and periodic 
training (OO-MD). 
Investing in Training and Orientation.  
All employees received training at the time of joining the bank. Initial training is 
usually the most intensive delivered during a two-week orientation conducted when 
someone is hired. During the first week new hires were trained on the history and culture 
of the bank aimed at gaining their commitment to the organization’s mission.  
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What we do mainly is that we make sure we give our staff quality training and make 
sure we don’t recruit anyhow. We take our time to do the recruitment, to make sure 
that we filter people from the entry point – application process - and take those that 
you examine and feel yes, this person has the passion for this job. We start from 
there and when they come in we also train them before they join the organization 
like if you look at the training center there now there are some people there now, 
they are getting them some training, we tell them about our mission and vision, how 
we operate generally (EE-AM). 
Successful recruits are hired on a six months probationary period, after which their 
employment is confirmed or terminated based on established criteria for confirmation.  
Follow up training can be organized once a month or as needs arise. “The bank encourages 
the staff to go for external training as well as internal training to keep the staff abreast of 
latest development as regards running of microfinance institutions, what is happening in 
the society. So that is the only way we can move forward” (JO-RM). To motivate 
employees to enlist in routine training the bank encourages promotion from within. The 
human resources policy provides for front line employees to progress to middle manager 
positions. 
We have periodic reviews of the staff, periodic reviews of performance of staff and 
trainings and re-training and of course we also do postings to ensure that the 
customer has a feel of the different departments and units so that you don’t stagnate 
in one unit. We make it such that staffs are moved around different units so that 
they can you know ehm so that we can operate more effectively (OO-MD). 
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However, there is an exception to the policy of promotion from within. Top 
management positions are typically filled by any qualifying candidate from within or 
outside the bank. Interview data showed that from past experience, the bank has favored 
those with commercial banking background for top management positions. The bank 
prefers individuals with commercial banking background for top management position 
because according to one of the ex-executive directors, “for somebody to be a managing 
director of a microfinance bank s/he must have handled banking at a lower level (must have 
grown from the ranks), have grown up through the ranks. That is where you get better 
people. This is why sometimes they go back to people coming from the commercial bank, 
because they have grown up to that level. They are believed to know the system very well 
to carry the bank to where you want to. It is not easy just getting somebody and planting 
that person at that level. It is not easy” (RO-XED). 
Hiring managers with conventional banking experience did not always deliver the 
desired result. The policy seems to have recorded with success at the beginning. An 
interviewee who joined the bank from the time it opened noted the change. “I think few 
years back and now there are…so many things changed from what I met when I came in. 
Like when I came in then it was like a neutral ground you are free to operate easily, no 
staff sees himself or herself as more superior than the other and it gave everybody a sense 
of belonging to go out there and do the job. … But over a little time now things have 
changed” (JC-CS). Bringing in people from the outside in particular at the top 
management position has led to persistent tensions between incoming managing directors 
and the board focused on the overall vision. Some of the tensions was observed in the 
following comments of a manager who voiced frustration at not being able to have 
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freehand to certain kinds of employees given her position and expertise as a professional 
banker,  
it is possible to get and build your own culture. But there were a lot of 
interference. In a way, ehm because if you are handed the mantle and said drive 
this, do this as long as money is not really involved or anything. I should be able 
to tell with years of experience I have dealing with people being a supervisor, 
being a manager and all that and I have run successful business. I should be able 
to say okay fine, this crop or this set of people will not fit into what you need 
(CE-XMD).  
In a ten-year period, the bank had hired five managing directors, three of whom with 
conventional banking experience and the other two with a mixture of both conventional 
and microfinance backgrounds. The average stay of the previous four managing directors 
was less than one and a half years which could be linked to lack of shared value or 
synergy. Implementing a policy of hybrid workforce can help the organization balance its 
social and commercial objectives if proper structures capable of handling concomitant 
conflicts arising from retooling ingrained habits exist. However, interview data revealed 
mismatch between the board and some managers on how and means of achieving goals. 
Either top management failed to embrace fully the vision of the founders, or they were 
incapable of inculcating same to the staff. Training and orientation have not produced the 
good fit workforce it was intended to bring due in part to the high turnover rate of 
managers. 
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Finding 3: Pro-active Poor Products and Services Delivery. 
The data analysis indicated Chikum MFB Ltd is committed to systems designed 
to developing integrated services to microfinance clients for organizational goal. Pro-
active poor products and services delivery outlines variety of products and services 
tailored to encourage a savings culture, build long-term customer commitment, provide 
collateral substitutes for microcredit facilities, and enable ease of access through outpost 
locations and integration of non-financial services for optimal result. The essence is to 
meet the diverse needs of the active poor population. The interview data analysis showed 
these varied products and services as being linked to overall strategies aimed at 
advancing the bank’s mission. 
Financial and Non-financial Products and Services.  
Based on the understanding that the challenges of the active poor are not merely 
access to credit alone, the promoters of Chikum MFB Ltd embraced the broad concept of 
microfinance. The broad concept involves the provision of both financial and 
nonfinancial services consisting of micro loans, deposit savings, fund transfer, financial 
education, formal and informal appraisal of borrowers, collateral substitutes for loan 
disbursement, training and technical support. The bank’s Managing Director outlined the 
variety of products and services the bank currently makes available to its customers in 
this lengthy description: 
We offer everything… we have several products where we have several 
terminologies. We have products where we are targeting savings accounts. We 
also have the fixed deposit accounts where we encourage the customers to place 
funds, idle funds that they are not using, or they don’t have use for at a period of 
101 
 
 
 
time immediately at a certain interest rate with us. We also offer salary 
administration... We also offer cash pick-up services ... to ensure that our 
customers do not have cash lying about in their business premises and not secure 
during the weekends. We also do daily cash pick up what we call like an isusu 
kind of contributory kind of accounts. We also do loan services. We provide loans 
what we call credit facilities to business to help build up their services. We also 
do loan services to salary earners…. We also do transfers though locally like I 
mentioned because by CBN guidelines we are not supposed to do foreign 
transfers. We also do “standing orders”, we have standing orders whereby we 
have customers who issue us standby order instructions to make monthly or 
bimonthly payments depending on how they want it, others for transfers either 
from their salary accounts to some savings that they do. And it goes on. (OO-
MD). 
Microfinance clients and their needs are varied and include market women, traders, shop 
owners, produce sellers, artisans, and low-income government workers. Chikum MFB’s 
wide-ranging financial products’ offering speaks to the bank’s client-focused services 
designed for the microfinance client population. Client-focused services entail not only 
making available a basket of financial services that addresses the financial needs of 
microfinance clients, but it also demands the integration of financial services with 
nonfinancial services related to those needs. It has been noted that for microcredit to be 
useful, the poor need a range of other nonfinancial products including financial education 
and business development (Ashta, Couchoro, & Musa, 2014). Data analysis revealed the 
bank recognizes the challenges of the active poor are not only a lack of funds, but in 
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addition, the need for nonfinancial supportive services that enables credit clients and 
micro entrepreneurs to better deploy and manage the funds. According to a credit and 
marketing staff, “we also advise them on how to establish their businesses like there are 
so many of them that are into businesses that doesn’t know how to manage it. There are 
some of them that have money, but they don’t know how to make use of that money, 
there are some of them that have started something, and they don’t know how to establish 
it” (RO-CS). The chairman, board finance and general-purpose committee highlighted the 
value Chikum MFB Ltd accords the nonfinancial component the bank attaches to its 
financial products. 
You know there is an aspect that is not very much emphasized. The poor, yes, 
they need money, but it is not all about money. They also need some intellectual 
empowerment. When people have an idea of business or conceive an idea, one is 
to ask for money, but the other is to have clear idea of what they are about to do 
(BO-ED).  
He goes a step further to explain what the bank does in practice when clients approach 
the bank. 
So, coming in contact with the bank, the bank will help you to streamline what 
you want to do and see if it is workable or not. That is why in the bank you talk of 
the risk department that will come in as you apply for facility, look at what you 
are applying for, will it really carry the business you are trying to do. And this 
idea you have conceived is it workable. You know one thing is to picture 
something another is to translate it into reality. There are a lot of challenges and 
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from experience the people who are working in the bank are better placed to tell 
you, no, this is not going to work here or there (BO-ED). 
In addition to business education and risk management, the operators of the bank 
also provide other nonfinancial services that include training and technical assistance 
related to financial management, bookkeeping and group formation for group bargaining 
power. In particular, the interviewees referenced the services offered to market traders 
and the members of the Catholic Women Organization (CWO) as cases in point. The 
CWO are an umbrella body that empowers and protects the interest of women in the 
Church and has substantial influence both within the church and in the wider society. The 
organization is also financially invested in the bank as one of the bank’s group 
shareholders. The bank offers loans and provides appropriate technical and business 
assistance in self-help programs to individual members of the CWO organization. 
Prospective loan applicants are encouraged to form small groups to receive funding for 
their micro economic activities.  
The bank plays an active role in matching prospective borrowers to avoid social 
animosity among them. Group sizes range from three to ten members per group. With the 
technical support from the bank’s staff their businesses are nurtured and grown into 
profitable ventures. The grouping enabled the bank to disburse loans in lump sums that 
the group members in turn share individually according to their individual needs and 
strength. It also makes it possible for the group members to cross-guarantee each other. 
An interviewee offered insight on how the bank assembled one of such groups and the 
services provided to them: 
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Currently there are some services we are giving to women in the church. We went 
to the church telling the women that they can come because using the church as 
an umbrella they are sort of a co-operative in the church, they can come as a 
group with the surety of their executive. If they come, these women are from St. 
Lazarus, from St. Georges they come together, they want like ₦100, 000 but they 
don’t have the same strength, for example this person want ₦10, 000 the other 
person want ₦30, 000, and this other person want ₦40, 000 etc., we spread it 
among them and by the time you calculate it, you are getting like ₦100, 000 for 
one set of group (VI-IM). 
The interview analysis revealed that such group lending arrangements has multiple 
benefits to the bank. First, it increases the bank’s number of micro borrowers, positively 
influencing the bank’s depth of outreach rating. Depth of outreach is an important rating 
index of a microfinance institution’s level of commitment to the very poor. Second, 
group-member cross-guarantee helps mitigate loan risks as delinquency could result to 
social shaming from the group. In the case of the CWO group, the linkage with the CWO 
organization leadership provides a second layer of protection for the bank. Also, the bank 
equally benefits from the reduction in transaction costs associated with lending to small 
scale individuals. As a whole, nonfinancial services profit both parties, it is a service that 
provides benefit to both the borrower and the bank lending the money. It helps the 
borrower succeed with his idea as well as safeguard the bank’s money entrusted to the 
borrower. 
Although some have argued that training and technical assistance are costly to 
provide and may undermine financial self-sufficiency such services are beneficial for 
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microenterprises. In the case of Chikum, the analysis showed it has increased its outreach 
and profitability. Dichter’s (1996) study indicated that business that act in their own self-
interest and stop providing nonfinancial services to achieve financial sustainability might 
not be building sustainable development for the poor because without other inputs than 
credit, many micro-loan recipients have enormous difficulty making productive use of 
these small loans. The prominence of non-financial services and connections to 
community organizations show that the bank invests significantly in mission-related 
aspects to complement and balance financial objectives.  
Outposts Location Strategy.  
Outpost location is another strategy for mission goal attainment. Coupled with 
varied products and service offerings, is making financial services easily accessible 
through the policy of outposts expansion. Staff uses the terms “outpost”, “outlet” and 
“branch” interchangeably. Outposts serve as branches but are not the equivalent of a bank 
branch. Chikum MFB Ltd endorsed outposts for economic and operational reasons. 
Though the bank is licensed to have branches, it rather uses outposts because of the cost 
implications. Albeit, outposts have limitations which includes the inability to host a vault. 
Cash have to be moved between head office and the outposts on a daily basis. Outpost 
expansion and strategic positioning are integral to attaining organizational goal. First, to 
be able to operate in more than one location essential to meeting mission goal, Chikum 
MFB Ltd invested heavily to attain the status of a state-level microfinance bank. The 
Central Bank of Nigeria has different requirements for participation at any of the three 
levels of microfinance practice in the country (CBN, 2011). For Chikum MFB, easy and 
accessible financial services to the active poor demands operating from more than one 
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location. The managing director explained the necessity of outpost locations in these 
words, “we are not only in one location because obviously if we are trying to reach out to 
people, we can’t conveniently do that from one location. The bank has been able to over 
the years have about six other outposts in addition to where we are, where we call the 
head office” (OO-MD).  
According to one of the founding directors, the active poor will not be able to 
access financial services if it is not within their reach. Since setting up outposts are 
fundamental to mission goal  
“…. we now tried to sale this idea to the managing director, the board has sold 
this idea to the managing director to form a lot of outlets, to go to the villages 
where the big banks or the commercial banks cannot get to because that is the 
whole concept of micro financing, for example we set up an outlet at Amaimo 
where within the ten to twenty kilometer around there is no commercial bank 
around and the people are yearning, these are the little, little people, and apart 
from even helping them financially their relations outside the country or in the big 
towns want to send them money at home” (JN-ED). 
A branch manager in charge of one of the outposts expressed similar understanding 
adding that multiple outposts give competitive advantage. “We have made sure that we 
have branches scattered because if you assume that everybody will come from Amaimo 
to Chikum is enough to make sure that they don’t get access to our facility. And we know 
that. So, we have gone as far as a bank planting a location like Amaimo to make sure that 
those funds are accessible to Ikeduru, Amaimo and its environs. We have planted another 
one at World Bank which is taking care of Umuguma, Irete, Avu etc., that axis. We have 
107 
 
 
 
another one at Douglas, so there is no need of saying I have to close shop and come to 
Chikum Whetheral enter hold-ups and all that” (CA-BM).  
Outpost expansion is integral to Chikum’s mission of easy and accessible 
financial services to the active poor. Most microfinance clients reside in the suburbs 
where there are no banking facilities, or their trade activities prevent them from leaving 
their shops to carry out banking transactions. Outpost’s expansion makes it easier to 
reach more people and for the bank to be near to where the needs are and for credit and 
marketing staff to monitor the progress of loan-supported businesses of their loan clients.  
Second, the outposts provide safer and profitable alternative to a large informal 
sector activity that uses inefficient traditional saving methods. People in poorer societies 
as well as poorer communities within richer societies often save in very traditional and 
informal ways partly due to their lack of access to mainstream banking services 
(Struthers, 2011). For the operators of Chikum MFB the policy of multiple outposts is 
also a business strategy for sustainability. 
“The locations that have been created have markets that were looked at before 
citing those outposts in those locations and the idea is to reach out to the 
communities and to the unbanked, and to the poor, the active poor around those 
areas and ensure that banking services are brought to them and see how that can 
also impact on their businesses and their personal lives” (OO-MD). 
In addition to providing better savings alternatives to those without access to financial 
institutions, the strategy also promotes the federal government’s efforts at integrating the 
informal sector into the mainstream economy. By encouraging their customers to save 
their money with the bank, which also serves as collateral for certain levels of borrowing, 
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the bank succeeds in mopping up excess cash from the informal economy into the formal 
economy. 
However, the strategy of multiple outpost locations is not without some 
challenges. There are security issues related to safety of cash movement between the 
outposts and corporate office, lack of adequate technology for interconnectivity, and 
operational cost. An executive director with conventional banking background described 
some of the challenges, “we have six outlets, to be able to run them synergistically that is 
key, so that wherever you are, in whichever branch you are let the connectivity be there 
to be able to have access to anything. And then even look at what we call on-line 
banking, well what we  call on-line banking here is just paying and receiving but to be 
able to do real time banking, being able to fill your form from where ever you are, you 
don’t need to walk into any branch of Chikum to do that. Fill the form on-line” (OI-ED). 
The strategy of outpost expansion is capital and labor intensive and has not been 
well received by some top management personnel who would prefer to invest the money 
serving higher end customers for higher profit margin. Having more branches creates 
higher overhead costs while improving access for low-income customers. Fewer branches 
would increase profitability and may also allow the bank to concentrate efforts on more 
profitable customers. The data analysis indicates that the directors have consistently 
resisted pressures to embrace such a mission drift. According to the chairman of the 
board, “The Chikum microfinance bank is an initiative that was born out of a desire to 
make funds available to the under serviced or underserved population of the Archdiocese 
of the community in which we live, and the population of the state of Imo who place a 
high premium on the credibility of the church … to start up the microfinance bank and it 
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has proven to be helpful to quite a considerable constituency” (AO-BC). Rather than 
place emphasis on high-end clients, the directors encouraged management to embrace an 
integrated approach to meeting organizational goals. Integrated approach in this instance 
means harnessing the strengths provided by the identity of the bank while mitigating its 
shortfalls. 
Integrated Practice. 
Integrated approach is not easy either. Commitment to integrated practice has 
long been identified as a source of normative tension and conflict even in organizations 
focused on maintaining the balance between social and commercial goals (Battilana & 
Dorado, 2010). Interview data offered evidence of tensions between board members 
committed to putting the bank’s hybrid identity to positive outcome and managing 
directors who subscribe to only a side of the coin – a tension caused primarily by a lack 
of willingness to integrate social and commercial orientations. The executive directors 
viewed such tensions as evidence of poor understanding on the part of the managers 
about the essence of the microfinance practice or of the primary objective of the 
promoters. 
Collateral Substitutes.  
Collateral substitute is another microfinance service to the poor provided by 
Chikum MFB. Financial institutions including microfinance banks use collaterals to 
mitigate credit risks. The inability to provide collateral is a key barrier to accessing micro 
credits for the active poor. To mitigate credit risk and enable microcredit access to their 
loan customers, Chikum MFB offers a range of collateral substitutes. An executive 
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director provided explanation to Chikum’s collateral policy and the need to customize the 
requirements for different classes of borrowers.  
And we told the managing director that the “conditionalities” if I can put it that 
way of granting loans to somebody in Owerri may be has to be different from the 
“conditionalities” for those in the rural areas because they are the ones who need, 
who don’t have anything going on for them except for the local marketing. So, 
you have to be very careful, don’t begin to ask the woman in the village to go and 
get guarantor of a civil servant because there is no civil service in Amaimo… So 
what I am saying in effect is that while they are trying to protect, because 
microfinance is owned by investors you also have to protect them, you don’t have 
to start dashing them money otherwise you will have many bad debts and that will 
affect the running of the bank and no investor will like to hear stories. (JN-ED). 
Some of the recommendations came from the input of those working in the front line. A 
credit and marketing staff stated how input from the bottom makes the difference. “For us 
to be able to do it, I think because every work lies on us the marketers because we are the 
face of the bank, because we are the ones interacting with these customers, we are the 
ones that recommended them to the bank, they should lessen the requirement because we 
are the one that is supposed to be with the customers, knowing when they want to default. 
Because if a customer wants to default; as a marketer, as the person that is going to him 
or her you should know” (RO-CS) 
In microfinance banking, credit risk is one of the greatest challenges to financial 
sustainability. Chikum has to protect itself from loan loss. “And also in terms of the 
collateral requirements; we also look at that, but in looking at that, we look at the risk-
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mitigants to make sure that while you are relaxing the requirements, you also ensure that 
at the end of the day the institution does not suffer a loss, unnecessary loss towards such” 
(DA-ED).  
The data analysis showed that Chikum MFB adopted several measures for credit 
risk management. To mitigate incidents of loan loss Chikum MFB combines a number of 
measures including guarantor requirements, group lending, savings deposits, and 
dynamic incentives. The innovation about these collateral alternatives is that they are 
tailored to suite the borrower’s unique circumstance. They are not the same for all 
customers; rather the bank has the flexibility to demand a collateral substitute relative to 
the borrower. For instance, for guarantor requirements, while market traders could be 
asked to guarantee their loans with the original copy of their shop lease agreement, and 
salary employees to domicile their salary account with the bank, individual borrowers 
may be asked to provide attestations from their community or church leaders as 
guarantors. Operating some forms of savings deposit can also certify the need for 
collateral. For instance, ROSCA, a savings account product also serves as a collateral 
substitute for the account holders.  
“Rotatory Savings (ROSCA), yes and by the grace of God Chikum is the pioneer 
of ROSCA especially in Douglas market, it is selling. It is their own money; it is 
their own savings. They will begin like deposit ten, ten thousand every month. By 
the sixth month they are eligible to get 80% of their own savings as loan and at 
the same time that money that they are given serves as cash collateral. So since 
they are not banks, they won’t understand the dynamics – ROSCA” (CA-BM). 
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Group lending serves as collateral substitute when group members serve as cross-
guarantors to each other or the parent body undertakes to suttee the members of the 
group. 
Dynamic Incentives. 
In addition to savings deposit, group lending and guarantor requirement, Chikum MFB 
used dynamic incentives to secure high repayment rates. Dynamic incentive is a form of 
progressive lending whereby the borrower receives progressive increase in loan size upon 
satisfactory repayment of the previous loan. With progressive lending once people prove 
that they are a low risk of default, they can then progress to other forms of financial 
investments such as larger loan size, longer-term savings and insurance. One downside 
however is that dynamic incentive wanes in the presence of competition. It thrives in 
locations where mobility is relatively low (Idolor, 2012) as is the case in rural 
communities. Interview data indicated Chikum combined dynamic incentives with 
competitive pricing to dominate the microcredit market.  
Finding 4:  Innovative/Strategic Products Pricing. 
Innovative strategic products’ pricing focuses on financial and marketing strategies “to 
reaching the poor without burning our fingers.” (JO-ED) The analysis associated lower 
interest rates, aggressive deposit mobilization, interest rates concession, and focus on 
long term gains as components of Chikum’s innovative/strategic products pricing. The 
study found that controlling operational expenses through innovative approaches 
including hiring from outpost catchment communities, enlisting support of host 
communities and quality asset management (investment of liquid assets in Treasury Bill) 
helped to control transaction expenses and increase profit margin. 
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Product Pricing as a Financial and Marketing Strategy.  
Interest rate strategy: Data analysis showed that Chikum MFB has an 
established policy of cheapest interest rate strategy. The bank’s cheapest interest rate loan 
policy echoes the bank’s image as a bank for the active poor. The bank uses it also as a 
business strategy. As part of the bank’s mission to make financial resources easily 
affordable to the active poor, cheapest interest loan rate “goes back to our mission and the 
mind of the people that started our bank. Our bank actually has a church background with 
the chairman of the board of directors as the Archbishop of Owerri, Most Rev. Dr. 
Anthony J.V. Obinna. The reason for opening the bank cannot be overstated. But if you 
are to help people and then kill them in the process, you have not helped anybody. You 
have only helped yourself. That is why we have tried to maintain a conservative rate. In 
order to help businesses grow at the same time the bank also will be making profit (LO-
CS). 
However, as a marketing strategy, the bank does not arbitrarily offer interest rates 
that are lower than their competitors. Chikum MFB structured its cheapest loan interest 
rate based on their analysis of the market and their perceived competitive advantage. First 
the bank takes advantage of the provisions of the regulatory body – the Central Bank – to 
determine their loan interest rate. From the data analysis the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(CBN) establishes interest rate guidelines and allows individual microfinance banks some 
leverage on fixing their own rates. Interview data from one of the bank’s ex-managing 
directors revealed how Chikum arrives at interest rates using the CBN’s guideline. “CBN 
had to bring out the guideline for interest rate for every bank including microfinance 
banks. Usually, they streamline what they call processing fee, management fee. When 
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they do that, then they now leave the interest rate to be negotiable. ... It is left for it to be 
negotiable…. And it is difficult to ignore certain things because you cannot be increasing 
your expenses and leaving your income, you cannot sustain that. You need to do 
something. It is either bringing down your expenses and bringing down your interest rate 
or you raise them up, so that it balances out” (CE-XMD). The Central Bank fixes the 
processing fee and management fee for all microfinance banks. The negotiable 
component which also explains differences in rates between banks is the function of each 
individual bank’s cost of capital and operational efficiency. A bank’s source of fund and 
operational efficiency are two key factors that could explain what the bank charges as 
loan interest rate.  
In Chikum MFB, cheapest interest rate policy is a marketing strategy,  
… the rate reduction is not a strategy to shoot ourselves on the leg, we also look at 
being competitive; we have lots of microfinance banks who are charging slightly 
higher than what we are charging. However, we are looking at having to make our 
services reach out to more people because the more people we can get with the 
reduced interest rate the more we can also increase the business that we are doing 
(OO-MD).  
To ensure that Chikum MFB is really offering the cheapest interest rate in the market, the 
head, Credit and Marketing department provided the explanation that was also 
corroborated by other interviewees. “We normally do a market survey of what the 
competition is doing before fixing the price or adjusting the pricing in terms of the 
interest rate so that it is always the cheapest in the industry at every point in time and we 
still sustain that and maintain it” (KO-BM). Because the market is there, the demand is 
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high, with the cheapest lower interest rate “you use volume to take care of the shortfall, 
because if you increase the volume of loans you will be able to recoup whatever 
difference in terms of what may have resulted in the drop in interest rates” (BO-ED). In 
addition to the “game of volume”, the bank takes advantage of her operational efficiency. 
According to the chairman board credit committee, “you also look at operational 
efficiency to make sure that your cost is not, your operational cost is efficiently managed. 
So, with that you will be able to more than compensate for any drop in the interest rate” 
(DA-ED).  
After Chikum determines what the competitor is offering, it then determines what 
to offer as rate, usually a few percentage points below the comparable market. For 
instance at the time of this interview, while their competitors were charging between 4% 
and 6% interest rate, Chikum’s interest rate was 3.5%. According to the company 
secretary, “It is a bit dicey… Look at the interpretation, if you charge at a rate though not 
below market rate at a moderate rate you attract good businesses, people who want to 
grow with the bank as the bank grows… And also, when you do this you are able to reach 
poor people. The profit that you would have made with fast rich people in charging 5% or 
6% or whatever percent, you may not get it at once. But if you charge 3% you will be 
able to reach out to more people. Those people that are doing more businesses will 
become regular customers to the bank. As the bank grows their businesses as well grows. 
And because whatever profit you make at that point it will continue to gradually ascend 
up. That is the point behind it. It is a good point” (LO-CS). 
In addition to reaching out to the poor and taking advantage of volume, cheapest 
interest rate policy serves to increase customer loyalty. It serves as a long-term market 
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strategy in the sense that “we wanted not just to win for now, but also the cumulative 
effect that will come overall. Customers compare; really, they will ask, these ones gave 
me 5% but these ones gave me 3% … the word of mouth effect because for each market 
they know themselves. We wanted to bank on that and draw people in which we have 
achieved to a very large extent, to a very large extent. That is why we were able to cash 
in and move out in our outlets” (OI-ED).  
Deposits Mobilization.  
Chikum identified the financial benefits of deposit mobilization for the sustenance 
of its operational services. In a society of large informal financial sector and based mostly 
on cash transactions, Chikum saw an unmet need for reliable savings products.  Interview 
data showed that Chikum MFB uses a variety of savings products to mobilize deposits 
from the general public. “We are interested in cash deposits, which are deposit 
mobilization; there are some special products like this daily contribution, “isusu” as it is 
called. Anybody might decide to and say I want to save for so, so and so number of 
months or years; at the end of that month or year collect whatever amount you have saved 
and we also make sure the interest is high so that it will attract people to do that” (EE-
AM). Other savings account products include corporate savings, individual/personal 
savings account, salary account and target account designed to enable customers 
accumulate funds for a particular event like rent, school fees payment or economic 
projects (KO-BM). For instance, the bank’s mobilized deposits stood at 584.31 million in 
2016 and 614.38 million in 2017 from a customer base of   27,755 in 2017 and 25,181 in 
2016 (Audited Financial Report, 2017). Savings accounts represented 48% (14,288) of all 
customer accounts in 2017 and 48% (12,987) in 2016. Mobilized deposits served to 
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provide funds for on-lending and also to increase profit margin through secure investment 
in Treasury Bills. The 2017 audited financial report revealed that while the bank 
dispensed 68.83 million and 46.58 million respectively on micro and macro loans, the 
sum of 575.50 million of mobilized deposits was invested in Treasury bills. The point to 
be made however is that on one hand, the various forms of savings products encouraged a 
savings culture, financial discipline, and provided collateral substitutes for customers. On 
the other hand, Chikum used the products to mop up cash from the society to satisfy loan 
requests, secure loans and invest in Treasury bills. 
Concession Interest Rate.  
In line with the social mission component, Chikum engages in financing 
negotiations with third party groups or individuals desirous of assisting the active poor in 
a sustainable manner. The finding indicated that Chikum used the benefit of its identity – 
integrated financial and social orientation – to provide concession interest rate products to 
identified customers. Our interview evidence and documents review indicated that 
concession interest rate beneficiaries pay interest rate lower than the normal loan 
customer because a third party has offered to pay the balance of full interest rate for the 
recipient. The third parties individual or group are people who arrange with the bank to 
empower identified individuals or groups without the beneficiary knowing about the 
agreement with the bank. The bank will charge the market rate on the loan, but the 
recipient pays no interest or a concession rate which is lower than the bank rate because 
the difference has been covered by the third party. An interviewee described concession 
interest rate:  
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… like there are people we know that are not paying the same interest rate, they 
are receiving interest rate concession. For instance, an individual from some place 
will come and say I will deposit this amount of money for you to give them this 
other amount of money. Before the expiration of the loan they can finish paying 
back the loan, but I don’t want them to be charged the prevailing rate. … Even 
some will go to the extent of okay let me pay the management fee, the upfront 
charges for these people. I don’t want them to suffer, let me even pay the interest 
rate even though it is a reduced interest rate let me pay it, take care of the upfront 
charges, let them just pay the principal amount of the loan (VI-IM). 
Finding 5: Institutional Competitive Advantage 
Institutional competitive advantage focuses on the bank’s institutional integrity 
and reputation, credibility and legitimacy clout, state level status and operational 
efficiencies. The interviewees discuss the reputation of the directors, association with the 
local church body and the bank’s market share. The data analysis revealed that the bank 
is very mindful it has something the competitors don’t have and are not in the position to 
easily acquire. 
Credibility and Legitimacy Clout.  
Chikum MFB Ltd has good reputation and optimizes the benefits of her 
credibility and legitimacy status. Factors that confer credibility and legitimacy include 
founders’ reputation and or affiliation with higher status organizations (Baum & Oliver, 
1992). Evidence from interview data and reviewed documents suggested that the bank’s 
institutional integrity resulted in greater acceptability and trust especially in a society 
where the integrity of the overall banking sector is in question. An executive director who 
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described the bank’s identity as a trademark shared that people perceived the bank to be a 
credible and reliable institution. 
I will call that our trademark. For the fact that we have a trademark – the church – 
in a place where people are skeptical and suspicious of others it is an advantage. 
They have some confidence to deal with you and to do business with you, 
knowing that “the person” they are doing business with can be reached, has 
integrity is reliable and also has what it takes to sustain the business both by 
human resources and financial resources. So that is an advantage really (BO-ED). 
Another executive director highlighted the reason for the legitimacy the bank enjoys. It is 
“because of the way things have gone wrong in the society, trust has become a major, 
major challenge. The affiliation with the faith gives it a unique advantage relative to other 
institutions in terms of trust because banking is a trust based service, if the trust is not 
there the depositors in particular will not in the long run keep their money but once they 
know that there is a trust there” (DA-ED).  
In general, customers perceive the bank as a reliable institution, operating on the 
principles of trust, generosity and ideology, in particular, the bank’s identification with 
the local church (Interview note, Sept. 2019). A credit and marketing staff spoke of her 
experience working for the bank, how the name of the bank and its founders opens the 
door of business in particular with savings clients. “So the church gives us that soft 
landing, it is something that many in fact all MFBs in Imo State run mad about, and that 
is why we are different, that is our edge, that is why they envy us, and that is the 
confidence we have in the market. You don’t need to talk two times, just we are Chikum, 
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we are from the Archdiocese, you see them trouping in, that is the advantage we have in 
this ROSCA product” (CA-BM). 
Leveraging Opportunities 
The unique identity of the bank as a hybrid institution combining social mission 
and commercial skills made it possible for the bank to enjoy “third party patronage” and 
create differentiated products with those who need reliable structures to empower the 
active poor. Third party patronage was observed with individuals or groups who solicit 
the bank to act as their proxy to provide credit facilities to the active poor of their 
communities (see concession interest rate product). Individuals who want to empower 
and support their relatives or micro entrepreneurs in need of start-off capital but do not 
want such financial assistance to be misunderstood as charity by the recipients approach 
the bank to dispense those funds. The individual negotiates with the bank, opens an 
account and deposits the fund with the bank, then the bank uses its structures to dispense 
the loans. The target group or individuals are marketed to approach the bank for loans at 
concession interest rate unaware of the source of the funding. One of the bank’s longest 
serving employee who worked in the marketing department detailed how it first started. 
Actually, the first one we got is a woman leaving in America, she did it for her 
people in Amaimo. We didn’t really go out to look for the customer, the customer 
heard about us; she came down one time she visited and made such proposition 
how it will work.  Actually, that first one we did wasn’t 100% cash backed. She 
just paid in little money which we put in fixed deposit and we now gave money to 
her people, the first experience wasn’t very ok anyway but we got the money after 
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some struggle but subsequently the last two people that also had that agreement 
with us, they had 100% cash deposited for that transaction (VI-IM).  
The money the individual or group deposited to the bank serves as cash collateral 
and the bank will issue micro loans to the loan recipients as in their usual credit 
transactions though at a concession interest rate. The loan recipient knows nothing about 
the agreement between the bank and the depositor. The bank calls it “concession interest 
rate product”. In the arrangement the bank does not lose any interest income and also the 
loan recipient receives loan at below market interest rate because the depositor absorbs 
all or the balance between the bank’s rate and the concession interest rate the recipient 
pays. An outpost branch manager indicated how the product is an on-going service in the 
branch, 
Yes, we have, right now we have about two individuals and one is an NGO and 
then another one is an individual who comes and says ‘we want you to help 
people. They now place their funds with us and say ‘I want you to extend loans to 
these people, charge the interest and service charges I will take care of them but I 
want you to give them this money so that they can pay the principal amount only 
while I take care of the interest (JC-BM).  
Two things to be highlighted here about concession interest rate. First, in addition to what 
was discussed above on pricing strategy, the sponsors of concession interest rate are 
convinced of the confidentiality of their transaction with the bank, and second, they trust 
their deposits are safe and that the bank will challenge the recipients to make judicious 
use of the funds. According to one of the interviewees, “they don’t usually come like that 
and we don’t just open our mouth to start saying it, they will tell you this is an 
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arrangement between us and them, I want my people to look at it that they are actually 
borrowing from the bank, because if I go to my village and give them the money, they 
can’t pay back and they will feel like it’s a free money and anything that is free cannot 
bring out anything useful. They will just eat it, some will use it and buy shoes and all of 
those, so instead of going to their village to share the money, they will now make them 
look like a bank’s loan and when you’ve taken something from the bank, you work hard 
to ensure that you multiply that money given to you” (VI-IM). 
Another form of third-party patronage comes in the form of providing logistics for 
outpost expansions. Good-spirited individuals and groups identified with the bank to 
advance its mission. An index case referenced by almost all the interviewees was the 
bank’s latest outpost in a community called Amaimo. Though there were other strategic 
considerations including lack of conventional banks in the area the decision was 
influenced by some concerned indigenes of the area who felt they needed the presence of 
the bank in their locality to help empower their people. The chairman of the board 
described the decision to open the outpost in these words: 
What has happened to take the example of Amaimo is that there are individuals in 
that community who are interested in empowering members of their community. 
They use their own financial leverage to attract the institution first and foremost 
to the community so as to make it possible for the population to have access to the 
microfinance bank…I realized that it was with their help that their less endowed 
brethren could have such a bank in the community. It kind of became a win-win 
situation. For us it wasn’t so much the poor people that attracted the bank in the 
first instance, it was those of their brothers and sisters who were out in the big 
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cities that felt there was a need for such a microfinance bank so that those at home 
could have access to it (AO-BC). 
Through such partnerships the bank receives goodwill from the community including 
security of assets, positive publicity, and business patronage because the bank is 
perceived by the host community as one after their interest. 
These kinds of arrangement are possible because for instance, “the sponsors of 
concession interest rate are more comfortable dealing with us as a church-related 
financial institution than any other place because one – confidentiality – they don’t 
believe that may be when they come here after having discussions with them we will go 
at their back and tell the customers this is what your person wants to do. And if they put 
in their money here they have trust on the Archbishop that whatever money that they are 
keeping here that nobody will swallow the money and go away even if anything should 
happen in the event of the business, or a staff misbehaved or something like that the 
Archdiocese will not allow such money to go down like that so that’s why they are more 
comfortable dealing with us than most of these privately owned financial institutions” 
(VI-IM).  
Notwithstanding, there are potential drawbacks associated with the bank’s strong 
ties with the church. For example, the data revealed that some customers erroneously felt 
that the bank was a charity extension of the church and would come to take loans without 
intending to pay or think that the bank will not prosecute defaulters. A director referenced 
some borrowers who came with that perception. “I was invited to be part of the concept 
and I found it very nice and very encouraging and since then we have developed the idea 
… There are individual people, characters who came in thinking that it was a religious 
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thing, that it is for charity not knowing that it is a business-like venture” (JN-ED). 
Similarly another director described the perception in vernacular; “Actually the mindset 
people have about the microfinance bank and Chikum precisely is that “okwa Nna anyi 
Obinna mepere ngaa si unu jiya nyenwe anyi loan anyi ji na-azu ahia” (Didn’t the 
Archbishop open this bank for you people to give us money to do our business”). So they 
believe that if actually they are coming to Chikum they will only come for loan – some 
form of grant” (JI-ED).   
Operational Efficiencies 
The other competitive advantage is the bank’s dedication to operational 
efficiency. Operational or internal efficiency refers to the ability of a program to deliver 
specific service with minimum costs. Inefficiencies could range from lack of synergy 
between the outposts and the head office, inadequate technology, non-recovery of loans, 
fraudulent practices due to lack of proper oversight. The bank understands her unique 
position is both a source of strength as well as a weakness and strives to provide 
appropriate mitigants.  
The overall regulatory framework for microfinance bank does not distinguish 
between faith-based or not faith-based microfinance banks however the operators of 
Chikum MFB know they have carved a niche for themselves. Operational efficiency 
begins first with proper oversight functions.  
“We have defined our goals and our objectives, which is also slightly different 
from the goals and objectives of the competition. We now have to put our own 
way of doing business to be unique, to be able to accomplish our own objectives. 
So, what we have to do or what we are doing is to take, to make sure that we 
125 
 
 
 
accomplish or adhere to the overall regulatory policies through designing things 
that are unique to us in terms of accomplishing our unique objectives. … So, for 
instance in reaching out, we now have to reach out to the society in the church 
which this people, the competition may not be able to easily reach out to” (DA-
ED). 
Board governance has central role to play to checkmate organizational 
inefficiencies. The board and board committees meet regularly to review operational 
activities. The Board of Directors is mandated by law to meet every quarter to demand 
financial information, review and provide appropriate governance on a regular basis 
guided by the general accepted accounting practices. The chairman of the board 
described efforts at upholding and maintaining the integrity of the bank including a zero-
tolerance policy against fraud and favoritism.  
Well, there has been efforts to monitor the various units from within as well as 
from without; this has led to the question of firing members of staff that are 
caught in the act of defrauding, no excuse no second chance. I as the chairman 
have maintained a policy of noninterference in terms of upholding the integrity of 
the Chikum microfinance bank so that nobody can use me as an alibi to continue 
to be there… And recently I did something I didn’t anticipate earlier, I brought in 
a Rev. Sister to work within the bank who is a trained graduate in accountancy. I 
also felt that her spiritual commitment will be an added value to the bank. And I 
now believe that bringing her in has done some good because sometimes seeing a 
reverend sister even in her garments - religious habit - puts some fear of God if 
not fear of man.  
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In addition, the operators of the bank are committed to ensuring that the activities 
of the bank are regularly reviewed by certified public auditors. A five-year review of the 
bank’s annual audited financial reports affirmed that the bank has been consistent and 
takes serious issues of accurate financial reporting. Lack of accurate financial reporting is 
the key reason program inefficiencies are often passed on unchecked (Bhatt & Tang, 
2001).  
Conclusions 
In summary, the findings of this study detailed above showed the operators of Chikum 
microfinance bank recognized that it is not one but combinations of interventions that are 
needed to attain the microfinance objective. The conclusion from the themes was that the 
bank is intentional about reaching out to the active poor in a manner that is sustainable. 
The bank relied on shareholders’ avowed commitment to founding mission, human asset 
development, pro-active poor products offering, innovative/strategic product pricing and 
institutional competitive advantage, separately and collectively to pursue organizational 
goal. 
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Figure 5.1, Five-Year Financial 
Summary  
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CHAPTER SIX 
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
 
“Today it is clear that the independence of social value and commercial revenue 
creation is a myth. In reality, the vectors of social value and commercial revenue 
creation can reinforce and undermine each other” (Battilana, Lee, Walker and 
Dorsey, 2012, p. 52) 
 
In this study, I investigated how Chikum Microfinance Bank Limited (Chikum 
MFB) navigates the integration of dual logics in pursuance of its microfinance mission. 
The data analysis identified five key findings. These interrelated goal attainment 
strategies developed for and reported in chapter five include a) shareholders’ avowed 
commitment to founding mission; b) human asset development; c) integrated 
products/services offering, d) strategic/innovative product pricing, and e) institutional 
competitive advantage. The microfinance literature highlights the lack of a common 
understanding of what constitutes sustainable microfinance practice. In this chapter 
which also serves as the conclusion I use the evidence of prior studies in particular those 
focused on institutional logics and microfinance institutions to engage in a discussion 
about the findings on how Chikum MFB pursued its microfinance goal.  
Chikum’s Shareholders Avowed Commitment to Founding Mission 
The analysis established how Chikum MFB shareholders’ avowed commitment to 
founding mission provided guidance for management decisions including workforce 
composition, decisions about products offerings and pricing as well as operation of 
multiple outposts. As summarized in Exhibit 4.2, shareholders emphasized the need for 
the bank to be perceived and be seen as focusing not on profit maximization but on 
promoting a “microfinance with human face”, as offering mission driven products and 
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services tailored to the needs of the microfinance client. Shareholders’ avowed 
commitment to founding mission is consistent with the assumptions of institutional 
theory especially in the three key areas of governance, mission drift and prerogative of 
founders. This section discusses these areas beginning first with governance.  
Governance.  
The suggestion of conflicting goals indicated in the microfinance literature was 
addressed by the Chikum MFB’s shareholders with their avowed commitment to the 
bank’s founding mission. Shareholders’ avowed commitment to founding mission was 
the major propelling force behind all the activities of the bank. The study found this to be 
consistent with both the expectations of board governance in an MFI in extant literature 
as well as the assumptions of institutional logics about an organization’s logics of action. 
First, the literature underlines the governance role of the board of directors of a 
microfinance institution in accounting for the microfinance double bottom line objective, 
pointing to governance mechanisms related to the board size and composition (Rock and 
Otero, 1997), ownership type and competition (Hartarska and Mersland, 2012; Mersland 
and Strom, 2009), the MFI’s goal definition (Amersdorffer et al., 2014), and even the 
effect of religion (Mersland et al., 2013) as mechanisms that could influence the MFI’s 
financial sustainability. 
Board composition. The composition of the board is a vital consideration here. 
Chikum MFB have board members consisting of both social and financial investors who 
are united in pursuing the integrated goal. Consisting of retired bankers and 
administrators with diverse cognate professional experiences, the board members use 
their diverse professional backgrounds to provide guidance for the successful operation 
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of the bank. Of the seven statutory members of the board, six of the directors (the seventh 
member is the managing director) are direct or proxy shareholders of the bank. The direct 
shareholder-directors are individual financial investors who aspired to “do well and do 
good” or were motivated by the pride they felt in their faith community to invest. The 
two-individual shareholder-directors were elected members based on their shareholding 
portfolio. On the other hand, proxy shareholder-directors are directors nominated by their 
shareholding-groups due mostly for their professional backgrounds to represent their 
group.  
Thus, the directors could decide which direction they want the bank to go or what 
interest to pursue. For instance, the investors agreed that restraining their appetite for 
investment returns was essential for the growth of investment capital required for depth 
of outreach. Instead of sharing dividends shareholders voted to delay gratification, to first 
develop the bank. Retained earnings for the owners of the bank is a win-win strategy that 
fulfils in the “short-term” the needs of individual microfinance clients and in the “long-
term” the promoter’s need for outreach and organizational sustainability. 
Second, the literature also suggests the governance role of the board of directors 
could influence the MFI’s financial sustainability, pointing to the relationship between 
firm performance and corporate governance (Garcia-Perez et al. 2017; Hartarska and 
Mersland, 2012; Mersland & Strom, 2008; Rock & Otero, 1997). Chikum MFB’s 
corporate performance is linked to the direct policies and effective governance role of the 
board. However, it is not enough to claim the bank is doing what it set out to accomplish; 
to determine the existence and extent of double bottom line performance in the bank one 
needs to evaluate the relationship between espoused values and the actual social and 
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financial performance results of the bank. An analysis of the bank’s audited five-year 
annual report provided the tools for that. The interpretation is based on the Central Bank 
of Nigeria’s (CBN) characterization of social and financial sustainability of microfinance 
banks in Nigeria and on the general microfinance industry benchmark found in the 
literature. First, in terms of financial sustainability the CBN guideline requires 
microfinance banks to operate in such a way as 1) to operate at full-cost recovery basis, 
and 2) to maintain lean operational costs in order to record positive return on asset (ROA) 
and return on equity (ROE). Positive returns on both ratios implies that the microfinance 
bank is financially sustainable. Also with reference to social performance the apex bank 
tends to be rather broad requiring MFIs to focus attention on mission and vision, 
transparency and responsible pricing as well as on avoidance of over-indebtedness. 
Specifically the CBN advices as follows:  
• Mission and Vision: Should be clear and focused on the poor, women, or 
vulnerable groups. 
• Transparent and responsible pricing: Prices, terms and conditions of financial 
products (including interest charges and all fees) should be clear, transparent, and 
adequately disclosed in a form understandable and affordable to the clients. 
• Avoidance of over-indebtedness: Reasonable steps should be taken to ensure 
that credit will be extended only if the borrowers have demonstrated adequate 
ability to repay and loans will not put borrowers at significant risk of over-
indebtedness (CBN, Circular to Microfinance Bank Stakeholders and the General 
Public, March 2020). 
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Similarly, while there are a number of indicators in the microfinance literature for both 
social and financial performance, operational self-sufficiency (OSS) and average loan 
size (ALS), respectively are the gold standard for financial and social performance (Kar, 
2012; Mersland & Strom, 2010; Roy & Pati, 2019). 
Operational self-sufficiency (OSS). Operational self-sufficiency (OSS) is the 
benchmark ratio used in the Microfinance Industry to analyze an MFI’s ability in 
generating operating revenues or incomes in order to cover the total cost incurred in 
running the business (Bassem, 2012; Ledgerwood, 1998; Serrano-Cinca and Gutierrez-
Nieto, 2014; Roy & Pati, 2019). It is a function of the three major indicators of financial 
health of banking institutions namely, return on assets (ROA) – which reflects the 
organization’s ability to use its assets productively; return on equity (ROE) – which 
measures the returns produced for the owners, and portfolio at risk (PAR) – which 
measures the rate of loan losses. ROA is calculated by dividing earnings before interest 
and taxes (EBIT) by the total assets figure listed on the balance sheet. The EBIT figure is 
used instead of net profits in order to focus attention on operating earnings. On the other 
hand ROE measures how efficiently a firm uses the money from shareholders to generate 
profits. It is a measure of financial performance calculated by dividing net income by 
shareholders' equity. Because shareholders' equity is equal to a company’s assets minus 
its debt, ROE could be thought of as the return on net assets. The higher the ROE, the 
more efficient a company's management is at generating income and growth from its 
equity financing. 
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Operational self-sufficiency (OSS) indicates whether the MFI is able to generate 
adequate returns to cover its total cost, i.e. operational expenses, loan loss provisions and 
financial costs. It focuses attention on the core revenues and expenses of the MFI. The 
ratio for OSS is derived by dividing operating revenues by total cost.  The operational 
revenues used in calculating this ratio are the financial incomes the company earned by 
charging interest on the loans it provided as well as fee and commission income. In the 
denominator, total cost includes operating expenses, financial expenses and impairment 
expenses on loan loss. Financial expenses and impairment expenses are included in the 
calculation because they tend to be a significant amount in the microfinance industry. An 
MFI with and beyond the ratio of 1 or 100% is regarded as sustainable and a ratio less 
than 1 or 100% is regarded as unsustainable. That is, a ratio of 1 in OSS would mean that 
the bank is just breaking even in the deployment of shareholder’s fund. On the other 
hand, if the ratio is less than 1, it would indicate that the MFI is not financially 
sustainable. 
The analysis of Chikum MFB’s performance data indicates consistent positive 
returns over the five-year period reviewed. First, in raw financial numbers, Figure 6.1 
shows the bank’s profit after taxation grew from ₦31.294 million in 2013 to ₦33.474 
million in 2014. However, profit after taxation started to decrease to ₦14.029 million in 
2015 and ₦6.827 million in 2016; and jumped up again to an impressive ₦18.490 million 
in 2017.  
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Similarly, in the same period, the bank’s earnings per share (kobo) increased from 29 
kobo in 2013 to 31 kobo in 2014. It also decreased from 13 kobo in 2015 to 6 kobo in 
2016 and jumped up to 17 kobo in 2017 (see fig. 6.2). The decrease in profit margin and 
earnings per share between 2015 and 2016 was attributed to the time the bank was 
experiencing challenges in recruiting and retaining managing directors (see board and 
management relationship on p. 141).  
  
In terms of benchmark ratios, the interpretation of Chikum MFB’s social and 
financial sustainability based on the industry standard revealed that the bank recorded a 
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positive return on equity of 0.10, 0.03, 0.07, 0.18 and 0.19 repectively for the years from 
2017 to 2013. Also ROA was 0.13, 0.08, 0.11, 0.07 and 0.07 respectively for the years 
under consideration. Operational self sufficiency was above 100% in four out of the five-
year period (Fig 6.4 Performance Ratios. Details of numbers and computation can be 
found in Appendix 6.1) indicating the bank has maintained financial sustainability. 
 
Average loan size (ALS). Equally, average loan size is the industry benchmark 
for social performance. It captures both depth and breadth of outreach, the proxies for 
social outreach (Navajas et al., 2000, Schreiner, 2002). It is believed that if ALS is low, 
the outreach is greater indicating that poorer clients can afford the loans (Mersland & 
Strom, 2010; Hermes et al., 2011; Roberts, 2013, Quayes, 2012, Kar, 2013; Roy & Pati, 
2019). A small ALS always shows greater outreach as it increases affordability by poorer 
customers (Hermes et al., 2011). It shows the MFI’s ability to reach the poor in terms of 
small loan amounts, as well as in depth of outreach. ALS is measured by dividing the 
gross loan portfolio (GLP) by the number of active borrowers (NAB). While GLP is an 
indicator of depth of outreach, NAB is an indicator of breadth of outreach. This makes it 
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an important indicator to understand the penetration of the MFI. Active macro borrowers 
constituted 1% (15); 5% (38); 4% (26) and 6% (44) of total active loan borrowers 
respectively for the years 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 (see Table 6.2, Loans and 
Recipients). Thus, the evidence of simultaneous strong social and financial performance 
suggest a synergy indicating that the bank’s integrated strategy promoted the realization 
of the dual objectives. 
 
Challenges of joint accountability. Also, corporate governance is essential in 
shareholder financed microfinance institutions to ensure joint accountability and to resist 
pressures to “drift” toward either social or economic objectives at the expense of the 
other (Garcia-Perez et al. 2017). Ensuring joint accountability is a principal governance 
challenge. It requires all key stakeholders, owners and management to be jointly 
responsible for realizing organizational vision. For instance, it is the duty of the directors 
to equip the employees to translate into action the bank’s policy of integrated social and 
financial objective. While much is known about governance in typical for-profits 
organizations and non-profit organizations, and even of differentiated hybrid 
organizations (Wolf & Mair, 2019), knowledge about microfinance institutions that 
Micro Macro Total
Average loan size 
per year
Average micro loan 
per year
Average macro loan 
per year
2015 1,089 15 1,104 ₦167,267.00 ₦134,146.17 ₦2,571,839.07
2016 758 38 796 ₦209,368.50 ₦133,303.88 ₦1,726,657.63
2017 713 26 739 ₦156,177.58 ₦96,540.87 ₦1,791,599.50
2018 724 44 768 ₦200,972.81 ₦119,598.02 ₦1,539,957.99
Gross Loan Portfolio
2015 ₦146,085,181.00 ₦38,577,586.00 ₦184,662,767.00
2016 ₦101,044,339.00 ₦65,612,990.00 ₦166,657,329.00
2017 ₦68,833,643.00 ₦46,581,587.00 ₦115,415,230.00
2018 ₦86,588,967.47 ₦67,758,151.69 ₦154,347,119.16
Table 6.1 Loan and Recipients
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pursue social and economic goals simultaneously through a single activity (Ebrahim et al. 
2014; Mair et al. 2015) are very limited. Some scholars suggest they could face unique 
governance challenges related to joint accountability to both social and financial 
objectives (Battilana & Lee, 2014). The commitment of Chikum MFB’s shareholders to 
founding mission as evidenced in the “good-fit” workforce composition policy of the 
board of directors is consistent with the literature on hybrid ideals (Mair et al. 2015), and 
microfinance institution’s goal definition (Amersdorffer et al., 2014). The bank invested 
to ensure the operators “think and act Chikum”, that is, to be sustainable serving the 
active poor.  
In addition to the shareholder’s commitment, the directors have added impetus to 
dedicate themselves to their governance role thanks to the regulatory requirements that 
hold directors directly accountable for the actions of their bank. First, board members are 
required to be financially vested in the bank and second, to be actively involved in the 
running of the bank. The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) guideline under which Nigeria’s 
microfinance banks operate hold members of the board directly responsible for the 
actions of their banks. “To ensure good governance of the banks, the board of directors 
shall be responsible for establishing strategic objectives, policies and procedures that 
would guide the activities of the banks and the means to attain same, as well as the 
mechanism for monitoring management’s performance” (CBN, 2005, p. 25). It goes 
further to state that, “while management of the day to day affairs shall be the 
responsibility of the management team, the board of directors shall, however, be 
responsible for monitoring and overseeing management’s actions” (p.25). This is 
corollary to the requirement of financially vested and professionally diverse membership. 
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Mission Drift 
An important debate in the microfinance literature focuses on whether 
microfinance institutions can avoid “mission drift” while emphasizing returns on 
investment, i.e., when commercial investors engage in providing microfinance services 
(Hermes and Lensink, 2007; Hermes et al., 2011; Lebovics, et al., 2016). It is a board 
governance responsibility to protect and champion the direction of their organization. 
Mersland, (2009) indicated that a microfinance institution’s (MFI) ownership type may 
influence mission drift but in the context of differentiated hybrid organizations. Even so, 
Mersland and Strom’s (2008) earlier investigation could not confirm differences in 
outreach performance between shareholder MFIs and MFIs categorized as non-
governmental organizations. The literature is silent about what happens when ownership 
is of integrated hybrid organizations. While Hartarska (2005) and Kyereboath-Coleman 
and Osei (2008) found that board independence exerts a positive influence on financial 
and social performance, Roy and Pati, (2019) suggest the investors’ wish for higher 
profitability often influences operations in achieving more financial returns and 
influences the MFIs mission. This study noted that the promoters of Chikum MFB 
cognizant of the potential influences of shareholders’ self-interest established measures to 
moderate potential conflicts that may arise from financial investors seeking to maximize 
their investment returns. They mutually decided at the time of investing to control such 
appetites in order to attain organizational goal and avoid mission drift. Investors’ appetite 
for high return on investment has been identified to negatively influence the decision to 
pursue the double bottom line goal (Omri and Chkoundali, 2011; Roberts, 2013). Profit 
oriented investors move-up market and start serving fewer poor customers to increase 
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profit margin (Lebovics, et al., 2016). This was not the case with Chikum MFB. Data 
analysis showed that the bank consistently served more micro clients than macro (Fig. 
6.3). For instance, in 2015, 2016, and 2017 loans to micro customers accounted for 79%, 
60% and 60% respectively of the bank’s total loans and advances disbursed to customers 
over the period.   
 
Religion. Some researchers have suggested that religion may also influence the 
perceptions and behavior of providers of microfinance (Astha & De Selva, 2011, 
Casselman, Sama and Stefanidis, 2014; Hoda & Gupta, 2015; Mersland, 2013), even if 
they are commercial investors. Investors with religious convictions are most likely to 
exhibit same in their daily operations. Though there was no explicit reference to religion 
in the study, the interview data provided information that indicated the bank was born 
under the umbrella of the church. The church connection provided a strong motive to 
retain the emphasis on social mission. Equally, it was evident that shareholders 
voluntarily consented to control their investor appetites on a note of goodwill and support 
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to a well-known religious vanguard of the poor. According to a founding director, “I am a 
founding member of the bank, … my interest in the bank came up when the archbishop 
of the diocese … mentioned that his target is to help the small and low-class people. … I 
was invited to be a part of the concept and I found it very nice and very encouraging…. 
So, I was blown away by that concept and I said that is good” (JN-ED). This is consistent 
with life experience even in the secular context; certain actions are inspired by the 
individual’s religious beliefs. True to Mersland and D’Epallier’s (2013) observation in a 
purely secular model, in particular, in financial considerations, there is a tendency to 
ignore the basic values of large group of people.  
More so in Nigeria, religious institutions and individuals coming together to 
provide commercial enterprises is not novel, it is rather the norm. The socio-historic 
context influenced by colonialism and detailed in chapter two linked religious institutions 
with economic empowerment activities especially in rural communities (Enwerem, 1995; 
Mbachirin, 2006). Individuals and religious bodies are known to jointly initiate economic 
projects to support rural or neglected communities. Citizens trust such initiatives more 
than they trust similar ventures by the private sector or even the government. Also, the 
context of such joint initiatives promotes seeking both social and financial goals to earn 
credibility with the people. The bank’s association with the church helped keep the 
mission focused. “The affiliation with the faith gives it unique advantage relative to other 
institutions in terms of trust because banking is a trust-based service, if the trust is not 
there, the depositor in particular will not in the long run keep their money with the bank” 
(DA-ED). Nigeria’s 2005 streamlined microfinance practice recognized the long existing 
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participation of religious institutions in microfinance and encouraged their participation 
in the new scheme. 
The Prerogative of Founders.  
From an institutional logics’ perspective, Chikum MFB’s shareholders’ avowed 
commitment to founding mission is consistent with the prerogative of founders to 
determine what kind of goal they intend their bank to pursue. Institutional logics provide 
actors opportunities to socially construct and reconstruct logics in ways that reflect their 
interests (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). The logics in action in an organization establishes 
how the organization functions and responds to emerging issues. In addition, 
organizations who want something else than the status quo strive to integrate logics to 
serve their purpose, including adopting novel logics leading to new and better future 
identities (Kodeih & Greenwood, 2014).  
The findings showed that the promoters of Chikum MFB opted to incorporate the 
logics of nonprofit and for-profit orientations leading to a new organizational identity 
and, to a better way of addressing an identified challenge – the competing goals. “We 
have defined our goals and our objectives…. We now have to put our own way of doing 
business to be unique, to be able to accomplish our own objectives” (DA-ED). Founding 
teams assemble such resources as legitimacy, commitment of effort, money and 
technology to succeed in establishing a new organization (Almandoz, 2012, p. 1382-3). 
For the same reasons, founders define the character of their organizations. It was 
understandable that the promoters of Chikum MFB held such influence on how best to 
achieve their goals. And, because founding teams share a set of cognitive beliefs 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991), priorities, meaningful categories (Ocasio & Joseph, 2005) 
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and normative values that shapes a “collective identity” (Alamandoz, 2012) they are 
expected to carry them into the organization they found (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). 
Chikum MFB’s shareholders are made up of investors who embraced the dual blend of 
social value creation and commercial value. They used their collective identity to 
establish an institution that seeks financial profitability while retaining the focus on social 
mission. In summary the three key mechanisms of governance, mission drift and 
founder’s prerogative support the conclusion that the commitment of the owners of the 
bank to the founding mission largely influenced the bank’s double bottom line goal. 
Human Asset Development 
This section discusses how Chikum MFB Ltd recruits, trains and socializes 
employees “to think and act Chikum” as the best strategy to drive the bank’s mission. 
The findings revealed that based on the policy of good-fit workforce composition, the 
bank recruited people with varied backgrounds and used training and orientation to 
onboard them into the bank’s integrated mission. It further showed that good-fit 
workforce composition when implemented with a managing director that understands and 
shares the bank’s mission directly promoted the overall objective. 
Good-Fit Workforce Composition.  
This finding is consistent with the assumptions of organizational theory (Davis et 
al., 1997; Jegers, 2009). The staff and management of Chikum MFB are predicted to 
comprise of those who shares the bank’s mission or those incentivized to join. Owners 
and managers follow the same stewardship logic and subscribe to the same principle of 
economic activity (Jegers, 2009). They either share interests or agents are at least 
motivated to act in the interest of principals even in the presence of goal conflict (Davis 
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et al., 1997). Thus, Chikum MFB Ltd believes it could recruit as employees a diverse 
group, those with conventional banking background, microfinance banking background, 
fresh graduates from the university and those from other fields of human endeavor and 
train and incentivize them to drive the mission of the bank.  
To be sustainable, an organization that combines logics needs to create a common 
organizational identity that prevents the formation of subgroups within the organization 
(Battilana and Dorado, 2010). In particular, it needs to develop hiring policies that 
supports the sustainability of the logics combination, which define who can become an 
organization member, and socialization policies, which teach and reinforce desired 
behaviors and values in hires (Battilana & Dorado, 2010. p. 1420). The good stewardship 
orientation emphasized at Chikum MFB favored the double objective of the microfinance 
practice. This study revealed that the stewardship behavior in which Chikum MFB 
operate enabled the board and managers through collaborative partnership to espouse 
positive attitudes known for social outreach as well as those that encourages financial 
sustainability (Guiso, Sapienza et al., 2003). Board members strove to promote a double 
bottom line goal, employed and compensated managers who share the goals of the bank 
(Davis et al., 1997; Filistrucchi and Prufer, 2014; Stone and Brush, 1996). However, in 
practice good-fit workforce policy encountered challenges, in relation to board and 
management relationship. 
Board and management relationship. Good board and management relationship 
ensure actualization of organizational goals. The study found that implementing the 
policy of good-fit workforce strategy at Chikum MFB met with some resistance in 
particular at the top management level. Consistent with studies in hybrid organizations 
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that suggest organizations with integrating high degrees of two logics face unique 
dilemmas in selecting their employees (Battilana & Dorado, 2010), Chikum MFB in the 
effort to establish good-fit workforce met with challenges of goal congruence with 
agents. The governance responsibilities of boards include to control or constrain the 
behavior of agents towards realizing the organization’s goals. It is their role to employ 
and compensate managers who share the goals of the bank and partner with management 
to achieve the double bottom-line goal. This assumption found in the literature indicating 
that staff and management will comprise of those who shares the bank’s mission or those 
incentivized to join (Davis et al., 1997) did not apply in some cases. The strategy to 
embed employees into the culture of the bank through orientation and training was 
hinged on the support and commitment of the managing director. 
While high turnover of workers is common in the industry, microfinance 
institutions integrating social and financial logics face additional challenges in recruiting 
a good-fit workforce. It is particularly challenging because as Haveman and Gualtieri 
(2017) indicates, such institutions need a workforce of similar minds to give life to the 
logics of their organization, “institutional logics are not organizational structures, 
practices, or policies, nor are they rituals or roles but rather are consequences of human 
action guided by logics” (p. 22). Chikum MFB hires individuals educated enough to 
appreciate the challenges of a commercial microfinance organization, then augment with 
training and orientation. It seemed to have been a success at the beginning. However, 
midway it proved to be a setback especially at the top management level. The bank 
lacked a pool of job candidates with integrated social and commercial banking experience 
to draw from as well the proficiency to train and orientate those with previous work 
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experiences who may need to unlearn some of their habits from previous work training, 
experience and exposure. In the case of Chikum MFB the problem is related to issues in 
the wider society. “The issue of staffing is a problem in Nigeria. People do not seek for 
employment to get job satisfaction but because of the poverty in the system they are 
ready to work anywhere. . .. And you see people who come into system just to moonlight. 
At the onset they express passion for the work, coming in you see that they are really not 
real, and it is a problem. And that is why you have a very high turnover rate in the 
institution” (BO-ED). 
Between 2014 and 2016 as the bank started to grow and expand, it started 
experiencing a challenge in workforce culture leading also to decrease in financial 
performance which itself can be linked to instability at the top management level. Over a 
period of ten years the bank witnessed the exit of five managing directors. Of the five 
directors, three were disengaged for incompetence or misconduct while the other two 
resigned to take higher paying jobs with organizations outside of the industry. More 
relevant though is that majority of these managing directors retired or resigned from the 
conventional banking sector before they were hired to head the bank. Three of the five ex-
managing directors had an all conventional banking background while the other two had a 
mixture of both before they joined the bank. This is very much the norm because the 
microfinance industry is relatively young, and the job market is lacking of experienced 
microfinance professionals.  
Leadership is a factor of organizational success (Churchill, 1997; Seibel & Torres, 
1999). To create a good-fit workforce, organizations of integrated logics require the right 
leadership. Leaders play important roles in shaping organizational culture in particular, 
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where integrated conception of the organization’s values are possible (Kraatz & Block, 
2008; Pratt & Foreman, 2000). Though inculcating the logics in action in Chikum MFB is 
possible and supported by the founders, preconceived notions especially at top 
management level was observed as the biggest obstacle to developing the behaviors 
required to strike the desired balance for the bank. The evidence suggests managers were 
not free to recruit employees of their preference outside what is established by the board, 
recruiting as to build a good-fit workforce in synergy with the bank’s institutional 
identity and goals. For instance, the board has always hired managing directors with 
conventional banking background to drive the policy and this seem to be the source of the 
tensions and has not yielded the desired result. The assumption was that managers will be 
able to assist create the synergy among the workforce. However, the evidence indicated 
some of them were not forthcoming. 
The problem seemed not to be issues of professional expertise, as it is that of an 
inability on the part of the managers to appreciate the uniqueness of the bank or to 
admitting there are fundamental differences between microfinance banking and 
conventional banking despite some areas of similarities. The managers have the core 
responsibility to train and orientate the staff for the envisioned synergy. But Chikum has 
not been successful at recruiting managers who share totally the vision of the bank. Part 
of the challenge as mentioned earlier is a limited job market; there is no magic wand to 
identifying the right candidate simply by examining their credentials. The interview data 
provided evidence of frustration with poor quality of job candidates in the market. “You 
know at times feelings can deceive and that is why we run a policy now that when we 
recruit, you have four months to work as a contract staff so at the end of the four months, 
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we either higher you or disengage you. That helps us to prove ourselves right or wrong” 
(BO-ED). 
External factors. Other reasons for lack of success in recruiting managers of 
similar views includes the country’s harsh economic conditions, lack of professional 
integrity and disrupted succession plans. These reasons also provide indications as to why 
some of the managers left. “Because of the economic conditions in Nigeria, people do not 
work for satisfaction, people work for economic reasons. So, you can see a manager 
resign the next day without giving you prior information just because he or she got an 
offer somewhere and s/he is going to get a higher pay package. That is a serious problem. 
Number two, the issue of integrity. You get people in, you spend time and resources to 
train, before you know it the person gets involved in things you cannot imagine. That is a 
challenge. Number three, succession management cannot easily be handled. When you 
have workers who can stay with you over time you can really plan. And then succession 
management which is one of the best ways to keep your organization moving. In this kind 
of setting you are not even sure that the person you are preparing will be there at the exit 
of the person for whom you are preparing him. So, the issue of succession management is 
a challenge” (BO-ED). 
Frequent changes linked to turnover of managers may have also affected the 
policy of good-fit strategy meant to embed employees into the bank’s logics through 
orientation and training. Almandoz (2011) had suggested that while integrating high 
degrees of two logics in the same organization may allow such an organization to reap 
the benefits from both logics, it can also introduce disharmony and factionalism in the 
organization (p. 1382). The study found that inability to recognize that some basic 
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differences exists between the two orientations and also of the bank’s integrated identity 
resulted into tensions between those with conventional banking background and others 
even if it is muted. There were evidences of lack of microfinance orientation in some top 
management staff. “I think that most people that we have at the management cadre are 
people coming from commercial banks and probably the ideology and idea they have 
about banking in general is that of the commercial bank. I think microfinance bank is a 
little different from what commercial bank does and should do” (KO-BM). 
Again, this is consistent with relevant literature. Evidence from the microfinance 
literature indicate that in microfinance organizations that provide loans to low income 
clients in the developing world, hiring people whose career backgrounds link them firmly 
to either the finance field or the development field can lead to factional conflict and 
organizational drift towards these logics. (Kraatz & Block, 2008; Pratt & Foreman, 
2000). Evidence of top-down management approach more in tune with attitudes in 
commercial banking created subgroups and perceptions of lower importance among field 
workers who interfaced daily with the customers. Though research in institutional theory 
have shown that multiple institutional logics can and do co-exist in organizational fields 
(Fitzgerald and Shepherd, 2015; Battilana & Dorado, 2010), rarely have they examined 
how institutions deal internally with the demands imposed by multiple logics, in 
particular workforce composition (Pache & Santos, 2010). Hiring employees without 
existing biases and socializing them into the hybrid culture may enable a more dynamic 
and innovative balance between logics (Battilana & Dorado, 2010). However, hybrid 
ideal organizations can rely neither on an existing model for handling the tension 
between the logics they combine nor on a pool of job candidates with experience in doing 
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so. How a hybrid organization socialize their members into a desired set of behaviors and 
values so as to build and maintain their hybridity is a work in progress. In this regard, 
Chikum MFB is a work in progress, struggling to build a good-fit workforce. Though 
current efforts through both training and orientation has not succeeded fully in creating 
the necessary synergy for organizational goal and may have even contributed to high 
turnover rate of managing directors, the directors believe it can be achieved with 
commitment and determination. 
Pro-active Poor Products and Services Delivery 
The data analysis revealed that Chikum MFB deployed integrated pro-active poor 
products and services delivery as a strategy for mission goal. This evidence detailed in 
chapter five associated integrated services to financial sustainability through diversified 
revenue sources. The provisioning of variety of products and services encouraged a 
savings culture among clients and built long term customer commitment. It equally 
provided collateral substitutes for microcredits and through strategic outpost locations 
and integration of non-financial services enabled ease of access to financial services to 
the active poor. This resulted in meeting the diverse needs of their clients as well as the 
financial goals of the bank. 
 First, these findings reinforce previous studies that indicate the needs of 
microfinance clients are varied and demand integrating financial with nonfinancial 
services (CBN, 2005, 2011). Chikum MFB’s dedicated mission to providing integrated 
products and services including a variety of savings options, customized collateral 
substitutes for credit facilities, location of outposts for ease of access, and other non-
financial services offering were all linked to the policy of focusing first on the needs of 
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the active poor. In line with the bank’s mission statement, the promoters of Chikum MFB 
Ltd recognized that the challenges of the active poor are not only a lack of funds, but also 
the need for nonfinancial supportive services that enables credit clients and 
microentrepreneurs to better deploy and manage funds received (Ashta, Couchoro, Musa, 
2014, CBN, 2005, 2011; Nasir, 2013). We discuss these findings under three subheads, 
namely mission driven products and services, integration of financial services with 
nonfinancial services, and citing of outpost locations. 
Mission Driven Products and Services.  
The study found that focusing on the poor does not in itself compromise financial 
performance, it depends largely on the will and strategies of the microfinance institution 
(MFI). While some studies have indicated focusing on the poor can be financially costly 
leading to mission drift (Hermes and Lensink, 2007; Hermes et al., 2011; Lebovics, et al., 
2016), the issue of mission drift will not arise where focusing on the poor i.e., social 
mission is the singular product of the bank. Chikum MFB’s audited financial reports 
indicated that the bank did not only remain focused on social mission but also generated 
profitable returns (Fig. 6.1, Five-year Profitability Report). Chikum MFB’s mission 
driven products and services is consistent with the institutional theory’s basic assumption 
that organizations determine what constitutes success to them and will commit the 
required resources to attaining the goals (Thornton, 2004; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). The 
primary goal of any organization is to fulfil that for which it was founded. The promoters 
of Chikum MFB view their essence as that of access of financial services to the active 
poor and, shared a strong conviction that outreach to the poor though capital intensive in 
the short term, is both financially profitable and empowering of the poor on the long 
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term. The analysis revealed the overall objective of the promoters is satisfaction of 
customers and sustainability of the service. “By the time you grow these people you now 
have more and more people and the volume will compensate for the financial short-term 
deficit, because in the long run, you now build a culture-like patronage from these 
customers” (DA-ED). It is a win-win strategy that fulfils in the “short-term” the needs of 
individual microfinance clients and in the “long-term” that of the microfinance institution 
for outreach and organizational sustainability (Morduch, 2000; Rhyne, 1998). 
Equally, the finding is not unrelated to the essence of the microfinance practice. It 
is consistent with the primary objective of the microfinance strategy which consists of 
financial inclusion and empowerment of the poor (Ledgerwood, 2013). Battilana and Lee 
(2014) did indicate that microfinance institutions have a natural fit for simultaneous 
social and commercial goals. “In the case of microfinance, the business activities of risk 
calculation, loan making, and collection are integrated with the venture’s social mission. 
Indeed, so long as they continue to provide the service to the poor at non-predatory rates, 
microfinance organizations accomplish their social mission of reducing poverty by 
helping poor people access financial services” (p. 413)   
In remaining focused to its founding mission, the bank at the same time is 
implementing the directives of the 2005 streamlined microfinance policy objectives of 
the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), namely to: 
Make financial services accessible to a large segment of the potentially productive 
Nigerian population who otherwise would have little or no access to financial 
services; Promote mainstreaming of the informal subsector into the national 
financial system; Enhance service delivery by microfinance institutions to micro, 
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small and medium entrepreneurs; Contribute to rural transformation; and promote 
linkage programmes (sic) between universal/development banks, specialized 
institutions and microfinance banks. 
By investing these responsibilities on the microfinance banks, the Central Bank is 
not presumptuous about the challenges therein, it rather trusts the MFIs have the 
capability and specialization to innovate ways to overcome or mitigate them. Contrary to 
the view that for-profit microfinance banks may engage in mission drift, the promoters of 
Chikum MFB demonstrated that not all for-profit microfinance banks will abdicate their 
core mission when more lucrative opportunities become available, when risks increase, 
when individual interests become misaligned, or when opportunities arise for members to 
evade costs or shirk responsibilities. 
Provision of Financial and Nonfinancial Services.  
Some studies have indicated that for microcredit to be useful, the poor need a 
range of other nonfinancial products including financial education and business 
development (Ashta, Couchoro, Musa, 2014). The findings suggest that Chikum MFB 
integrated financial and nonfinancial services tailored to the varied needs of microfinance 
clients resulting in both social and financial goals. Based on the understanding that the 
challenges of the active poor are not merely access to credits alone, but also the need for 
nonfinancial supportive services that enables credit clients and microentrepreneurs to 
better deploy and manage the funds (Akinboyo, 2007; Ayodeji et al., 2015; Barr, 2005), 
the promoters of Chikum MFB Ltd embraced the broad concept of microfinance that is 
beyond microcredit. According to the Chairman, board finance and general-purpose 
committee, “the poor, yes, they need money, but it is not all about money. They also need 
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some intellectual empowerment” (BO-ED). For instance, outside of microcredits one of 
the key services Chikum MFB provides its customers is the opportunity to save. Savings 
is a form of asset-building (Dowla & Barua, 2006). It helps the poor turn their money into 
large sums enough to satisfy a wide range of business, consumption, personal, social and 
asset-building needs (Matin, Hulme and Rutherford, 2002, p. 273). Struthers (2011) noted 
that people in poorer societies as well as poorer communities within richer societies often 
save in very traditional and informal ways partly due to their lack of access to banking 
institutions. 
The analyzed data revealed that the bank’s lending methodology, level of 
transparency and the standard of good practice (Garcia-Perez, Munoz-Torres and 
Fernandez-Izquierdo’s, 2017) associated with the bank’s pro-active poor products and 
services delivery best explained the popularity and support the bank enjoys. The finding 
is a further proof that inclusion of nonfinancial services could advance financial 
sustainability. Dichter (1996) had earlier advised microfinance institutions to not neglect 
providing nonfinancial services just to achieve financial sustainability as such might not 
be building sustainable development for the poor. Without other inputs than credit, a 
great many micro-loan recipients do have enormous difficulties making productive use of 
the loans.  
In addition to providing integration between financial and nonfinancial services, 
the strategy was relevant to the varied population of microfinance clients. Microfinance 
clients varied from market women, traders, shop owners, produce sellers, artisans to low 
income government workers. Similarly, a varied population demands diversified products 
offering (Nasir 2013). 
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Collateral. Financial institutions including microfinance banks require collaterals 
to secure their loans against nonrepayment. The poor are no riskier than the average 
borrower nor is a higher portfolio at risk associated with poorer clients (Bassem, 2012). 
However, because microfinance clients lack assets acceptable as collaterals by 
conventional banking institutions, microfinance operators innovated collateral substitutes 
to give them access to loans. The microfinance literature evidence that MFIs hedge 
against default risk using joint liability, social pressures or personal guarantees (Bassem, 
2012). To secure its loans and make it accessible to their customers, Chikum MFB 
deployed these measures as well as several other collateral substitutes including operating 
special savings account. For instance, Chikum MFB structured some savings products to 
help evaluate the potential borrower’s financial strength and risk exposure. The rotatory 
savings account (ROSCA) encourages the saver to make regular daily or weekly deposits 
to monitor a customer’s cash flow and reliability. “it is not as if you will contribute that 
money and leave it there, but since you can be able to contribute 2,000 naira continuously 
for three months it means that if you are given a loan of 90,000 naira to help you, they 
know you will be capable of making regular returns” (RO-CS). It provides evidence to 
customer’s reliability and financial strength.    
Outpost location strategy.  
Chikum MFB uses outpost locations to bring their services nearer to where the 
need is, “to go to the villages where the big banks or the commercial banks cannot get to 
because that is the whole concept of micro financing” (JN-ED). Das et al. (2010) found 
that easy and accessible microfinance services is a major challenge to the active poor and 
could be addressed by the provision of needed facilities. It is that big a challenge to 
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microfinance clients that the Grameen bank included in its charter “option for the rural 
area”, not to establish any branch in the urban areas (Yunus, 2004). Microfinance banks 
should be established in the rural and semi-rural area than in the urban areas (Okafor, 
2014). Currently, Chikum MFB has seven outpost locations including the head corporate 
office. According to one of the founding directors of Chikum MFB, the active poor will 
not be able to access financial services if it is not within their reach (DA-ED). “Within 
their reach” is much more than making cash available for lending, it includes making 
available the physical structures required to first make the transaction possible such as 
office space and equipment.  
Equally, Iganiga (2008) identified building of institutions that deliver financial 
services to the poor in an efficient manner and on a sustainable basis as one of the eleven 
principles of microfinance (p. 97). Some microfinance clients would even value 
convenience and flexibility in accessing financial services from MFIs more than they will 
value paying a lower interest rate (Otero & Rhyne, 1994). For instance, comparing 
interest rate and time efficiency of a competitor to a loan customer, an interviewee said, 
“[T]heir interest rate is high, (our own is half of their own, their interest is high) but still 
customers do not mind the high rate of their interest but still they are trooping there every 
day. This is because the target of a businessperson is time to meet up with that business.  
Yes, time is money, they want to meet up with that time because once they make that 
money at that time they want it, they don’t mind the interest rate they are paying on it.” 
(RO-CS). Interest rate is not the only thing the microfinance borrower is worried about, 
for some customers interest rate is not important as access to the fund or the loan 
processing time. 
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However, the strategy of multiple outpost locations is not without some 
challenges. Apart from the cost associated with opening new locations, there are security 
issues related to safety of cash movement between the outposts and corporate office, 
deployment of adequate technology for interconnectivity, and operational cost. Outposts 
have limitations including inability to host vault (cash have to be moved between head 
office and the outposts on a daily basis) which the operators think they can sacrifice at 
this time for presence in strategic markets. 
Innovative Strategic Product Pricing 
This study found lower interest rates, aggressive deposit mobilization, interest 
rates concession and focus on long term gains were mechanisms deployed by Chikum 
MFB as goal attainment strategy. The analysis indicated that controlling operational 
expenses through innovative approaches including hiring from outpost’s catchment 
communities, enlisting support of host communities and quality asset management helped 
contain transaction expenses that benefited clients and increased profit margin. These 
findings corroborate some of the findings in prior literature as well as offer unique 
insights on providing services to the active poor. 
The topic of microfinance institutions and financial sustainability is prominent in 
the microfinance literature, and in particular with reference to loans and interest rates 
(Conning, 1999; Meyer, 2015; Omri and Chkoundali, 2011; Roberts, 2013; Quayes, 
2015). For instance, MFIs increase interest rates and fees in order to be financially 
sustainable (Roberts, 2013). And Conning (1999) indicated that institutions distributing 
smaller loans on average charge higher interest rates to be sustainable. While paying too 
much attention to profitability is “likely to move away microfinance institutions from 
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their primary objective of delivering financial services to the poor by a too strict selection 
of clients” (Bassem, 2012, P.93; Lebovics et al., 2016), overly social mission could lead 
to the application of very low interest rates threatening the viability of the institution 
(Conning, 1999; Cull et al., 2007; Hermes et al., 2011). Chikum mitigated the potency of 
the extremities with innovative and strategic product pricing focusing on profitability and 
rejecting actions that could lead to over profiteering. This finding also affirmed 
Bédécarrats et al.’s (2012) study which suggested that financial and social performance 
can both be achieved as long as MFIs have a well-planned social performance 
management strategy.  
Interest Rates.  
Our findings revealed that interest rate is not the only tool available to 
microfinance institutions for financial sustainability, microcredit and its associated 
interest revenue is one of the many services microfinance institutions provide and use as 
revenue stream (see fig. 6.4). Chikum MFB’s high-yield revenue source came from 
mobilized deposits invested in treasury bills and fixed deposits with commercial banks. 
The bank generated sufficient funds from deposits mobilization to serve the credits needs 
of her clients as well as some surplus to invest in secure Treasury Bills. The audited 
financial report revealed that Chikum MFB through a mix of innovative strategies 
increased the bank’s profit margin. For instance, treasury bill represented 40% of total 
revenue in 2016, and 73% in 2017. Interest on loans and advances came a distant second 
with 30% and 18% in 2016 and 2017 respectively. However, the bank’s investment in 
treasury bills is an issue of concern as the bank continues to exceed the maximum 10% in 
treasury bill investment established by the regulatory body. Due to patronage and 
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aggressive mobilization the bank had to invest her idle mobilized funds at times up to 
60% in treasury bills.  
Too much focus on interest rate can be harmful. Scholars have indicated that the 
microfinance crisis of 2006 in the Krishna district of Andhra Pradesh, India emerged due 
to high interest rates and rigid repayment policies that led the clients to go for multiple 
lending (Shylendra, 2006). Chikum MFB used operational efficiency, innovative and 
strategic product pricing, volume of activity, and deposit mobilization collectively to 
achieve financial sustainability. For instance, the bank’s adoption of the policy of 
cheapest interest rates not only increased the volume of loan recipients but also helped 
increase customer loyalty and loan repayment rate. Equally the bank’s concession interest 
rate product provided loans to very poor customers at below market interest rate without 
the bank losing any interest income. Concession interest rates addressed issues associated 
with transaction costs; recipients received loans at zero or below market interest rate 
based on the agreement between the bank and the sponsoring individual or group. It 
further suggests that focusing on the poor does not compromise financial performance. 
The operators need to be innovative as well as create opportunities to welcome those in 
need of “third party agents” to assist the active poor. Focusing solely on loan interest 
rates to determine profitability ignores the basket of other financial services microfinance 
institutions provide to their clients and fails to acknowledge the larger determinants of 
sustainable microfinance practice. 
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Sustainability versus Profit Maximization.  
Misconception exists in the literature that suggest sustainability of the 
microfinance practice is synonymous with profit maximization (Morduch, 2000). This is 
not supported by factual evidence. While microfinance institutions are expected to 
operate in a manner that promotes sustainability, to the best of this researcher’s 
knowledge profit maximization has not been articulated in any literature, culture, region 
or time as the goal of microfinance practice. The primary objective of the microfinance 
strategy is the reduction of poverty and inequality (Armendariz and Labie, 2011; Dichter, 
1996), financial inclusion and empowerment of the poor (Abubakar et al., 2015, Lashley, 
2004; Ledgerwood, 2013; Nasir, 2013). Profit maximization became an issue when focus 
on financial ratios in the microfinance market transformed understanding of what 
constitutes organizational success for MFIs (Roy & Pati, 2019). The search - how to fund 
microfinance services - amplified to such a scale that profit maximization was glamorized 
and often realized by compromising the poverty alleviation objective (Rhyne, 1998). In 
the process, the path to financial sustainability is misinterpreted as profit maximization 
(Morduch, 2000). The business environment, in particular, competition has been fingered 
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as a propelling force behind profit maximization rather than an intentional move by MFIs 
(Morduch, 2000). Competition among microfinance institutions is defined not in terms of 
sustainable business but on who earns the highest financial ratio. “Microfinance banks 
should be less aggressive in their pursuit for profit. The promoters of microfinance banks 
are more of capitalists than socialists. The board and management struggle to post high 
profit to satisfy their shareholders” (Okafor, 2014, p. 157).  
The microfinance literature keeps suggesting that for-profit MFIs mainly 
concentrate on the achievement of clearly stated financial goals (Mersland and Strom, 
2009) and on efficiency as the measures of organizational success (Hermes, et al., 2011). 
Thus accentuating the profit maximization race. Kablan’s 2012 study noted that 
increasing competition among MFIs leads to higher interest rates between MFIs, and the 
ultimate victim is their social performance. The competition is also driven by the 
unreasonable quest by microfinance institutions seeking to appear like conventional 
banks. If microfinance institutions should compete, “they should do so as by reducing 
their expenditure such as those on their intimidating office furnishing” (Okafor, 2014, p. 
157). 
In addition, the concept of sustainability has been narrowly defined in the 
literature (Conning, 1999; Cull et al., 2007; Hermes et al., 2011) to apply only to 
microfinance institutions. Sustainability refers not only to the providers of resources but 
also to the users (CBN, 2005, 2008, 2011). Nigeria’s Central Bank believes the 
interpretation of sustainability should apply both to the microfinance institution as well to 
the microfinance clients. Sustainable microfinancing is “an approach that recognizes the 
role of banks in driving long-term economic development that is not only economically 
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viable, but also environmentally responsible and socially relevant” (CBN, MFB 2020 
Regulation, p. 53). Thus, Pinz and Helmig (2015) suggest the introduction of value shop 
logic to microfinance performance evaluation. Value shop logic in business management 
is a customer’s problem-solving principle that recognizes success only when customer 
problems are fixed (p. 500). In addition, the value shop logic identifies organizational 
reputation as a driver of value creation. A good reputation equates with organizational 
success. According to this logic, value creation corresponds to the provision of network 
services.  
Microfinance institutions can lower lending interest rates and still remain 
sustainable. This study suggests that reasonable profits are very possible and attainable 
through the use of technology, operational efficiency and integrated and innovative 
services delivery. Bolivia’s BancoSol in 1996, Indonesia’s The Unit Desa (or The Village 
Bank) and Bangladesh’s Grameen Bank are other good examples in this regard. Roy and 
Pati’s (2016) study of microfinance institutions in India indicated that operating and 
financial expenses along with portfolio quality are the main causal variables of 
sustainability when MFIs focus on interest income. Notwithstanding, Chikum MFB’s 
innovative and strategic product pricing is consistent with the bank’s long-term approach 
to balancing outreach with profitability. 
Institutional Competitive Advantage 
Chikum’s institutional identity provides it with a crucial 
competitive advantage. It is a shareholder for-profit 
microfinance bank embedded with a social mission agenda. 
Behind the concept of hybrid organizations found in the 
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literature is the notion of independence between commercial revenue and social value 
creation that address social value and commercial revenues with differentiated strategies 
(Battilana et al. 2012). Contrary to this categorization, Chikum epitomizes an integrated 
hybrid organization. The findings revealed that Chikum microfinance bank differ from 
the typical ownership structures in microfinance organizations found in the literature 
which includes, shareholders firms (SHFs), non-profit organizations (NPOs), and 
cooperatives (COOPs) (Mersland, 2009) with differentiated strategies. Chikum MFB is a 
“hybrid ideal” microfinance institution, an identification that also serves as a competitive 
advantage. “Hybrid ideal” is a term promoted by Jed Emerson for organizations where 
social value and commercial revenue are non-divisible; where everything it does 
produces both social and commercial revenue (www.blendedvalue.org). The shareholders 
comprise of individuals and group shareholders with integrated commercial and social 
goals. Unlike social innovator organizations that combines earned and donated revenue, 
that primarily pursues a social mission relying significantly on commercial revenue to 
sustain operations, managers do not face a choice between mission and profit, because 
both are articulated in the same strategy. It enables a virtues cycle of profit and 
reinvestment in the social mission that builds large-scale solutions to social problems 
(Battilana et al., 2012).  
The finding also indicated that Chikum maximizes the advantages of both 
nonprofit and for-profit orientations through integration, thus creating for itself a niche in 
the microfinance market. First, from the nonprofit perspective, Chikum MFB takes the 
advantage of its institutional association with the church. Starting with its choice of 
name, “CHIKUM-AGA” – God is carrying me along - Chikum for short, symbolized in 
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the logo of two hands holding three golden stars shooting up the sky is an expression of 
the all-embracing hand of God supporting and prospering the treasures of all 
stakeholders. This is pertinent given the socio-religious context in which the bank 
operates. It is a concept that resonates trust and hope not only to a society used to the 
provisioning of socio-economic services by religious entities but more so to one 
recovering from the erosion of confidence in the banking industry. Ikechukwu Acha’s 
study, “Microfinance Banking in Nigeria: Problems and Prospects” identified lack of 
confidence on the part of prospective clients – clients not trusting providers – as a major 
obstacle to the growth of microfinance banking in Nigeria (Acha, 2012). In addition to 
the failure of past microcredit government initiatives, the erosion of confidence on the 
new scheme due to the unscrupulous activities of fraudsters was so real that the CBN had 
to issue a public warning in April 2010 to the effect that:  
“there has been an upswing in the activities of unscrupulous people parading 
themselves as fund managers/finance companies to swindle members of the 
public of their hard-earned funds. Unfortunately, many people out of ignorance 
have fallen victim of the activities of those illegal institutions. Consequently, 
members of the public are hereby advised to ensure that they confirm the status of 
any company offering alluring incentives and interest rate on deposit/investment 
from the CBN or SEC before entrusting their money with them, anyone that 
patronizes the unlicensed institutions does so at his or her own risk” (Abraham & 
Balogun, 2012, p. 174).  
The warning was followed with the withdrawal in the same year (2010) of the licenses of 
224 microfinance banks announced on public radio following an audit of the banks by the 
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apex bank (Radio Nigeria, 22/09/2010). So, Chikum came into the market with a note of 
high trust and confidence from the people. The interview data described the impact of the 
religious association on the customers.  
You know out of the population in Owerri, if you divide them into … let me say 
into two more than half is Catholic so because of the trust they have in their 
church and when we tell them that the Archbishop is the chairman of the bank 
they have that trust. I think that fear is removed somehow that their money is not 
going to miss. I think they know how standard and how strong their Catholic 
church is, and sometimes they do see the advert, they do see Chikum there, and so 
many of them do come here to pay the school fees of their children. So, they have 
that trust that once it’s something owned by the church and Catholic for that 
matter it’s not going to run away with their money (RO-CS). 
 Also, the bank’s close association with the church gives it a “nonprofit perception”, with 
an assurance of continuity and sustainability. The bank is perceived as different by the 
people “… since it is affiliated with the church, it is a microfinance which will not give 
them the same headaches that they had in the past with failed banks…. that is the 
difference and the perception of the people is that this is a microfinance that has come to 
stay, will not fail or liquidate or make away with their funds” (CE-XM). Chikum enjoys 
all these advantages and proactively seeks to avoid activities that could depict it to the 
contrary. 
Second, as a for-profit MFI, the bank also enjoys the benefits of a shareholder 
financed organization. For-profit microfinance banks are advocated by most studies 
“because they are regulated by banking authorities, accept deposits from the public, 
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provide larger range of better-quality services, are independent from donors, attract 
private equity capital and benefit from superior corporate governance” (Mersland, 2009, 
p. 469-470). For instance it has been posited that for-profit microfinance institutions are 
more likely to cover costs associated with small loans thereby serve more poor people 
(Roberts, 2013), because MFIs that are better in managing financial sustainability 
perform better in poverty reduction than the MFIs which are not (Mosley & Hulme, 
1998). Though for-profit MFIs charge high interest rates and tend to shift to more 
profitable business segments leading to mission drift (Lebovics et al, 2016; Woller, 
2002), shareholders have what it takes to checkmate mission drift. Shareholders control 
the organization, decide on how to define success and are free to insist on their founding 
mission. Mersland (2009) indicated that “most investors including those seeking a double 
bottom line naturally seek opportunities with increased returns” (Mersland, 2009, p. 475). 
To mitigate such tendencies, Chikum MFB has structures that helps it retain the social 
mission while enjoying the other benefits of for-profit status. Chikum shareholders would 
tend to stay in business even if their financial return is far below regular market return. In 
all, the bank’s institutional identity enabled it to be perceived as credible, legitimate and 
sustainable giving it competitive advantage over its competitors.   
Limitations 
The main objective of this study was to understand how Chikum MFB Ltd – a 
bank that pursues economic goals as a means that enables it to pursue social goals – 
navigates the potential conflicts of integrated logic. The topic of this study set the initial 
boundaries of the inquiry. The choice of a case-study design and the selection of the case-
study institution defines the scope conditions of this study. The case-study design best 
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addressed the research question and the broader theoretical assumptions of the study. 
Also, the selection of the case study institution was purposeful, to focus on a 
microfinance bank with integrated identity. Thus, the study’s findings are not 
generalizable to other microfinance banks even within those integrating the dual logics. 
Generalizing data is not typically a goal of qualitative research (Merriam & Tisdell, 
2016) and was not a concern in this study. 
The study may have the potential influences of unconscious bias associated with 
the researcher’s prior knowledge of the case-study institution. It was essential to select a 
microfinance bank where the researcher had access to key information on the research 
question and purpose (Merriam, 2009). Similarly, some familiarity with the case study 
institution was crucial for both informed inquiry and for the analysis of the finding 
(Chowdhury, et al., 2020). However, by remaining faithful to data and using rigorous and 
reliable design I tried to minimize potential bias.  
Another limitation of this study is the adoption of the interpretive study approach. 
The interpretive approach privileges understanding complex relationships and meaning 
making. It is a flexible approach that enabled capturing meaning and understanding 
perspectives relative to context (Harrison, Birks, Franklin & Mills, 2017). In the process 
of the research, the choice of questions, the conduct of the interviews, and the 
interpretation of the data were all shaped by the subjectivity of the researcher. While 
concerted efforts were made to remain objective and faithful to the data, the 
interpretations will remain susceptible to the limitations of the researcher. In all, despite 
these limitations, the findings are transferable to other microfinance institutions desirous 
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of achieving the microfinance objective and can also contribute to further research on 
microfinance institutions integrating the dual logics. 
Significance of Findings to Literature 
Though organizational research has begun to address how organizations adapt to 
complex environmental requirements with competing institutional expectations 
(Almandoz, 2012; Battilana & Dordo, 2010; Fitzgerald & Shepherd, 2106), rarely have 
scholars explored under what conditions microfinance institutions more easily integrate 
competing logics and under what conditions mixing those logics has favorable or 
unfavorable consequences. That is what this study has started to address. The in-depth 
exploration of how Chikum MFB Ltd navigates the potentially competing objectives of 
the microfinance practice opens the door to research that can explain how integrated 
microfinance banks might prevent mission drift. The findings consistent with the 
institutional logics’ assumption, indicates that determination and commitment to logics in 
action by an organization’s founders can deter mission drift and secure sustainable 
outreach to the active poor. It opens a promising area of research on the subject of how 
logics affect microfinance performance more broadly.  
Equally, the microfinance literature has largely neglected innovative ways 
microfinance operators could simultaneously balance profit and mission (Pinz and 
Helmiz, 2015). Previous studies mostly investigated microfinance institutions either as 
nonprofit or for-profit microfinance institutions (Im & Sun, 2016; Rhyne, 1998). Creative 
ways of addressing conflicting issues are overlooked or discredited. Thus, the 
microfinance literature lacks firm support for the double bottom line concept – MFIs 
desirous of balancing outreach and financial goals (Roy & Pati, 2019). This study 
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responded to this need and contributes to the literature through providing one example of 
how a for-profit microfinance bank (MFB) addressed the double bottom line challenge. 
The findings revealed that Chikum MFB combined a number of products with innovative 
strategies including technology, deposit mobilization, product pricing, and hiring from 
outposts’ catchment areas amongst other measures to attain organizational goal. This 
finding further indicates that the microfinance double bottom line objective is possible 
and also challenges the existing exclusive view that MFIs need higher interest rates to be 
financially sustainable. 
Consideration of both financial and social performance must not be considered as 
mutually exclusive or incompatible (Rhyne, 1998; Roy & Pati, 2019, p. 119). Evidence 
from related disciplines including social enterprises and impact investing suggest that 
organizational behavior (Battilana & Lee, 2014), institutional logics (Fitzgerald & 
Shepherd, 2018) and governance theories (Davis et al., 1997) provide insights on how 
organizations can employ multiple logics to achieve diverse organizational goals. 
Nigeria’s microfinance scheme, the context of this case study where microfinance banks 
are regulated for-profit deposit taking institutions enables the promotion of “hybrid ideal” 
MFIs by individuals and institutions who do not want to face the choice between mission 
and profit. This is also consistent with studies that indicated there is no absolute 
distinction between social and economic roles of organizations and that all organizations, 
to some extent, demonstrate both commercial and social trait on a continuum, rather than 
a duality (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Dees & Elias, 1998; Fitzgerald & Shepherd, 2017, 
p.476). These findings require testing and further exploration to further understanding of 
how microfinance institutions could achieve the double bottom line. 
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Significance of Finding to Practice 
The contribution of this study is not its ability to demonstrate that the double 
bottom line objective is attainable which indeed it has, but more so in revealing how and 
what Chikum MFB does to make it possible. The founders of Chikum MFB showed that 
financial sustainability is possible through providing products and services tailored to the 
needs of the active poor. Adopting the broad concept of microfinance enabled the 
operators integrate financial with nonfinancial services, addressed the varied needs of 
their clients resulting in both social and financial goals.   
It is also significant to reveal that financial sustainability cannot be reduced to 
higher interest rates from loans. Loan interest rate is a component and not the only driver 
of financial sustainability. Operational efficiency, concession interest rate, and mobilized 
deposits are other sources of financial revenue. The major challenge microfinance 
institutions may be facing is not interest rates per se, but that of competition that 
engenders the charging of exorbitant interest rates and fees to satisfy the greed of 
profiteers in the industry. Profiteering reduces the notion of sustainability to high interest 
rates and profit maximization, and all that is done “to show good financial results” 
(Bassem 2012, p. 93).  
Also, the bank recognized that the path to financial sustainability is not 
synonymous with profit maximization. “Paying too much attention to profitability is 
likely to move away the institution from their primary objective of delivering financial 
services to the poor by a too strict selection of clients” (Bassem, 2012, P.93). It suggests 
shareholders can control the tendency towards profit maximization by not competing to 
be like conventional banks and by controlling investor appetite for return on investments.  
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Furthermore, it suggested that commitment to the organizational logics enables 
operators to source and channel resources necessary to meeting organizational goals. The 
promoters of the bank committed themselves to the founding mission of the bank. 
Chikum MFB combined two traditionally separate models: a social welfare model that 
served as the guiding principle and a commercial model that acted as the operational tool 
to achieve both objectives. (cf. Battilana, Lee, Walker and Dorsey, 2012). It executed a 
strategy where one compliments the other. Its integrated model produces both social and 
commercial revenue through a single unified strategy. The dual logics of social purpose 
and commercial pursuit that microfinance institutions are asked to embrace can be 
balanced based on the institution’s goal. This study showed that the dual bottom-line goal 
is possible through the use of innovative ways to mobilize and exploit resources (Mair & 
Marti, 2006). The findings may help challenge microfinance institutions to redirect itself 
to the objective of the microfinance practice and invest in areas and methods more 
relevant to its mission and purpose. 
Concluding Thoughts 
 “Without firm commercial foundations, microfinance cannot become the 
profitable business that it needs to be in order to survive. But without firm ethical 
principles and a commitment to benefit poor people’s lives first and foremost, it will no 
longer be microfinance” (Roy, 2010, p. 85). This statement credited to Elizabeth 
Littlefield, the former CEO of Consultative Group to Assisting the Poor (CGAP) 
summarized the significance of this study. The essence of the microfinance strategy is to 
provide microfinance services, provision of micro loans, micro savings, micro insurance, 
transfer services and other financial and nonfinancial services targeted at the active poor 
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(Kurfi, 2008;  Van Rooyen et al. 2012;), “to drive out poverty and bring sustainable 
socio-economic development” (Roy & Pati, 2018, p. 118). The underlying logic is that by 
providing these services, the poor will manage their money differently, investing, 
acquiring productive assets, increasing their skills, and opening new businesses etc. (Van 
Rooyen et al., 2012, p. 2249). The question that should concern everyone is whether the 
various approaches to making the microfinance practice sustainable do indeed promote 
the objective of the practice; whether the current emphasis on financial ratios where 
“financial performance becomes the watchword in the governance of microfinance 
institutions; everything is done to show good financial results” (Bassem 2012, p. 93) do 
actually serve the objective of the practice. Can the microfinance strategy still be 
microfinance with compromised social objective? 
This study responded to the need to examine the influence of integrated 
frameworks and context, the conditions under which the double bottom line goal can be 
achieved and the relationships between a microfinance institution and her stakeholders 
combining competing goals (Jayashankar et al., 2018; Zuru et al., 2016). In particular, the 
study investigated how Chikum MFB Ltd – a faith-backed for-profit microfinance bank – 
navigates the potentially competing objectives of social and financial goals. Our findings 
revealed that the bank from inception was committed to using commercial strategy as a 
tool to achieving mission goal. Commercial strategy interpreted to mean profitable 
operation as against profit maximization. Such a strategy enabled the development and 
application of policies that simultaneously integrated social and financial goals. In 
particular, shareholders’ avowed commitment to founding mission, human asset 
development, integrated products and services offerings, innovative products pricing, and 
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institutional competitive advantage separately and collectively were deployed as goal 
attainment strategies to achieve organizational goal. The findings also suggested that 
espoused values even with the avowed commitment of the board may be insufficient to 
prevent the emergence of intractable identity conflicts among agents who could not align 
themselves with the bank’s mission or be incentivized to join.  
This study compliments prior works focused on understanding the effectiveness 
of different types of microfinance institutions operating in different contexts (Casselman 
et al., 2015). The research is original in so far as it does not simply seek to explain the 
challenges of the double-bottom line objectives of the microfinance practice in Chikum 
MFB. By adopting a case study approach, the study provided in-depth clues to why and 
how sustainable outreach could be achieved. It revealed how Chikum MFB, a faith 
backed for-profit microfinance bank in the context of Nigeria’s streamlined microfinance 
banking scheme promoted sustainable microfinance practice. The interpretation of these 
findings associates the study to the assertion of Battilana et al., (2012) “today it is clear 
that the independence of social value and commercial revenue creation is a myth. In 
reality, the vectors of social value and commercial revenue creation can reinforce and 
undermine each other” (p. 52).  
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Appendix	4.		
Definitions	and	Labels	of	Themes	
Theme	1.	“Shareholders’	avowed	commitment	to	founding	mission”	relates	to	the	
shareholders’	commitment	to	mission	goal	primarily	through	the	control	of	their	appetite	
for	investment	returns,	investing	for	long-term	gain	and	focusing	on	profitable	returns	
and	not	profit	maximization.	Commitment	to	founding	mission	meant	that	the	
overarching	principle	behind	all	aspects	of	the	bank’s	activities	is	focused	on	its	overall	
ability	to	first	make	financial	services	available	to	the	active	poor.	The	interviewees	
identify	outreach	to	the	poor	though	capital	intensive	in	the	short	term,	is	both	financially	
profitable	and	empowering	of	the	poor	on	the	long	term.		
	
Theme	2.	“Human	Asset	Development”	outlines	the	ways	the	bank	recruits,	trains	and	
inculcates	 organizational	 culture	 to	 its	 employees	 to	 meet	 organizational	 goals.	 The	
interviewees	perceive	the	bank	as	intentional	with	who	joins	the	organization.	Employees	
comprise	 of	 those	 with	 conventional	 banking	 background,	 microfinance	 banking	
background,	 fresh	 graduates	 from	 the	university	 and	 those	 from	other	 fields	 of	 human	
endeavor.	The	idea	is	that	commercial	microfinance	banking	is	new	and	evolving,	without	
any	institutional	script	for	how	to	provide	commercial	services	to	the	poor.	For	the	same	
reason,	job	candidates	with	extensive	experience	or	training	in	commercial	microfinance	
typically	do	not	exist.	The	right	approach	to	good-fit	employees	 is	 through	training	and	
orientation	aimed	at	socializing	recruits	to	think	Chikum	and	her	unique	mission	to	the	
active	poor.		
	
Theme	3.	“Pro-active	poor	products	and	services	delivery”	refers	to	a	dedicated	
mission	to	providing	varieties	of	products	and	services	including	savings	options,	
customized	collateral	substitutes	for	credit	facilities,	location	of	outposts,	and	other	non-
financial	service	offerings	tailored	to	meet	client	needs.	The	interviewees	speak	of	the	
bank’s	commitment	to	systems	designed	to	developing	long	term	customer	retention	to	
increase	profit	margin		
	
Theme 4. “Innovative/Strategic products pricing” focuses on financial and marketing 
strategies “to reaching the poor without burning our fingers.” It consists of aggressive deposit 
mobilization, interest rates concession, use of volume to compensate for lower interest rates, 
and focus on long term gains as tools of innovative/strategic products pricing. Operational 
efficiency through hiring from outpost communities, involvement of host communities and 
quality asset management (investment in treasury bill) increase profit margin and aid in lower 
interest rates.	
	
	Theme	5.	“Institutional	competitive	advantage”	relates	to	the	bank’s	institutional	
integrity	and	goodwill,	credibility	and	legitimacy	clout,	and	state	level	status.	The	
interviewees	make	reference	to	the	reputation	of	the	directors,	association	with	the	local	
church	body	and	sizeable	market	share.	The	bank	understands	it	has	something	the	
competitors	don’t	have	and	are	not	in	the	position	to	acquire.		
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Exhibit 1: List 
of Informants
Appendix 4. 1: List of Interviewees
Identifier Title
Duration of interview  
in minutes Gender
DA-ED Executive Director 50 Male
CA-BM Branch Head 53 Female
CA-CS Credit & Marketing 42 Female
JC-BM Credit & Marketing 42 Male
CE-XM Ex-Managing Director 44 Female
EE-AM Admin Manager 49 Male
OI-ED Executive Director 65 Female
OI-CS Credit & Marketing 52 Female
CI-CS Credit & Marketing 30 Female
VI-IM Head, ICT 50 Female
JN-ED Executive Director 70 Male
JO-ED Executive Director 58 Female
AO-BC Executive Director 52 Male
VO-CO Cash Officer 30 Female
OO-MD Acting Managing Director 57 Female
BO-AM Head, Internal Audit 52 Male
JO-RM Risk Manager 47 Male
RO-CS Credit & Marketing 47 Female
BO-ED Executive Director 47 Male
LO-CS Company Secretary 66 Female
KO-BM Branch Head 55 Male
RO-XD Ex-Executive Director 60 Female
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Appen
dix4.2: 
List of 
Review
ed 
Docum
ents
Appendix 4.2: List of Reviewed Documents
1 Feasibility Report on Chikum MFB LTD (Proposed) 
2 Chikum Microfinance Bank: 2017 Annual Report And Financial Statements
3 Chikum Microfinance Bank Ltd: 20016 Annual Report And Financial Statements
4 Chikum Microfinance Bank Ltd: 2015 Annual Report  And Financial Statements
5 Chikum Microfinance Bank Ltd: 2014 Annual Report And Financial Statements
6 Chikum Microfinance Bank Ltd: 2013 Annual Report And Financial Statements
7 Chikum Microfinance Bank Ltd: 2012 Annual Report And Financial Statements
8 The Board Manual (October 2013)
9 Human Resources Policy Manual (March 2010)
10 Manual of Operation (2010)
11
Chikum Product Papers (Internal Memorandum):
a) Special Product & Incentive for CWO Members, 2017)
b) Target Savings – Child’s Education Special Project 
c) Chikum Cash Collaterized Product Program (CCPP) 2017
d) Modification of some current loan Requirements, 2017
e) Chikum Civil Servants Salad  
12 Minutes of Board Meetings (2018 – 2019)
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APPENDIX 4.4: Interview Guide 
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Year 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013
EBIT 107,766,767 68,736,988 93,366,400 61,757,326 62,324,001
Total Assets 823,565,246 817,093,804 846,787,216 855,468,336 859,826,161
ROA 0.130853952 0.084123742 0.110259577 0.072191247 0.07248442
ROA = Earnings before interest and taxes divided by Total Asset
 
Net Income 18,489,785 6,826,770 14,028,868 33,474,105 31,294,304
Shareholder Equity 177,086,240 203,388,655 196,561,885 190,562,129 168,060,161
ROE 0.10441119 0.033565146 0.071371253 0.175659798 0.186208937
ROE = Net Income divided by shareholder Equity
Interest Income 134,787,733 92,916,082 120,991,977 110,252,321 107,245,048
Fee Income 1,949,578 6,379,795 7,095,784 7,639,749 9,462,934
Commission Income 7,462,184 7,452,757 7,222,076 10,337,349 9,321,422
Other Income 1,562,998 4,146,730 6,134,517
Total Op. Income 145,762,493 110,895,364 110,895,364 110,895,364 110,895,364
Interest Expenses 23,721,718 25,336,725 33,229,930 31,924,000 21,712,398
Fees Expenses (included in General Overhead expenses)
Financial Expenses 23,721,718 25,336,725 33,229,930 31,924,000 21,712,398
Loan Loss (impairment expenses) 3,299,248 1,157,631 5,511,463 11,952,158 6,241,622
Depreciation 6,539,648 6,168,882 4,193,775 2,040,345 2,344,391
Administrative Expenses (General Overhead Expenses) 87,337,555 67,596,728 75,502,231 53,099,332 62,023,330
Operating Expenses 93,877,203 73,765,610 79,696,006 55,139,677 64,367,721
OSS ratio 1.205663363 1.106078213 0.936320495 1.119976052 1.20118363
OSS ratio = (Total operating income) / (Total operating 
cost + loan loss provision + Financial expenses)
Appendix 6.1 Performance Ratios
  
 
 
 
 
 
